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effect, and as such, vested in individuals the right to challenge national

measures which allegedly infringe upon these rights.8 6
In van
Binsbergen, the Court was asked to provide a preliminary ruling as to
whether Articles 49 and 50 had direct effect. 87 Van Binsbergen

challenged a Dutch law which prevented him from using the services
of a legal representative whose primary place of residence was not in
the Netherlands.8" The Court held Articles 49 and 50 had direct
effect, and that national law may not impede trans-border services

simply because the service provider resides in another member state,

and not locally.8 9 In its analysis, the Court looked to the parallel
conclusion in Reyners9° that the right of establishment has direct
effect.9
Through judgments in several cases,92 the Court has clearly
established that even non-discriminatory restrictive measures will only
be permitted under limited circumstances. In van Binsbergen,9' the
Court considered the effect of the restriction on the right to provide
services, and noted that all requirements that a person providing
service must be a national of the Member State in question, or which
mandated habitual residence in the Member State would "depriv[e]
Article 59 [now Article 49] of all useful effect." 94 The Court
recognized that such requirements may be compatible with Treaty law
when necessary for the "general good."95
86. Vertical direct effect permits a citizen of a Member State to challenge the
Member State's national regulations, laws or measures that infringe upon a freedom
granted by the Treaty or a directive with direct effect. Thus there is a private right of
action, not simply an obligation as between the members of the Community. See
Hartley, supra note 41, at 206-15 (explaining direct and indirect effect); Bermann et
al. supra note 36, at 252. Horizontal direct effect, on the other hand, creates rights of
action between private parties. Id. Thus, where there is horizontal effect, a person
has Treaty rights and obligations vis-A-vis other people, not just against the Member
State.
87. See Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
18 ("The
Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, $ 18, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1974),
Court is also asked whether the first paragraph of Article [49, previously Article 59]
and the third paragraph of Article [50, previously Article 60] of the EEC Treaty are
directly applicable and create individual rights which national courts must protect.").
88. See id. $ 4 (noting also that the legal representative was a Dutch national who
moved to Belgium during the proceedings).
89. See id. $$ 15-16 (deciding that in the absence of a requirement of special
qualifications or "professional regulation" a requirement that the provider of services
be a habitual resident of the locale is not acceptable).
90. Case 2/74, Reyners, 1974 E.C.R. 631, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305.
27,
91. See id. $ 32; see also Case 33/74, van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. 1299,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298, 27.
92. Case 33/74, van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298; Case
205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986 E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 69 (1986); Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
93. Case 33/74, van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298.
94. Id. 11.
95. Id. 12.
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The general good or public interest exception was carried forward

over a decade later in another significant Court decision in In re
Insurance Services.96

The Court held that restrictions upon the
freedom to provide services could only be accepted if "in the field of

activity concerned there are imperative reasons relating to the public
interest. 9 7 More recently, the public interest exception was critical to
the Court's reasoning in Gebhard,98 when the Court stated that any

acceptable restriction "must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner [and] must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest."99 These three cases illustrate the development of

the rule that non-discriminatory measures, like discriminatory ones,
will only rarely be tolerated.

4. Free Movement of Capital
Finally, with the amendments to the Treaty in Maastricht, effective

on November 1, 1994,' °° free movement of capital is now also
specifically and indisputably protected by Article 56.101 The original
EEC Treaty included a chapter devoted to capital movements, within
which Article 67 obligated Member States to "progressively abolish
between themselves all restrictions on the movement of capital."" °2
The Chapter allowed the Council to adopt directives to further this
goal," 3 and in the 1960s two such directives were adopted."°
However, Article 67 was limited by Article 73, which allowed the

Commission to authorize, and Member

States to implement,

96. Case 205/84, In re Insurance Services, 1986 E.C.R. 3755, [19871 2 C.M.L.R. 69.
In In re Insurance Services, the Court evaluated certain German restrictions placed
upon insurers established in another Member State. In order to provide insurance
services within a second state, German law required that the insurer have a
permanent establishment in the second state, as well as separate authorization from
the appropriate supervisory body of the second state. Id. 28.
97. Id. 29.
98. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995). Gebhard is important to
the analysis of the golden share cases not only for its adoption of the public interest
exception, but also for the formulation of the four-part test which the Court applies to
restrictive national measures. Gebhard is discussed in greater detail infra notes 13539 and accompanying text.
99. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 37.
100. Treaty on the European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1, 32 (as
amended by the Treaty of Nice).
101. EC Treaty art. 56. For the text of Article 56, see supra note 64.
102. Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1173 (quoting Article 67(1) (now deleted) of
the EEC Treaty).
103. EC Treaty article 69 (repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam) granted the
Council authorization to issue directives to implement Article 67. See id.
104. See id. at 1173-74 (discussing the initial success regarding free movement of
capital under Article 67, and the subsequent stagnation). The first directive adopted,
Directive 921/60, initially implemented Article 67. Its effect was later expanded by
Directive 63/21. Id. Both directives focused on liberalizing commercial capital flows.
Id. at 1174.
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restrictive measures designed to protect the functioning of the
Member States' capital markets. °5 Such an exception was susceptible
to broad application, which in fact occurred throughout the economic

turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s."°
Moreover, because of this
limitation, in Casati17 the Court declined to interpret Article 67 as one
having direct effect.
In contrast to the original treatment of capital in Article 67 of the
Treaty of Rome, the amended Treaty now states: "[A]ll restrictions
on the movement of capital between Member States... shall be
prohibited."'0 8 Despite the initial appearance of clarity and objectivity
of the exceptions to the freedom, which are detailed in Article 58,
subsequent judicial analysis has demonstrated that some ambiguity
remains as to the extent and nature of these exceptions, particularly
that relating to public security. 9 Notably, the Court has imported
105. See id. at 1173 (detailing the various articles within the chapter on capital
movements in the original EEC Treaty).
106. See id. at 1174 (discussing the frequency of Commission authorization for
restrictive schemes throughout the two decades).
107. Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings Against Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595,
1112, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1981), $ 11-12.
108. EC Treaty art. 56(1). The Treaty still permits a few restrictions, however,
which are expressly set out in Article 58(1). See EC Treaty art. 58. Article 58(1)(a)
provides an exemption for restrictions imposed to distinguish between taxpayers
based on residence. See EC Treaty art. 58(1)(a). Article 58(1)(b) exempts restrictions
imposed to "prevent infringements of national law" specifically, laws relating to
taxation and supervision of financial institutions, as well as those procedures requiring
declaration of capital movements, where the purpose is explicitly administrative or for
gathering statistical information. EC Treaty art. 58(1)(b). Article 58(1)(b) also
includes an exception for public security or public policy. Id. The exceptions detailed
in Article 58 are narrower than those found elsewhere in the Treaty, which
systematically also include public health (clearly of limited relevance to capital
movements). See Flynn, supra note 65, at 796. However, the chapter of the Treaty on
free movement of goods also contains a public morality exception, and the freedom of
establishment and the right to provide services each include an exception for the
exercise of official authority. See EC Treaty arts. 45, 55. Both exceptions could also
have been inserted in Article 58. It is not impossible to imagine a nation regulating
investment in sectors which may be closely connected with morality, such as lotteries
and gambling. Cf Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs & Excise v. Schindler, 1994
E.C.R. 1-1039,
60-61, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 4 (1994),
60-61 (determining that
legislation which allows small scale lotteries, but prohibits larger ones is an acceptable
restriction on the freedom to provide services, because "it is not possible to disregard
the moral, religious or cultural aspects of lotteries, like other types of gambling, in all
the Member States").
109. For example, the Court must still interpret which activities are meant to fall
into the public security realm. There is little doubt that activities surrounding
national security are exempted. See EC Treaty art. 296(1)(b). However, there are
other activities which are also vital to public security, and the Court has begun to
identify these through case law. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for
Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727, 34, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 34 (finding
that protecting petroleum supplies is vital to the public security); Case C-503/99,
Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 46, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), 46
(holding that protection of energy supplies is analogous to protecting petroleum
supplies).
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from the sector of services and establishment doctrines the notion of
"overriding national interests" as an acceptable reason to restrict
capital movements. 110 However, as illustrated by the golden share
cases, what constitutes an overriding national interest is not well
defined and is open to varying interpretations, thus introducing more
uncertainty and allowing the use of more subjective criteria in

evaluating the justification of a Member State restriction."'
Over time, the Court has developed an impressive body of case law
from which to draw upon when evaluating infringements of EU law
and Treaty obligations. 112 In 2002 alone the Court heard 513 cases.'13

Decisions pertaining to the fundamental freedoms account for a

substantial percentage of the ECJ's recent judgments.114 In 2002, the

Court handed down many decisions relating to the free movement of
capital, 1 5 as well as numerous decisions regarding infringements of

the right of establishment." 6 In order to better comprehend the
Court's reasoning in the golden share cases, a basic understanding of
judicial interpretation of the free movement of capital and the
freedom of establishment is necessary. This Comment now describes
that judicial interpretation.
B. The Coming of Age of Capitaland EstablishmentCase Law
The use of golden shares implicates two fundamental freedoms: the
free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment.
Therefore, principles from both bodies of law are relevant in
analyzing golden share restrictions.
1. Interpretation of Article 43: The Freedom of Establishment
Freedom of establishment, detailed in Article 43, "include[s] the
right to take up and pursue activities as self employed persons and to
110. See, e.g., Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, T 49,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), T[49. The notion of "overriding requirements of the
general interest" (also referred to as requirements of the national interest) was
brought to capital case law from the right of establishment, which had borrowed it
from free movement of goods. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the extension of "overriding national interests" from the case law of the
right to provide services into the related right to establishment. See also Bermann et
al., supra note 36, at 676 (noting that the concept of a national interest exception was
extended to the free movement of services in In re Insurance Services from free
movement of goods, specifically, from Cassis de Dijon).
111, For more detailed discussion of the Court's evaluation of potentially
restrictive measures, see infra Part II.
112. Though the ECJ does not have a doctrine of stare decisis, "the Court does
folow its previous decisions in almost all cases." Hartley, supra note 41, at 75.
113. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 42, at 158.
114. See id,at 161. In 2002, it was nineteen percent. Id.
115. There were twenty-four such judgments in 2002. See id.
116. Eleven judgments pertaining to the freedom of establishment were handed
down in 2002. See id.
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'
set up and manage undertakings" 117
as well as enabling nationals of
any Member State to establish "agencies, branches or subsidiaries"1"8
throughout the Community.
Freedom of establishment covers
investments as well," 9 and thus is closely related to the free movement
12
of capitalY.
Not surprisingly, an infringement of one is often linked
with an infringement of the other. 2 1 Since the Treaty of Maastricht,
the ECJ has applied the laws governing the two freedoms in

parallel.2

The provisions of Article 43 apply to investments which grant
control of a company, but do not apply to those which represent a
passive investment, such as one taken for portfolio diversification.
However, the actual line between a purely passive investment and an
investment with control rights is sometimes difficult to draw, and no
clear answer exists. 123 Advocate General 24 ("A.G.") Alber addressed
117. EC Treaty art. 43.
118. Id.
119. See generally Case C-251198, Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingen
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G.
Alber, T 33, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of A.G. Alber, 33 (discussing the
difficulty in drawing a line between an investment which is a capital flow, and an
investment which falls into the right of establishment).
120. See id.
13. The distinction between the two freedoms is difficult to draw
specifically because they are often intertwined. The acquisition of company shares
obviously requires a capital movement, but can easily also involve establishment,
particularly if the acquisition is great enough to give the purchaser some control rights
vis-A-vis the company. Kronenberger likens the purchase of company shares to the
purchase of real estate, which also, by its very nature, requires a movement of capital
in order to achieve an establishment (in that case, the real estate). Kronenberger,
supra note 13, at 127. Though Kronenberger notes that the wording of the Treaty
chapter on capital movements seems to imply that the two freedoms should not be
applied concurrently, he recognizes that this is by no means clear. Id. Notably, A.G.
Alber argues that the rules of both freedoms can, and in some instances, should, be
applied together. See id. at 129-30; see also supra Part I.B.3.
121. See, e.g., Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et
de l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955, $ 10, 15 (finding infringements of both freedom
of establishment and free movement of capital where a Luxemburg regulation
precluded interest rate subsidies for those who take a loan from an institution which
was not one approved in Luxemburg); see also Flynn, supra note 65, at 788;
Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 127.
122. See Case C-251/98, Baars, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 9 15,
[2000] 1 C.M.L.R. 49, Opinion of A.G. Alber,
15. See infra Part I.C.3. for a
discussion of how and why the Court usually opts to apply the law pertaining to either
the free movement of capital or the freedom of establishment, but not both, when
infringements of both are alleged.
123. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 65, at 788 ("When distinguishing between the
internal market freedoms, the line dividing establishment and capital is the hardest of
all to draw.").
124. The role of the Advocate General ("A.G.") is unparalleled in the U.S. system.
An A.G. is a legal professional having the same rank as an ECJ judge. See EC Treaty
art. 222. The A.G. derives his power directly from the Treaty: "It shall be the duty of
the Advocate-General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make,
in open court, reasoned submissions on cases brought before the Court of Justice, in
order to assist the Court in the performance of the task assigned to it." Id. Though
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this issue in Baars,125 which involved a Dutch decision to deny a tax

exemption to a Dutch national for his investment in an Irish

enterprise, of which he was the sole shareholder. 2 6 Though Dutch law

provided for just such an exemption, when Baars applied the
exemption to his taxes, it was denied. 27 The Dutch government
argued that the specific tax provision in question was intended to
prevent the double taxation of a sole shareholder who would have to

pay both the wealth tax and the company tax. 128 Baars challenged the
denial on two grounds: It infringed upon freedom of establishment
and also on the free movement of capital. 1 9 The Commission and the
Dutch government disagreed as to which rule was truly applicable, 3 '

which is not surprising, as the law implicated both freedoms.
Advocate General Alber ultimately determined that the line

between a capital movement and the right of establishment was "at
the point where a shareholder ceases to confine himself to the mere
provision of capital in support of a particular business activity carried
on by another person, and begins to become involved himself in
conducting the business."''
Of course, where the shareholder is
merely providing capital, his rights are still protected under Article
56.132 Because golden shares often limit the number of shares which
an individual can hold precisely because a large holding may permit-

and in practice often does permit-the investor to have some

influence, the right of establishment is certainly at issue.'33
For this reason, the development of EU law regarding the freedom
of establishment has implications for the golden share cases. The

the A.G. hears the case alongside the Court, he does not take part in its deliberations,
and his opinion is separate from that of the Court. See Hartley, supra note 41, at 5456. The A.G.'s opinion is rendered before the Court issues its decision, and the Court
takes it into consideration in its deliberations. Id. The Court is not obligated to follow
the A.G.'s opinion, but the A.G.'s opinion carries much weight, and even where not
adopted by the Court in the specific case, these opinions are influential in the
development of future Community law. See id.; Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 6162 (discussing the Advocate General's role and qualifications).
125. Case C-251/98, Baars, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, [2002] 1
C.M.L.R. 49, Opinion of A.G. Alber.
126. Id. I 1-3.
127. Id. I 5-6.
128. Id. 7.
129. Id. 1 10.
130. Id. 11.
131. See id. 133.
132. See EC Treaty art. 56 (prohibiting any restriction on capital movements).
133. See Case C-251/98, Baars, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 50,
[2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 50:
[I]f the holding in a company reaches a size which enables the investor to
exercise a decisive influence over the undertaking's decision-making, the
right of establishment will supplement free movement of capital. Such an
investment would then additionally fulfill the criteria set out in Article 52(2),
and would be protected by the EC Treaty under two separate heads.
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Court's approach to establishment cases imports much from
recognized principles involving the free movement of services.134
Specifically, the notion that only those regulations necessitated by
national interests can justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom
3
was carried over from precedent regarding freedom of services. 1
Thus, the Court imported the test it applied to freedom of
36 from previous case law on free movement
establishment in Gebhard1
137
of services.
Gebhard discussed the right of establishment as relating to selfemployed persons, specifically a lawyer attempting to establish
himself in another Member State. 38 In evaluating an Italian law
which restricted Gebhard's ability to open a legal practice in Milan,
the Court held:
[N]ational measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must
fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of
the objective which they pursue;13 9and they must not go beyond what
is necessary in order to attain it.

134. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
the general good exception in the free movement of goods sector, and its subsequent
application in freedom of services and establishment cases).
135. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 669 (explaining "this doctrine is not only
crucial in the area of free movement of services, but has now been carried over to the
right of establishment"). Compare Case C-58/98, Proceedings Against Corsten, 2000
E.C.R. 1-7919, 1 35 (holding that, in the context of movement of services and the right
of establishment, where the host state's interest is not protected by the rules
governing the service provider in his home state, any regulation in the host state
which restricts the freedom must be "based only on rules justified by overriding
requirements relating to the public interest"), with Case C-279/80, Criminal
Proceedings Against Webb, 1981 E.C.R. 3305, 1 17, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1981),
17 (finding that the freedom to provide services, as a fundamental freedom, can only
be obstructed by rules "justified by the general good").
136. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
137. See Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986
E.C.R. 3755, 1 33, [19871 2 C.M.L.R. 69 (1986), 9 33.
[T]here are imperative reasons relating to the public interest which may
justify restrictions on the freedom to provide services, provided, however,
that the rules of the State of establishment are not adequate in order to
achieve the necessary level of protection and that the requirements of the
State in which the service is provided do not exceed what is necessary in that
respect.
Id. There are similarities between In re Insurance Services and Corsten. See supra
note 135. In re InsuranceServices borrowed from Cassis de Dijon, wherein the Court
noted the "imperative requirements" exception. See supra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text.
138. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 9 2, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 1 2.
139. Id. 9139.
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The Court has applied this four-prong4 test in many cases involving a
restriction of a fundamental freedom.
The Court applies the wording of Article 43 literally, and will not

permit restrictions which violate the letter of its text. Centros Ltd. v.
Erhvervs-Og Selskabsstyrelsen, 4 involved Denmark's refusal of

Centros's application to register a branch in Denmark because
Centros, though incorporated in the U.K., did not actually conduct

business in the U.K. The sole purpose for Centros's incorporation in
the U.K. was to evade the Danish paid-in capital requirements. 142 For
this reason, Denmark believed that refusing to allow registration did
not violate the right of establishment. 143 In finding that the refusal

140. Though not always explicitly identified as such, the Court often considers
these four conditions in evaluating a restriction of a fundamental freedom. See, e.g.,
id. 37 (freedom of establishment); see also Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. ErhvervsOg Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 34, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999), 34.
(freedom of establishment); Case C-153/02, Neri v, Eur. Sch. of Econ., 2003 E.C.R.
_,
I 45-46, available at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (free
movement of persons); Case C-215/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Schnitzer, 2003
E.C.R. _,
117, 2003 WL 100051 (E.C.J. Dec. 11, 2003) (free movement of services);
Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
49, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48 (2002),
49 (free movement of capital). Advocates General have also widely
adopted the four-part test. See Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de
Nederlandse Orde van Avocaten, 2002 E.C.R. _, Opinion of A.G. Leger, 91249,
[2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Leger, 91249 (freedom of
establishment); Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahnirztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein,
2000 E.C.R. 1-5123, Opinion of A.G. Mischo,
103, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 11 (2000),
Opinion of A.G. Mischo, 103 (freedom of establishment); Case C-120/95, Decker v.
Caisse de Maladie des Employ6s Privds, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1831, Opinion of A.G.
Tesauro, 9145, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 879 (1998), Opinion of A.G. Tesauro, 45 (free
movement of goods and free movement of services).
141. Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551.
142. Id. 9I 13, 23. Danish law required a certain minimum amount of capital be
paid into a company as a pre-requisite to incorporation (presumably intended as a
protective measure for investors), whereas the U.K. does not have the same mandate
for limited liability companies. Therefore, incorporating in the U.K. saved the
shareholder 200,000 Danish kroner. See id. 917.
143. Denmark argued that Centros's actions fell within the "van Binsbergen
exception." The so-called van Binsbergen exception provides that a Member State
may
take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing services whose
activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom
guaranteed by Article 59 for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules
of conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established within
that State.
Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 9113, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1974), 9113; see Case
C-148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media,
1993 E.C.R. 1-487, IT 12-14 (finding acceptable, based on the van Binsbergen
exception, a Dutch law which prohibited domestically established broadcasting
organizations from participating in the establishment of broadcasting organizations in
other Member States which would direct broadcasts into the Netherlands, where the
establishment of the second broadcast organization is done to evade Dutch
regulations regarding the non-commercial character of programs, and types of
broadcast content). Finding that the Danish law failed to satisfy the four conditions
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violated Centros's right of establishment, the Court noted that "[t]he

right to form a company in accordance with the law of a Member
State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in the
exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment
guaranteed by the Treaty.

' 144

If the company was not violating the

law of the nation in which it was established, its intent to evade certain
obligations of the company law of another Member State was
unimportant
and the literal application of Article 43 demanded this
1 45
result.

2. Article 56-The Free Movement of Capital
Before 1994, Member States were under no absolute obligation to

'"open up their frontiers to capital from other Member States."' 146
Prior to the amendments adopted in Amsterdam, the ECJ considered
that EC Article 67 did not itself accomplish the free movement of
capital, but rather required legislative implementation. 47
Thus
Article 67 urged liberalization of capital movements, but did not have

direct effect; rather it required legislation to impose measures

loosening such restrictions.1 48 Two directives issued in the early 1960s
required for a restriction of a fundamental freedom, the Court determined that the
refusal to register the branch infringed upon the right of establishment. Case C212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459,
30, 39, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 1 30, 39.
144. Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 27, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 27.
145. See id. 26.
The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment are intended
specifically to enable companies formed in accordance with the law of a
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the Community to pursue activities in
other Member States through an agency, branch or subsidiary.
Id. $ 26.
146. Case C-54/99, Association lglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, Opinion of A.G. Saggio, 2; see also supra Part I.B.
147. See Hartley, supra note 41, at 199-200 (noting that, at least as originally
understood, the Treaty authors did not intend directives to have direct effect, but
rather required national legislation be enacted for their implementation). For a
discussion of the Court's role in the expansion of direct effect, see id. at 199-204.
148. See generally Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377, %%
27-33, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984),
27-33 (recognizing
that Article 67 does not require full liberalization of capital flows and that Member
States may still impose restrictions on capital movements); Case 203/80, Criminal
Proceedings Against Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, 10, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1981),
10 (noting that unlike the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods, persons
and services, capital movements, under Article 67 need only be liberalized to the
extent necessitated by the functioning of the common market). The Court addressed
the issue of whether or not Article 67 had direct effect in Casati. In Casati, an Italian
national who resided in Germany was prevented from exporting a large sum of Italian
currency pursuant to Italian law which capped the export of national currency (at that
time, Lira) at 500,000. Id. 4. In March of 1981, the equivalent of ITL 500,000 was
approximately $500. See Currencies,Money and Gold, Fin. Times, Mar. 2, 1981, at 18
(showing the range at which the Italian Lira traded against the U.S. dollar on March
2). Casati argued that Article 67 had direct effect, and therefore he challenged the

2240

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

implemented Article 67.149 Together, they liberalized the most
common forms of both commercial and private capital movements.150
Prior to the Treaty of Maastricht and the launch of the "internal
market project," there was little case law regarding the free movement
of capital as an independent right.15 ' That is not to say that Article 67
imposed no duty on Member States to liberalize capital
movements' 5 2-particularly where capital movement was linked to the
exercise of the other fundamental freedoms, the Court did not permit
excessive restriction.'5 3
In 1985, the Commission released a White Paper on Completing the
Internal Market, which advocated even greater liberalization of
capital movements. 54 After the White Paper, efforts to achieve free
movement of capital were renewed.155 Thus, in 1988, the Council
Italian law as contrary to the Treaty. Case 203/80, Casati, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, $ 6,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 365, $ 6. The Court noted that capital movements are also "closely
connected with the economic and monetary policy of the Member States" and
therefore "it cannot be denied that complete freedom of movement of capital may
undermine the economic policy of one of the Member States or create an imbalance
in its balance of payments, thereby impairing the proper functioning of the Common
Market." Id. 9. Because Article 67(1) included the clause "to the extent necessary
to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Market," EC Treaty art. 67(1)
(repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam), the Court determined that free movement of
capital was conditional, and therefore, Article 67 required legislation for
implementation. See id. $$ 10-12.
149. Council Directive 60/921, 1960 O.J. (L 43) 921; Council Directive 63/21, 1963
O.J. (L 9) 62.
150. See Council Directive 60/921, annex I, 1960 O.J. (L 43) 921 (listing capital
movements covered by the first directive); Council Directive 63/21, annex I, 1963 O.J.
(L 9) 62 (amending the first directive and adding to the list of capital movements to
be liberalized). Most financial and banking transactions were not freed, however. See
Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1173-74 (discussing the first and second directives
and the initial success of the efforts to liberalize capital movements).
151. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 773.
152. See generally Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984) (finding that restricting the
exportation of currency cannot be permitted where the currency is a payment needed
to exercise another fundamental freedom).
153. In Luisi & Carbone the Court found that an Italian law which forbade Italians
from taking more than a small amount of Italian currency out of the country
impermissibly restricted Treaty-created freedoms. Id. $137. Luisi wanted to take
enough currency to pay for medical treatment in another Member State, and Carbone
wished to travel in other Member States with enough money to cover his traveling
and tourism expenses. See id. 1 3-4. The Court determined that currency being
taken out of the nation to pay for tourism and medical treatment did not fit the
definition of a capital movement, but was rather a current payment for services. Id.
$$ 22-24. Since free movement of services did have direct effect, the Court
determined that the removal of currency from a Member State for the purpose of
paying for services in another must be allowed without limitation. See, e.g., Bermann
et al., supra note 36, at 1175 (analyzing the Court's reasoning in Luisi & Carbone).
154. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM(85)310 final at 33-34 [hereinafter Completing the Internal
Market].
155. See generally Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1175-76 (discussing the 1985
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issued Directive 88/361/EEC to address the issue. 15 6 Prior to Directive

88/361/EEC, restricting capital flows was the norm for some
The purpose of the directive was to
Community members.157
accomplish the absolute liberalization of capital flows: "Member

States shall abolish restrictions on movements of capital taking place
between persons resident in Member States."' 58 The directive was
subject to certain exceptions which included allowing measures

required to protect bank liquidity and protective measures against

short term capital movements which would threaten the Member
State's foreign exchange balance.' 59 The Directive included an

illustrative list of what would constitute a capital movement; the list
included direct investments, 160 and the Directive achieved free

movement of capital upon the expiration of the stated implementation
period, 61 but it was not until the Treaty was amended in Amsterdam
that free movement of capital was elevated to a "constitutional" right
by adoption of Article 56. 162 Article 56 mandates that "all restrictions
on the movement of capital between Member States and between
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.', 163 The

Commission has continued to make free movement of capital a
priority in recent years1 64
Article 56 liberalizes both capital flows and payments, but for the
purposes of golden shares, only the movement of capital is relevant.
Capital movements are "those resources used for, or capable of,
investment intended to generate revenue.', 65 In the Commission's
view, direct investments-included in the definition of capital laid out
in Directive 88/361/EEC-are to be treated as a capital movement,
White Paper and the subsequent adoption of the 1988 Directive).
156. Council Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5.
157. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 1172-73 (noting that while some Member
States, such as the Netherlands and Germany permitted liberal movement of capital,
others, specifically France, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal, were much more
restrictive); see generally Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 123; see also Case C-251/98,
Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000
E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G. Alber, 23, [2000] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of
A.G. Alber, $ 23.
158. Council Directive 88/361, art. 1, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5, 6.
159. Id. at 6.
160. Id. at 11.
161. See, e.g., Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et
6 ("It should be noted in that regard that
de l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955,
restrictions on movements of capital were abolished by Council Directive 88/361/EEC
of 24 June 1988.").
162. See Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 123 (noting the elevation of free
movement of capital to "constitutional" status).
163. EC Treaty art. 56, 1; see also Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 124 (discussing
the effect of adopting Article 56).
164. See generally Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 124 ("From approximately ten
judgments between 1957 and 1993, the Court delivered 17 judgments directly
concerning capital movements between 1994 and 2002.").
165. Flynn, supra note 65, at 776.
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and thus protected by the Treaty.166 The Court has also adopted this
view, accepting the definition as appropriate.'67
The ECJ has defined the reach of this freedom broadly: In
Svensson & Gustavsson6 s the ECJ held that legislation which "[is] of a
nature to dissuade individuals"' 69 from the exercise of their Treaty
rights is restrictive. 7 ' A law which has the potential to restrict an
investment is therefore contrary to the obligations of Article 56.171 In
Trummer & Mayer the Court held that a law permitting only
mortgages backed in Austrian shillings to be recorded constituted a
restriction in the free movement of capital.'
Fearing that such a
requirement would inhibit the exercise of free movement of capital,
the Court declared it incompatible with Treaty law. 73 Thus, not only
would the Court disallow direct restrictions, but it would also strike
down measures which may indirectly restrict the free movement of
capital as well. 174
Not long after the amendments in Maastricht mandated the free
movement of capital, the Court held that free movement of capital
had direct effect. 7 5 In Sanz de Lera,'17 6 the Court reviewed a Spanish
law which required prior authorization for the exportation of currency
over a certain value.'7 7 First, the Court determined that requiring
166. See Communication, supra note 20, I 3, 8.
167. See, e.g., C-222/97, In re The Application to Register Land by Trummer &
Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
21, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999),
21 ("[Tjhe
nomenclature in respect of movements of capital annexed to Directive 88/361 still has
the same indicative value, for the purposes of defining the notion of capital
movements, as it did before the entry into force of [Article 56] et seq.").
168. Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et de
l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955.
169. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 779 (stating that the "starting-point for the
identification of a restriction is Svensson & Gustavsson).
170. See Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955, 10.
171. See Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 125.
172. Case C-222/97, Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
34, [2000] 3
C.M.L.R. 1143, 34.
173. The law did not per se forbid people from holding mortgages backed by other
currencies, id. 5, but did forbid the registration of such mortgages, and the Court
found that the inability of people to record those mortgages might deter them from
obtaining such mortgages, id. 34. The regulation might impair the free movement
of capital because "rules are liable to dissuade the parties concerned from
denominating a debt in the currency of another Member State, and may thus deprive
them of a right which constitutes a component element of the free movement of
capital and payments." Id. 26.
174. See id. 26.
175. See Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 & C-250/94, Criminal Proceedings
Against Sanz de Lera & Others, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4821,
43, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631
(1995), 1 43 (holding that Article 73 (now 56) confers rights on individuals upon
which they may rely).
176. Id.
177. Id. $ 5-6. Any individual taking more than PTA 1,000,000 out of the country
was required to obtain prior authorization for its removal. Id. 6. As of December
14, 1995, that equaled approximately $8,300. Currency and Money, Fin. Times, Dec.
14, 1995, at 34.
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consent from governmental authorities effectively gave those
authorities discretionary powers over whether to restrict the free
movement of capital." 8 Permitting the freedom to be dependent upon

the discretion of an administrative authority is "such as to render that

freedom illusory." '79 Despite the validity of the purpose of the
scheme-to prevent illegal activity such as money laundering-the
Court held that the means chosen were not proportionate.8 s Because
the Spanish government could have achieved its objective with less

restrictive means, by instead implementing a system of prior
declaration,' the Court held that the principle of proportionality was
not met.

2

Thus, the holding of Sanz de Lera was very important in

the golden share cases, for it illustrated that any acceptable restrictive
scheme must be the least restrictive means by which to achieve the
The Court applies this principle of
stated objective.'83
proportionality"8 whenever a fundamental freedom is restricted, from
the free movement of goods in Cassis de Dijon,"5 to the right to
Sanz de Lera
provide services in In re Insurance Services.'8 6
established the importance of the principle in the context of capital

movements.
Despite such broad interpretations, it is also clear that the

protection against restrictions is not absolute. Thus, even where there
is a valid justification under the EC Treaty, the Court will scrutinize a
national law which infringes upon a fundamental freedom. 7 Certain

principles must be met in order to permit a restriction. Using the four

178. Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 & C-250/94, Sanz de Lera, 1995 E.C.R. I4821, IT 24-25, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631, $$ 24-25.
179. Id. 25.
180. Id. $$ 26-28.
181. See id.
182. Id. $$ 22-23 (stating that since Spain's objective can justify a restriction in the
free movement of capital, it is necessary to determine if it is using the least restrictive
means possible to meet that goal). The principle of proportionality is one of several
foundational general principles of law that the ECJ has adopted which allow the
Court's review to have more bite. See generally Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 31,
171-79 (presenting the case law pertaining to the development of the principle of
proportionality); see also infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
183. See Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 & C-250/94, Sanz de Lera, 1995 E.C.R. I4821, $ 27-29, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995), 1 27-29.
184. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (defining proportionality).
185. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979).
186. Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986 E.C.R.
3755, 1 27, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69 (1986), 1 27.
187. See generally Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. I3099, $ 37-40, [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 963 (1999), $ 37-40 (examining an Austrian law
which had an acceptable objective-town and country planning-but nonetheless was
unacceptable); Case C-423/98, Alfredo Albore, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5965, $$ 18-19, [2002] 3
C.M.L.R. 10 (2000), 1 18-19 (considering an Italian law which might be justified
based on the public security exception, but which appeared to be unnecessarily
restrictive).
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step analysis developed in In re Insurance Services,188 carried over to

89 the Court first examines if
the right of establishment in Gebhard,'
the objective is acceptable. If it is, the means implemented must still
be limited in scope so as to not go beyond what is needed to achieve

them. 9 ° This is the principle of proportionality. 9 '

The Court has found that some restrictions might be within the

192
parameters permitted by the Treaty, though such instances are rare.
For example, the ECJ interpreted the scope of Article 58's public
security exception in Albore 9 3 An Italian law forbade the sale of land

to foreign nationals where the land was located in an area decreed by
the Minister of Defense to be one of military importance. 94 Despite
the Court's recognition of a public security exception under Article
58, it held that the infringing law must still meet the principle of

proportionality.

95

In order to satisfy the requirements for such an

exception, the threat posed by foreign ownership of the land in
question must be "real, specific and serious ' 196 as well as one which
could not "be countered by less restrictive procedures."1' 97 Not having

sufficient factual information regarding the specific nature of the
threat to the public security by foreign ownership of the coastal land,

the Court left it to the Italian court to determine whether such a
threat existed, and, if it did, whether198the measure was as minimally
restrictive as possible in addressing it.
In Konle v. Austria 99 the Court considered a law mandating prior
authorization for non-nationals wishing to purchase land in the Tyrol

(Alpine) region of the country, which was of environmental
concern."° The stated purpose of the law in question was for the
27, [1987] 2
188. Case 205/84, In re Insurance Services, 1986 E.C.R. 3755,
C.M.L.R. 69, T127.
189. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
190. See James Hanlon, European Community Law 67 (2d ed. 2000).
191. See generally id. Hanlon notes that the principle of proportionality, though
similar to the U.S. "reasonableness" test, is a more rigorous inquiry. Id. The principle
is embodied in Article 5 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty art. 5 ("Any action by the
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaty."). For a more comprehensive analysis of the principle of proportionality, as
well as examples of its application in various sectors of Community law, see Hanlon,
supra note 190, at 67-70.
192. The Treaty expressly permits some restrictions. See supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
193. Case C-423/98, Alfredo Albore, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5965, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 10
(2000).
194. Id. 5.

195. Id. 1[ 19, 24.
196. Id. T122.
197. Id.
198. Id. 9123.
199. Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3099, [2000] 2
C.M.L.R. 963 (1999).
200. Id.
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general national interest of urban planning.0 1 While the Court
accepted that such an environmental concern was valid, 2 it reiterated
the principle that "[a] procedure of prior authorisation... which
entails, by its very purpose, a restriction on the free movement of
capital, can be regarded as compatible with Article 73b [now 56] of
the Treaty only on certain conditions. ' 2 3 Austria had secured a
derogation to maintain discretionary rules regarding the acquisition of
secondary residences in its accession agreement. 2' The purpose of the
restriction, though not one explicitly condoned in Article 58, was
considered an imperative interest, and thus could, under the right
circumstances, justify some restriction.2 5
However, since the specific law that prohibited Konle's purchase
was not one which had existed at the date of accession, but rather was
a replacement (and significantly different)20 6 law for one which had
subsequently been declared unconstitutional, it was not covered by
the derogation.2 7 Because the system of review in place was not
proportionate to the purpose of the restriction, it conflicted with
Treaty obligations.2 8
In Eglise de Scientologie the Court evaluated a French law that
required prior authorization for any foreign investment which might
be connected to the exercise of public authority, or which might pose
a threat to public policy, health or security.2 9 The Court determined
that a system of prior authorization is per se restrictive,2 0 and, to be
acceptable, such a system must clearly delineate the criteria required
for authorization. 2 ' The French law in question was neither specific

201. See id. 37.
202. See generally id. 40.
[A] Member State can justify its requirement of prior authorisation by
relying on a town and country planning objective such as maintaining, ...a
permanent population and an economic activity independent of the tourist
sector in certain regions, the restrictive measure inherent in such a
requirement can be accepted only if [certain conditions are met].
Id.
203. See id. 39. Those conditions are that the measure be non-discriminatory,
necessary and proportionate. See id. I 40, 42.
204. See id. IT 14, 25. The derogation allowed Austria to continue to apply
restrictions which existed at the time of accession, even those which were applicable
only to foreigners. See id.
22-25.
205. See id. 40 (finding that certain goals of town and country planning can fall
within the general interest and thus justify restrictive measures, provided that the
measures are proportionate and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objective).
206. See id.
53-54.
207. Id. 54.
208. Id. 56.
209. Case C-54199, Association tglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335.
210. See id. 14.
211. See id. [21-22.
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nor clear enough to permit such broad restrictions.1 2 However, the
Court did state that there may be cases where a system of prior
declaration is not sufficient to safeguard the interests of public policy
or public security, and a system of prior authorization may be
acceptable.2 3 Thus, the Court left some hope for the defense of such
schemes in the future.
But tglise also shows that this is a high burden to meet. The law
must relate to a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat ' 21 4 and
indicate to investors the specific circumstances in which prior
authorization is needed. 215 Legal certainty is required so as to apprise
individuals as to the extent of any rights and duties that they have
under the Treaty.2t 6
3. Which Freedom to Use?
The Court often develops a test for one freedom, and extends its
application to another when an appropriate case is brought. 2 7 Thus,
some important doctrines apply to several, or all, fundamental
freedoms.2 8 In some cases more than one Treaty obligation is at
212. Id. The French law in question was very broad, and required a foreign
investor to get prior authorization from the Minister in charge of the Economy for
any investment in an endeavor which was involved, even occasionally, with the
exercise of official authority, or which might threaten public policy, security or health.
Id. 7. The Court noted that in order for an activity to qualify for inclusion in the
public policy, health or security exception there must be a "sufficiently serious threat
to a fundamental interest of society," and that such determination could not be made
unilaterally by a Member State. Id. 17.
213. See id. % 19.
214. Id. 9120.
215. Id. 9 21.
216. Id. 22. _1glise de Scientologie holds:
Article 73d(1)(b) of the EC Treaty must be interpreted as precluding a
system of prior authorisation for direct foreign investments which confines
itself to defining in general terms the affected investments as being
investments that are such as to represent a threat to public policy and public
security, with the result that the persons concerned are unable to ascertain
the specific circumstances in which prior authorisation is required.
Id. Legal certainty, like proportionality, is a general principle of Community law, and
is therefore always a consideration. See Hartley, supra note 41, at 142. It requires that
laws be predictable and certain, thus providing notice as to what satisfies the law. Id.
For further discussion on the principle of legal certainty, see id. at 142-47.
217. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 804-05. Flynn notes that in five years, the Court
has developed capital law as fully as the law pertaining to other freedoms, which took
thirty years to develop. Because the Court does take from one to apply to another,
this huge development with regard to capital movement will impact the Court's
analysis of violations of other freedoms. Id. The Court is able to, and will, "pick
elements from the case law on capital and to relay echoes from it in those fields." Id.
at 805; see also supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (noting the development of
the four-prong test in the services case law and its subsequent utilization in
establishment case law and discussing the extension of the concept of "overriding
national interests" from free movement of goods to services and establishment).
218. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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issue, and it is unclear which body of law the Court will apply. 219
Frequently there is overlap between free movement of capital and the
freedom of establishment.2 0 In such instances, the law relating to
either freedom may be applied.2 l Compounding the confusion is the
clause in Article 43 that states that the freedom of establishment ' 22is2
"subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
Likewise, Article 58 includes the reservation that the Chapter on
capital "shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions
on the right of establishment. 22 3 This may imply that protection is
only extended to one freedom where both are implicated, but as
Advocate General Alber noted in Baars:
[Tihe reservations do not signify that conduct can be protected only
under one of these fundamental freedoms. Were any reference to
capital movements ipso facto to preclude application of the chapter
on the freedom of establishment, that fundamental freedom would
lose any practical meaning, since establishment in another Member
State generally involves a transfer of capital.224
Certainly, the Court only addresses those questions that are
presented. However, as is evident from the golden share cases, the
Court is selective about which law it uses to ground its decision. In
Baars, Advocate General Alber suggested:
(1) where the free movement of capital is directly restricted such
that only an indirect obstacle to establishment is created, only the
rules on capital movements apply; (2) where the freedom of
establishment is directly restricted such that the ensuing obstacle to
establishment leads indirectly to a reduction of capital flows
between Member States, only the rules on the freedom of
establishment apply... ; (3) where there is direct intervention
affecting both the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment, both fundamental freedoms apply, and the national
measure must satisfy the requirements of both. 22
Theoretically this is a sound formula, but in practice the line may be
more difficult to draw. Accordingly, the Court has often avoided the
issue by making a decision on one of the freedoms, and not addressing
the other, even if it is raised.22 6
219. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 65, at 788-91.
220. See generally id.
221. See id.
222. EC Treaty art. 43.
223. EC Treaty art. 58.
224. Case
C-251/98,
Baars
v.
Inspecteur
der
Belastingen
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G.
Alber, 13, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of A.G. Alber, 13.
225. Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 129-30.
226. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 789. Flynn notes that the Court followed the same
pattern in X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, Case C-200/98, X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, 1999
E.C.R. 1-8261, where "it ruled that, in the absence of justification, such a difference of
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In the past, the Court pragmatically opted to decide only the
establishment issue, because "once an incompatibility appears to
arise, [regarding the right of establishment] there is no purpose in
examining the implications of the provisions on capital. ' 227 Now that
there is a wealth of capital case law,228 the Court has declined to
address9 the freedom of establishment issue in any of the golden share
22
cases.

It seems the Court bases its rulings on the law most amenable to the
precise issue at bar. The Court logically relied on its existing
precedent in deciding the golden share cases. 230 There were other
options, however: In the opinions presented by Advocate General
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in each of the golden share cases, he advocated
analysis under the right of establishment. 231 Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer

found that in the golden share cases the restriction of the free
movement of capital was incidental to the restriction on the freedom
of establishment. 23 2

This is similar to A.G. Alber's line-drawing

treatment is contrary to the rules on freedom of establishment and that it was not
necessary to examine whether the rules on free movement of capital preclude
legislation such as that in question in the main proceedings." Flynn, supra note 65, at
789 (paraphrasing X & Y, at $1 28, 30). But see Case C-484/93, Svensson &
Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et de l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955
(discussing both the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital
issues).
227. Flynn, supra note 65, at 804.
228. See id. passim for an excellent discussion of the development of case law
pertaining to the free movement of capital.
229. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 86, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 86; Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
1-4641, $ 52, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 19 (2003),
52; Case C-367/98, Commission v.
Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, $ 56, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), $ 56; Case C-483/99,
Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
56, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 56;
Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 59, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002), 9 59. While this frustrates the inquiry as to the actual format of analysis the
Court would apply, this Comment presumes that the conclusion would be the same in
these cases.
230. Since the adoption of Article 56, a number of cases in the capital sector have
been decided that provided a suitable framework for considering the acceptability of
restrictive golden shares. See Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de
Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335; Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik
Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3099, [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 963 (1999); Joined Cases C-163/94,
165/94, & 250/94, Criminal Proceedings Against Sanz de Lera & Others, 1995 E.C.R.
1-4821, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995).
231. Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
-, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 9 36; Joined
Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48
(2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48
(2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48
(2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, $121.
232. Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & Case
C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G.
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, $ 36.
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formula in Baars,233 where he concluded that the appropriate rules to
apply were those relating to establishment, because Baars' owned all
of the shares in a company.3 4 This indicates that some cases infringe
both freedoms, and the reason for the Court's application of one body
of law over another may be apparent only by considering the
development of relevant precedent.
C. The 1997 Communication
Since the mid-1990s, the Commission has made it clear that it will
not tolerate restrictions on the free movement of capital and freedom
of establishment.235
In fact, in 1997, the Commission issued a
Communication which unambiguously stated its position on Article
56, expressly "indicat[ing], to national authorities and economic
operators in Member States" how it interprets Articles 43 and 56.236
Because acquiring a controlling stake in a company is considered a
capital movement, 37 Article 56 must be considered with regard to
investment. Additionally, such acquisitions are "also covered under
23
the scope of the right of establishment,""
thus also requiring
compatibility with Article 43. Therefore, the Commission, at least,
recognizes that golden share devices, which directly or indirectly
regulate the acquisition of shares, implicate both Treaty rights.239
The National Treatment Principle prohibits discriminatory
treatment of the nationals of other Member States. 240 The principle
has always been a part of the Treaty; initially embodied in Article 7,
and now in Article 12: "Within the scope of application of this Treaty,
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. 24 ' Only
in very limited circumstances can any law which violates this principle
be acceptable.242 Because a discriminatory regulation unequivocally
233. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
234. Case
C-251/98,
Baars
v.
Inspecteur
der
Belastingen
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2787, Opinion of A.G.
Alber,
34, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 (2000), Opinion of A.G. Alber,
34 ("The
distinction in question presents no problems in the present case. It is clear that the
situation is one of establishment, since all the shares are owned by one person.").
235. See, e.g., Communication, supra note 20, at 1 1.
236. Id. 2.
237. Id. 3.
238. Id. 4.
239. See id. 1$ 6-9.
240. EC Treaty art. 12. Though not expressed in the treaty, Article 12 mandates
non-discrimination based on nationality, and thus requires that a citizen from another
Member State be treated equivalently to a citizen of the Member State in question.
The Court has interpreted this to be a "general doctrine of equality." Hartley, supra
note 41, at 130. The National Treatment terminology comes from GATT. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 3, 61 Stat. A-11, A-18, 55
U.N.T.S. 188,204-06.
241. EC Treaty art. 12.
242. See Communication, supra note 20, $ 5(i)-7. The Commission recognized

2250

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

conflicts, not only with provisions in the Treaty, but with the
underlying purpose of the EU,243 such measures presumptively

infringe upon Treaty obligations.2 4 Such measures can only co-exist
with Treaty obligations if they
are one of the few exceptions explicitly
245
granted by the Treaty itself.

Regulations that are non-discriminatory on their face are also
scrutinized carefully, though the criteria are slightly more ambiguous,

leaving more to the court's discretion. 246 Applying by analogy judicial

doctrines that were developed to limit Member State restrictions on
the free movement of services2 47 and the right of establishment, 24 the
Commission argued, and the Court has held, that such laws must meet

four conditions.2 49 First, they must not be applied discriminatorily.25 °

Second, the law must achieve "imperative requirements in the general
interest." 1 Third, the measure must be appropriate for attaining the
that discriminatory measures which were related to activities connected with "official
authority" might be accepted. Id.
5(i). Note, however, that the very narrow
applicability of the "official authority" exception ensures that such measures have
rarely been accepted. See, e.g., Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631,
54, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (1974), 54. Additionally, the Commission recognized that
when a regulation discriminated on the basis of nationality and was justifiable under
explicit Treaty exceptions-public security, health or policy-it might be acceptable,
though "these exceptions have to be understood in a narrow sense.., and exclude
any interpretation based on economic considerations." Communication, supra note
20, T 5(i).
243. See EC Treaty pmbl. (stating that the Community was created because the
Members were "[determined] to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe,... [recognising] that the removal of existing obstacles calls for
concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair
competition").
244. See Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 41, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 41.
245. See Communication, supra note 20, T1 5; see also supra notes 82-85 and
accompanying text (discussing the specific exceptions to the prohibition on restriction
of the freedom of establishment); supra note 108 and accompanying text (identifying
the Treaty exceptions permitting restrictions of the free movement of capital).
246. See generally Communication, supra note 20, 9 ("[T]hey are permitted in so
far as they are based on a set of objective and stable criteria which have been made
public and can be justified on imperative requirements in the general interest. In all
cases, the principle of proportionality has to be respected.").
247. See Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany (In re Insurance Services), 1986
E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69 (1986).
248. See Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano,
1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995).
249. Communication, supra note 20, 5(ii).
250. Id.
251. Id. The Commission draws upon the Court's analysis in previous case law
pertaining to the free movement of services and the right of establishment. Cf Case
C-55/94, Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603, 9 37 (reiterating
the four conditions necessary for a restriction on a fundamental freedom, the second
of which is that the measure "must be justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest"); Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging
voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 (1974), (finding
that the Dutch refusal to permit a Dutch legal representative, residing in Belgium, to
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objective.252 Finally, the regulation must not impose 2any
restriction
53
beyond that which is necessary to achieve the objective.
The Commission also recognized that Article 296(1)(b) generates a
clear and overriding exception. 254 Article 296 unequivocally permits
Member States to implement regulations needed "for the protection
of the essential interests of its security.., connected with the
255
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.,
However, the Commission expressed reliance on the continued
narrow interpretation of this caveat by the ECJ, and remained
confident that this exception would not become "a general
proviso
256
covering all measures taken for reasons of public security.
The Commission applied this interpretation to various mechanisms
currently in place in some Member States to determine compatibility
with EU law. 257 Essentially, the Commission declared that any
scheme requiring prior authorization for an investment, any retention
of state veto rights over important company decisions, or the right to
appoint directors to a company's board were inherently incompatible
with the obligations of Articles 56 and 43, and therefore could only be
acceptable in narrowly defined situations.
All of these
objectionable measures are common devices employed when Member
States use golden shares.259
The Commission's interpretation of the relevant Treaty Articles
provided the basis for initiating the six golden share cases.2 ° The
choice to privatize a previously state owned enterprise remains the
decision of the Member State.26 ' However, what the golden share

represent a client in an administrative proceeding was acceptable due to the specific
nature of the service provided).
252. Communication, supra note 20, 5(ii).
253. Id.
254. Id. I 5(i).
255. EC Treaty art. 296(1)(b).
256. Communication, supra note 20, 5(i).
257. Id. IT 7-8.
258. Id. 8.
259. See infra Part II (discussing the various golden share mechanisms which have
come before the ECJ).
260. See EC Treaty art. 226.
Article 226 provides the procedure for the
Commission to initiate proceedings against a Member State before the ECJ.
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its
observations.
...If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before
the Court of Justice.
Id.
261. Communication, supra note 20, n.1 (noting that such a decision is an
"economic policy choice which... falls within the exclusive competence of Member
States"); see also EC Treaty art. 295 (previously Art. 222) ("This Treaty shall in no
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cases prove is that, post-privatization, Member States do not have free
rein to regulate those companies in a manner inconsistent with the
free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment.
This Communication expressed the opinion of the Commission, and
was not binding law. 262

Actual rules pertaining to such matters

"should be left for Parliament and the Council, acting on a proposal
263
from the Commission.,

By the end of the 1990s, efforts to further integrate the internal
market and eliminate--or at least diminish-measures designed to
inhibit cross-border company activity were increased.2 4
The
Commission began initiating actions against Member States using
restrictive protective devices, such as golden shares. The obvious
restrictive nature 265 of golden shares made them uniquely vulnerable
to challenge.
II. THE GOLDEN SHARE CASES
This part discusses the six golden share cases in turn. Each case
provides unique insight into the Court's method of interpreting Treaty
law and building upon precedent. Furthermore, analyzing each case
in turn demonstrates how these cases incrementally defined the scope
of the free movement of capital.
Even before the commencement of infringement proceedings
related to golden shares, commentators criticized golden shares for
their "sweeping legal nature. ' 2 6 Despite the recent judicial activity,267
way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property
ownership.").
262. The Commission does not have the ability to create binding law. For a
discussion of the Commission's role in the EU, see Bermann et al., supra note 36, at
42-51; Hartley, supra note 41, at 11-17.
263. Eur. Parl. Doc. O.J. 2002 (C 21E) 338, 339 (Minutes, Apr. 5, 2001). The
European Parliament has asked the Commission to stop using the Communication
alone as the basis for the infringement proceedings against Member States and urged
it to replace the Communication with a proposed directive. Id. at 339 ("Calls on the
Commission to cease using the abovementioned communication as the basis for its
infringement procedures and immediately to propose a directive to replace the
abovementioned communication.").
264. In 2001 the Commission set up a High Level Group of Company Law Experts
to advise it on a suitable framework for Community company law. See High Level
Group of Company Law Experts, Report on a Modem Regulatory Framework for
Company
Law
in
Europe
1
(Nov.
4,
2002),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm
[hereinafter High Level Group Report (November)]. In addition to the report on
company law, the Group prepared a report on takeover law as well. See High Level
Group of Company Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids 1 (Jan.
10,
2002)
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en/
company/company/news/02-24.htm [hereinafter High Level Group Report (January)].
265. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
ways in which golden shares protect a company or governmental interest by
implementing restrictions on a number of activities.
266. Kronenberger, supra note 13, at 123.
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golden shares are still quite common throughout the EU, 268 and thus
an analysis of the Court's decisions will assist in predicting the nature
of the Court's scrutiny and the outcome of future cases.
The 1988 Directive included direct investments in the illustrative list
of operations to be liberalized,269 which was subsequently understood
to have been incorporated into Article 56.270 For the purposes of the
directive, direct investments are defined as:
Investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial
or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to
maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the
capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which
the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic
activity. This concept must therefore be understood in its widest
sense.271

A golden share, by its very nature, potentially restricts
investments.2 72 In some cases, the golden share sets caps on the
amount of shares that an individual may own.273 In others, the
government maintains such a level of control as to render the
investment less attractive.274 In recent years, the Court has had the

267. See infra Parts II.B., II.C.
268. For example, there are an additional twenty-five in the U.K. alone. See, e.g.,
Terry Macalister, Ruling Leaves UK Firms Vulnerable, The Guardian, May 14, 2003,
at 18, available at LEXIS News Library, Guardian File. See infra Part III.A. for a
discussion of the pending cases and potential cases.
269. See Council Directive 88/361 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty, 1988 OJ (L 178) 5, 8-11; see also Case C-54/99, Association tglise de
Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, Opinion of A.G. Saggio,

3.
270. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
271. Council Directive 88/361 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty,
1988 O.J. (L 178) 5, 11; see also Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I4781, %6, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 6.
272. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
273. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
9, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 9 (noting the provision in Spanish law 5/1995 which allows the
state to require ministerial authorization before any person or legal entity acquires
more than ten percent of a recently privatized company's voting shares); Case C98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641,
11, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R.
19 (2003), 11 (discussing article 40(1) of the Articles of Association of the British
Airports Authority which prevents persons from acquiring more than fifteen percent
of the voting shares); Case C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, $ 9, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49, 9 (discussing the French requirement that prior authorization must be
obtained before any person or legal entity acquires more than one-fifth, one-tenth, or
one-third of the voting rights in Elf-Aquitaine); Case C-367/98, Commission v.
Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, j 11, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002),
11 (noting that
Article 13(3) of Portuguese Law No. 11/90 permits the government to limit the total
number of shares held by foreigners in certain designated companies).
274. See, e.g., CAmara, supra note 12, at 504.
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opportunity to evaluate both of these schemes.

75

Because the

movement of capital is at issue, there are only a few permissible
justifications for any restriction, and the Court has also begun to
identify which motives can be acceptable. 76

A. Commission v. Italy

In May 2000, the Court decided the first of the golden share cases.277
An Italian law required that, prior to relinquishing control of any state

controlled company operating in certain sectors, a provision be

installed to reserve certain powers to the Minister of the Treasury.2 78
These special powers in effect constitute a golden share retained by

the state. The government reserved the right to appoint at least one
director to the board and the ability to veto certain company
decisions. 279 The government inserted these provisions into the
statutes of ENI SpA, STET SpA and Telecom Italia SpA.280

companies

operated

in

the

energy

sector

(ENI)

and

The

the

telecommunications sector (STET and Telecom Italia).81
Following the necessary procedure, the Commission brought the
case to the ECJ, pursuant to Article 226.282 Before the Court, the
275. See infra Part II.A.-C. for a discussion of the six cases in which the court has
evaluated various golden share schemes, and its determination of which motivations
can be acceptable.
276. See Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809 (permitting
the use of the Belgian golden share); Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, %71
(identifying certain industries which might merit some protective measures). Because
the principles of proportionality and legal certainty are general legal principles of the
Community, they apply in all circumstances. For a comprehensive discussion of the
origin and application of general principles of Community law, see Hartley, supra
note 41, at 130-54. Thus, only those schemes which ensure the protection interest of
the affected investor can be justified. Such safeguards include judicial review,
precisely worded restrictions, and specific constraints on the governmental restriction.
See, e.g., Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $$ 48-52, [2002]
2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), 11 48-52.
277. Belguim, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
48-52, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50,
48-52.
278. See id. 3.
279. Id.
280. Id. 15-6.
281. Though the specific industries involved were unimportant in this case,
retrospectively, it is possible that Italy might have successfully defended the system as
necessary for the protection of overriding reasons in the national interest, because the
Court has since stated that both sectors are important enough to justify restricting a
fundamental freedom. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
71, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 71 (noting that protecting the telecommunications
industry may constitute a valid public security justification for restricting the free
movement of capital); see also Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I4809, 46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), 46 ("[T]he safeguarding of energy supplies
in the event of a crisis.., falls undeniably within the ambit of a legitimate public
interest."). Of course, the regulation would still have to be proportionate. See, e.g.,
Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000
E.C.R. 1-1335, 18.
282. Case C-58/99, Italy, 2000 E.C.R. 1-3811,
7-11; see also EC Treaty art. 226.
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Commission argued that the law conflicted with Treaty obligations

and failed to meet the necessary four conditions, as outlined in the

1997 Communication. 283 Furthermore, the Commission argued that
the law gave the Italian government too much discretion, and
therefore the ability to apply the law in an arbitrary and

discriminatory manner.2 4

Here, the Italian government conceded that Law No. 474 was
incompatible with the law of the European Community.2 85
Accordingly, the Court had no need to scrutinize the law to determine

whether it actually restricted capital movements or establishment, or
if any such restriction was in fact impermissible. But the Court did
not have to wait long before the issue again appeared.
B. The OriginalGolden Share Cases
On June 4, 2002, the ECJ decided three cases regarding the use of
golden shares. 286 The Court's analysis of the various forms of the
golden shares outlines the basic structure of the current test of golden
share compatibility with Community law. 287 Each case resolves

different and important issues.
Before rendering its decision, the Court considered the opinion of
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 288 who recommended that

the Court dismiss the Commission's actions against the nondiscriminatory measures of Portugal, Belgium, and France. 28 9 The

Article 226 provides the proper procedure for the Commission to bring an action
before the ECJ:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its
observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period
laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
Id. Thus, the Commission sent a formal notice to the Italian Republic, informing it
that in the Commission's opinion, the law violated Articles 43, 49, and 56. Case C58/99, Italy, 2000 E.C.R. 1-3811,
7. After receiving a response from the Italian
government, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion, giving Italy two months to
comply. Id. 8. Italy failed to respond within the time limit. Id.
9-10.
283. See supra note 20 and text accompanying note 249.
284. See Case C-58/99, Italy, 2000 E.C.R. 1-3811, %13.
285. Id. 14.
286. Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48 (2002); C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49
(2002); C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 50
(2002).
287. See generally Fleisher, supra note 19.
288. See supra note 124 (explaining the role of the A.G.). For a more complete
discussion of the A.G.'s opinion in the golden share cases, see infra Part II.D.
289. Joined Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2
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A.G. relied primarily on Article 295, which asserts that the Treaty

laws do not prejudice the property law of the Member States.2 9 °
Company shares and the rights which they entail are property. 29 The
Court, however, did not agree, and only briefly addressed the

Advocate General's argument before swiftly rejecting it, noting that
Member States' systems of property ownership are not exempt from
Treaty rules.2" The Court cited one of its important precedents,
Factortame II, to show that Member States may only exercise the

powers that they retain consistently with Community law.293
1. Commission v. Portugal

The Commission's strongest case was against the Portuguese golden
share rules. 294
The Portuguese law in question established a
framework for all privatizations.2 95 One objective of the law was "to

permit widespread participation by Portuguese citizens in the share
capital of undertakings. "296 Presumably to further that goal, Article
13(3) of Law No. 11/90 was discriminatory on its face, allowing

legislation to "limit the overall amount of shares which may be

acquired or subscribed for by foreign entities. '297 The Commission
brought the action to challenge specific decree laws, three of which
implemented a discriminatory measure. 98
Additionally, the
Commission objected to certain decree laws which, though not facially

discriminatory, nonetheless restricted free movement of capital by
limiting to ten percent the total number of shares any individual or
entity could legally hold without government authorization.29 9

C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 92. One of the laws in
question capped the amount of voting shares any single person (or legal entity) could
own at ten percent. This law applied irrespective of the shareholder's nationality, and
applied to any "single, natural or legal person." Id. 14.
290. EC Treaty art. 295.
291. See generally Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48, C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99,
Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, 92.
292. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 48, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, T 48.
293. See Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905,
16-17, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 589, $1 16-17
[hereinafter Factortame 11] (noting that Member States may implement registration
requirements for vessels in so far as they do not conflict with International law or EU
law).
294. See Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48,
C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. __ [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99, Belgium, 2002
E.C.R. -_, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 22.
295. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
10-14, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48,
10-14.
296. Id. J 10 (quoting Article 3 of Law No. 11/90).
297. Id.
298. See id. T[13.
299. See id. 14.
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Regarding the discriminatory aspect of the Portuguese law in
question, the Commission's argument followed the rationale of the
1997 Communication.3"0 First, the Commission contended that the
true purpose behind such protective measures was to control intraCommunity investment.301
The Commission further noted that
discriminatory measures are clearly incompatible with Article 43 and
Article 56, unless they are within one of the express exceptions.3 2
The Portuguese government contended that since it had endeavored
"as a matter of policy, not to use the powers conferred on it by those
provisions,"' 3 3 Portugal had not in practice violated its obligations
under the EC Treaty.3"
As for the non-discriminatory measures, the Commission again
referred to the 1997 Communication,3 5 claiming that the measures
were incompatible with Community law. Only those laws which are
"based on a set of objective and stable criteria which have been made
public and can be justified on imperative requirements in the general
interest 30 6 and which meet the principle of proportionality,30 7 can be
accepted.3 ' The Commission contended that Portugal did not meet
these requirements.30 9 Portugal argued that (a) the scheme was
applied to both foreigners and nationals, and was therefore nondiscriminatory, and (b) the measures were justified by "overriding
31
requirements of the general interest.""
Portugal asserted that
safeguarding its nation's financial interests was an imperative national
interest,31 1 which justified a restriction of the freedom of establishment
and the free movement of capital.
The Court disregarded entirely A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's
analysis of Article 295,312 and instead evaluated the national measures
under Article 56.313 The Court seized upon this opportunity to
formulate an appropriate structure of analysis for golden share
restrictions based on the free movement of capital. First, the Court
noted that Article 56 bars such restrictions.3 4 Trummer & Mayer

300. See Communication, supra note 20.
301. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 20, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, 20.
302. Id. 22 (citing Communication, supra note 20).
303. Id. 29.
304. Id.
305. Id. 22 (quoting Communication, supra note 20, $ 9).
306. Id.
307. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
308. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, $ 22, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48,
22 (quoting Communication, supra note 20, 9).
309. See id. $$ 23-27.
310. Id. 31.
311. Id. 32.
312. Id. 28 ("Article 222 [now Article 295] of the Treaty is irrelevant in the
present case.").
313. See id. $$ 36-54.
314. Id. $ 36.
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clearly held that such a restriction need not have a direct restrictive
effect; it is enough that the measure may indirectly hinder the free
movement of capital.3 15

The Court then addressed the discriminatory aspects of the
measure. The Court rejected Portugal's argument that because the
discriminatory rules were not actually used they did not violate
Article 56,316 because such a policy failed to meet the principle of legal
certainty.317 Portugal's practice "cannot be regarded as constituting

the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligations under the
Treaty, since they maintain, for the persons concerned, a state of
'
uncertainty."318
Thus, an administrative policy of not applying an
existing measure discriminatorily was not a valid defense to an alleged
breach of EC 2Treaty
obligations.3 19
3 0
Community law.

This remains well-settled

Next the Court evaluated the non-discriminatory measure
embedded in Decree-Law No. 380/93, which required prior
authorization before an individual or entity could hold shares totaling
more than ten percent of the voting capital.321 Having already dealt
with systems of prior authorization in Sanz de Lera3 22 and Eglise de
Scientologie,3 23 the Court had a well-developed body of law from
which to draw.

Without hesitation, the Court dismissed Portugal's argument that
315. See Case C-222/97, Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
26, [2000] 3
C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999), 26 (holding that measures which may deter investment, even
if they do not prohibit or directly restrict it, violate Article 56).
316. See generally Case C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
41, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R.48, 41.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See id. IT 41-42. Interestingly, in earlier days, the Commission seemed to
accept such promises not to use discriminatory measures which existed. See Graham
& Prosser, supra note 8, at 151. In the days of the EEC, the Commission objected to
France's attempt to limit a sale resulting in foreign ownership to fifteen percent but
accepted a limit of twenty percent on the condition that such limits would not be
enforced against other members of the Community. Though this specifically applied
to the original sale of the company, the golden share was inserted to ensure adequate
State control in the post-privatization period. Id. at 151-52.
320. See, e.g., Case 167/73, Commission v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, $ 47-48, [1974]
2 C.M.L.R. 216 (1974),
47-48 (holding that even though a French requirement that
at least seventy-five percent of the crew on some vessels be French was not applied
against nationals of other Member States, the wording of the regulation created
uncertainty, and thus France had failed to meet its obligation of free movement of
workers).
321. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
43-44, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48,
43-44 (declining to accept Portugal's argument that because the measure is not
discriminatory, it is acceptable).
322. Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94, & C-250/94, Criminal Proceedings Against
Sanz de Lera & Others, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4821, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995). See supra
notes 175-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sanz de Lera.
323. Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335; see also supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
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because the measure did not discriminate based on nationality, it was
compatible with the Treaty.3 24 Article 56 does not permit such
restrictions.3 1 5 Any rule with the potential to dissuade investors from
other Member States from investing is "liable... to render the free
movement of capital illusory, 3 26 and as such is incompatible with
Article 56. This is firmly settled case law.327
Since no blanket rule permits non-discriminatory restrictions, the
Court considered whether the scheme in question fulfilled the
requirements of any of the express exceptions of Article 58,328 or could
be justified by some "overriding requirements of the general
interest. 3 29 The Court found that the statute was not justified by any
overriding need in the general interest, since "general financial
interests of a Member State cannot constitute adequate
justification."33 Therefore, the scheme failed to meet the acceptable
justification condition.
The Court did not need to evaluate whether the measure was
proportionate and narrowly tailored to meet the objective, but briefly
discussed both legal certainty and proportionality.33" ' The Court was
not swayed by the argument that the "administrative decisions had to
be reasoned 3312 because knowledge of the criteria ex post facto failed
to meet the burden of legal certainty.333 As for the principle of
proportionality, the Court declared that a system of ex-post facto
declaration would have to be completely incapable of achieving the
objective in order for a system of prior authorization to ever be
acceptable.33 4
Portugal was the least complicated of the three golden share cases
The first law challenged was
decided on June 4, 2002.335
324. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 44, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, %44.
325. Article 56 permits no restrictions on either capital or payment flows between
Member States and Member States and third parties. EC Treaty art. 56.
326. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 45, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, 45.
327. See supra Part I.C.2.; see also Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94, & C-250/94,
Sanz de Lera, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4821, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1995).
328. Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 49, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, 49.
329. Id.
330. Id. '52. A long line of cases establishes this concept. See Case C-54/99,
Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335,
17; Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et de
l'Urbanisme, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3955, $1 13-14; Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister
35 (1984)
35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544,
for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727,
(noting that safeguarding petroleum supplies is not a purely economic motive, and
can therefore be acceptable).
49-50, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
331. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
49-50.
48,
332. See Cdmara, supra note 12, at 508.
333. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (defining legal certainty).
334. See Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 50, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48,
50.
335. See Joined Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2
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discriminatory on its face, and thus could only be allowed to stand
under extremely limited circumstances, none of which were presented

by the Portuguese.336 The second law, which applied to all persons

wanting to purchase shares with a voting weight of more than ten

percent, failed the first of the four necessary conditions,33 7 as the
338

objective could not justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom.

The harder questions, those relating to proportionality and necessity,
did not need to be addressed.
2. Commission v. France

The question of proportionality became the pivotal issue in the
second case decided by the Court on June 4, 2002. 339 At issue in the
Commission's case against France was the golden share which

reserved certain rights to the Minister of Economic Affairs. 340 Postprivatization legislation created a golden share in Soci&t Nationale
Elf-Aquitaine ("SNEA").
Specifically, the statute granted the
Minister the right to oppose company decisions regarding the disposal

of assets and to appoint two members to the board of directors. 3"
Even more troubling was the obligation imposed upon any investor
wishing to purchase more than a certain number of shares to obtain
prior approval of the Minister.3 42 It was this scheme of prior
authorization which was the focus of the Commission's case against

France.343 The Commission, as required by procedure, notified France
that it believed the requirement to be contrary to EC law. The
French, fearing foreign control over the petroleum supplies, were not
willing to forgo the golden share entirely."
The Court first assessed whether the golden share that France
reserved in SNEA posed a restriction on the movement of capital. 45

Like the Portuguese, the French argued that the measure was not
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 22.
336. See supra notes 82-85, 95-96, 108-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of
exceptions under which a restriction of the free movement of capital and freedom of
establishment may be imposed.
337. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
338. See generally Case C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
52, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48, 52 (asserting that Portugal's motive was purely economic, and thus did
not justify restricting capital movements).
339. See id. 53.
340. See id. 14.
341. Id. 9. It should be noted that the two members appointed by the Minister
did not have voting rights. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. T 21-24.
344. Id.
14-15 (stating that France would require pre-authorization only where
holdings in excess of the maximum share limits might threaten petroleum supplies
and that safeguarding such supplies was an important objective).
345. Id. T 38-43.
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contrary to Article 56 because it was non-discriminatory, 346 but again,
the Court found no merit in this argument. 347 Any measure which has
the potential to deter investment by nationals of other Member States
might make free movement of capital "illusory," and is thus contrary
to Community law.3 48 Therefore, for the French golden share to
comply with Article 56, it had to be justified either by an explicit
Treaty exception or by "overriding requirements of the general
interest. '349 Moreover, even if the objective justified the restriction,
the system of prior authorization must be the least restrictive means of
achieving that goal.35
The French, unlike the Portuguese, satisfied the first condition: In
1984, in Campus Oil, the Court had determined that
petroleum products.., are of fundamental importance for a
country's existence since not only its economy but above all its
institutions, its essential public services and even the survival of its
inhabitants depend upon them. An interruption of supplies of
petroleum products ... could therefore seriously affect the public
security.35
Thus the objective of safeguarding the nation's petroleum supplies is a
legitimate national interest,352 and can justify some restriction of
capital movements.3 53 The Commission itself conceded that the
objective might, under the right circumstances, merit a restriction.354
Accepting this,35 the Court examined the scope of the scheme
utilized.3 56 Because the use of the public security exception requires
that there be a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat, ' 3 7 a Member
State may adopt only those measures which are absolutely necessary
to secure against the threat.35 8 Finding that the French system of prior
authorization offered investors no "indication whatever as to the
specific, objective circumstances in which prior authorisation will be
346. Id. 39.
347. Id. 40.
348. Id. 41.
349. Id. 1 45; see also Case C-54/99, Association lglise de Scientologie de Paris v.
Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, IT 17-18.
350. See generally Association Aglise de Scientologie de Paris,2000 E.C.R. 1-1335,
20.
351. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R.
2727, 34, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 34. In Campus Oil, the Court scrutinized
Irish rules which were adopted to ensure that Ireland's only oil refinery was not
closed, which would have had the effect of making the nation entirely dependent
upon foreign oil supplies. In the wake of the energy crisis of the 1970s, the Irish
government was reluctant to allow that to happen. See id. 'll 5-7.
352. See id. 35.
353. Id.
354. Case C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, 1 26, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49, 26.
355. Id. 47.
356. See id. 147.
357. Id. 48.
358. See id. 49.
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granted or refused,"35' 9 the Court decided that the lack of transparency
and legal certainty provided too much discretionary power, and was
therefore not proportionate to the stated purpose.3 6 As with the
system of prior authorization that the Court denied in Eglise de
Scientologie,36 1 the French golden share system lacked the requisite
specificity and failed to adequately indicate to investors when prior
authorization would be granted or denied. As such, the restriction
violated Article 56 of the EC Treaty.
The most important aspect of France was the Court's
acknowledgment that some important national interests could
necessitate restricting the free movement of capital and the freedom
of establishment.3 62 Furthermore, the judgment made clear the
absolute importance of transparency and proportionality. Though this
is a high standard, the final judgment on golden shares handed down
on June 4, 2002 proved that it is not an impossible standard to meet.
3. Commission v. Belgium
The third, and arguably most important,363 case was that against
Belgium. At issue were two Royal Decrees, each of which vested a
golden share in the government.3 64 In the Royal Decree of June 10
1994, a golden share was granted in the Socijtg Nationale de Transport
par Canalisations ("SNTC").3 65 Another Royal Decree on June 16,
1994 vested in the state a golden share in Socidtg de Distribution du
Gaz SA ("Distrigaz").3 66 Both enterprises were involved in the gas
and energy distribution sector.3 67 The golden shares granted were
very similar, reserving to the state: (1) the right to be notified of any
transfer, sale, or use as collateral of the company's strategic assets, 368
and (2) the right to appoint two members to the board of directors
who could in turn suggest to the Minister responsible that he annul a
359. Id. 50.
360. See id. 50-51.
361. See Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime
Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, $$ 21-23.
362. Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, T$ 49-50, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), T149-50.
363. Because the Belgian case is the only one to date in which the Court permitted
the use of golden share measures, it is perhaps the most important because it leaves
open the possibility that governments may implement such measures in some
instances. Without this decision, the outlook for the future of golden shares would be
very dim. Additionally, the Belgian golden share can serve as a model for future
golden shares. Provided a government has an acceptable objective, it may avail itself
of the protections inherent in golden shares. See infra Part III.B.2.
364. Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002), 1.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. 28.
368. Id. T 1.
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decision of the board, if he "consider[ed] that the operation in
question36 9 adversely affect[ed] the national interest in the energy
sector.
The structure of these rights, and how they were to be asserted, was
of particular consequence to the Court's evaluation. The government
officials who were appointed to the board of directors could, within
four business days, propose to the appropriate Minister that an action
of the board be annulled. 37 ° The proposal effected an immediate
suspension of the action in question.3 71 The Minister then had eight
business days to take action, and should he fail to annul the decision
in that time, the suspension would end, and the action would become
effective.372 However, there was a right of appeal to the Belgian
Conseil D'Etat to seek annulment of the Minister's decision.373
The Commission, relying on the 1997 Communication, argued that
such measures were a restriction of the free movement of capital and
the freedom of establishment, and could not co-exist with Community
law unless covered by one of the express exceptions.3 74 Belgium
contended that the measures were justified by reasons of public
security and overriding general national interest requirements.375
Moreover, like both France and Portugal, Belgium noted that the
schemes were non-discriminatory.376
Following the framework utilized in France and Portugal,the Court
recognized that restrictions on the free movement of capital are
clearly contrary to the EC Treaty, and justifiable only in narrowly
limited circumstances.3 77 The Court then commenced its four part
assessment of the system. The objective in question-safeguarding
energy supplies and protecting the national energy policy-satisfied
the first criterion.378
Like protection of petroleum supplies,37 9
'380
safeguarding energy supplies is a "legitimate public interest.
Having determined that the objective was legitimate and might permit
some restriction of capital movement, the Court considered whether

369. Id. $$ 1, 9.
370. Id.
371. Id. 9.
372. Id.
373. Id. 29.
374. Id. $$ 16-21.
375. Id. 26.
376. Id. 12.
377. Id. 45.
378. Id. 46.
379. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R.
2727, $ 34-35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544, $$ 34-35 (1984) (recognizing that securing
petroleum supplies is of fundamental interest to the public security).
380. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, %46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 46.
The Court explicitly acknowledged that though Campus Oil was a free movement of
goods case, the "same reasoning applies to obstacles to the free movement of capital."
Id.
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the measure was structured
to meet the principle of proportionality
381
and legal certainty.
The Court noted three specific elements of the scheme which
ensured that it met the requirement of legal certainty. First, it was a
system of opposition, not of prior authorization.3 2 The investor need
not apply for permission; rather, the onus was on the government to
object to an action which it believed posed a threat to national
security. 383 Second, the government could only object where the
action considered by the board related to certain specific assets, such
as altering the energy supply networks. 3 4 Third, the Minister was only
permitted to intercede when the government's energy policy
objectives were jeopardized by the proposed action. 8
These
limitations created the legal certainty necessary to permit a restriction
on a fundamental freedom.3 86 A final critical element was the
availability of judicial review.3" The Belgian golden shares, therefore,
satisfied the principle of proportionality and were a permissible
restriction on the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment.388
All four conditions were met, and though the Court did not
explicitly apply the four-part test to the facts, it is clear that it
considered them all: the scheme was not discriminatory,3 89 and it was
justified by an overriding need in the general interest,390 which had
previously been identified by the Court in Campus Oil;39 ' the scheme
could effectively achieve the objective,3" and Belgium had
demonstrated that the measure was narrowly tailored to achieve the
objective without excessive restriction.393 The standard, therefore, is
not impossible to meet.

381. Id. 48.
382. See id. 49.
383. See id. IT 47-49.
384. See id. 50.
385. See id. 51.
386. See id. 52.
387. See id.
51. The availability of judicial review of the Minister's decision
ensured the necessary predictability needed to create legal certainty. See id. 52.
388. See id. IT 57, 60.
389. See id. I 9-10 (outlining the laws in question, which were applicable to all
persons, regardless of nationality).
390. See id. 46.
391. See Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R.
2727, 35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 35.
392. See Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
45-52, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50,
45-52.
393. See id. 53. ("The Commission has not shown that less restrictive measures
could have been taken to attain the objective pursued.").
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C. The 2003 Cases
In May 2003, the Court handed down two more golden share
decisions, one against Spain and the other against the U.K.394 Not
surprisingly, the Court analyzed the laws at issue in these cases using
the same formulaic approach as it had in the 2002 cases, focusing on
the Article 56 violation and only minimally addressing the Article 43
infringements. 39'
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer again
rendered a prior opinion, 96 arguing that there were some deficiencies
in the Court's analysis of the original golden share cases, particularly
that against Belgium as compared to its analysis in the case against
France. 397 The Advocate General's opinion determined that in light of
those decisions, the case against Spain should be dismissed,398 while
the Court should find the U.K. scheme unacceptably restrictive. 399 As
with the original golden share cases, and contrary to the Court's
frequent practice of adopting the opinion of the A.G.,4° the Court did
not follow his opinion.
1. Commission v. Spain
Spanish Law No. 5/1995 provided the structure for privatization and
the retention of certain powers by the State. 401 Specifically, the law
394. Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18
(2003); Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19 (2003).
395. See Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641,
52, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19, 52.
[I]t is appropriate to point out that in so far as the rules in question entail
restrictions on freedom of establishment, such restrictions are a direct
consequence of the obstacles to the free movement of capital... to which
they are inextricably linked. Consequently, since an infringement of Article
56 EC has been established, there is no need for a separate examination of
the measures at issue in the light of the Treaty rules concerning freedom of
establishment.
Id.; Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
86, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18,
86
(repeating almost verbatim its consideration of the issue in the case against the U.K.).
396. The Advocate General's analysis was again very well-formulated and seemed
to deal with the issues in a more logical manner, and will be discussed in greater detail
below. See infra Part II.D.
397. Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -,
[2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
-,
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, I 38-40.
398. Id. 46.
399. Id. 58. A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer noted that with minor changes, the
provisions in place in the U.K. could be brought into line with the Treaty and
therefore be legal. Specifically, he noted that reasoned opinions by the government
for its use of the golden share powers, and the availability of judicial review, were
needed to bring these provisions into conformity. Id.
400. See Bermann et al., supra note 36, at 62 (noting that the Court "often...
reach[es] the same conclusion, though perhaps on different grounds").
401. Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
9 [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 9.
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applied to any undertaking in which the State owned greater than

twenty-five percent,4 °2 and which was involved in "essential services or
public services,""' 3 activities subject to administrative review due to
public interest,4" and those actions which were exempt from EU laws

governing competition.

5

The law set up a system of prior

authorization for certain company decisions,"' as well as for any

reduction in the State-owned shares of ten percent or greater, or the
acquisition of shares by an investor which "results in a holding of at
least ten percent of the share capital."4 7 The framework was
executed by individual Royal Decrees regarding various undertakings.
The sectors involved included petroleum,
telecommunications,
40 8
tobacco, commercial banking, and electricity.
As with the cases against France, Belgium, and Portugal, the

Commission argued that any system of prior authorization was per se

restrictive of capital movements. 9
Moreover, the Court had
41
addressed this exact form of restriction in tglise de Scientologie 1

holding that a system "which makes a direct foreign investment
subject to prior authorization constitutes a restriction on the

'
movement of capital."411
The Commission conceded that there may
be instances where such restrictions could be applied, but based on
clear case law, these are narrowly defined exceptions, and in all
circumstances, the principles of legal certainty and proportionality

must be met.412 Furthermore, it is absolutely clear that
such
413
restrictions can never be applied for purely economic motives.

It is here that the Commission had its strongest argument. While it
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. Article 90 governs competition. See EC Treaty art. 86 (previously art. 90).
406. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, T 9. The
company decisions in question related to mergers, de-mergers, disposal of key assets,
or alteration of the company purpose.
407. Id.
408. Id. 1 11.
409. Id. 31.
410. Case C-54/99, Association tglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Prime Minister,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1335.
411. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $133, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 1 33
(citing Case C-54/99, Eglise de Scientologie, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, 9114).
412. Id. 9134 (citing Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1993 E.C.R.
1-1663; Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995)). These two cases
outline the four conditions necessary for the imposition of a restriction of a
fundamental freedom. See Case C-55/94 Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 9 39, [1996] 1
C.M.L.R. 603, 9 39; see also Case C-12/92, Kraus, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1663, [1 37-41.
413. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, T 35, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 9 35; see
also Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 91 52, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 9 52 ("[T]he general financial interests of a Member State cannot
constitute adequate justification. It is settled case-law that economic grounds can
never serve as justification for obstacles prohibited by the Treaty.").
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is true that protecting petroleum was an overriding public interest
worthy of restricting the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment," 4 and it is possible that electricity, like energy"' and
petroleum, 4 6 could also be considered fundamental to the national
interest, the Commission would not accept the protection of a tobacco
company as such. 17
Nor would the Commission recognize the
commercial banking activity as an overriding interest worthy of an
exception to the prohibition on restrictions.4 8 Although the measures
in place for the petroleum, telecommunications, and electricity
companies arguably met the first requirement-that the objective
must be valid-the Commission absolutely rejected the system of
prior authorization, 419 because it failed both the legal certainty and
proportionality tests.42 °
Spain contended that since one of the laws stated that the system of
prior approval established by Royal Decree No. 5/1995 was meant to
be applied "consistently with the provisions of the Treaty...
concerning the right of establishment and the free movement of
capital, ' 42 1 it did not violate the Treaty. Spain also adopted A.G.
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's argument in the original golden share cases:
The Treaty expressly states that it "'shall in no way prejudice the rules
' 422
in Member States governing the system of property ownership, '
and therefore the system did not violate the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty.42 3
Notably, Spain argued in the alternative that there was no
restriction on the free movement of capital, but conceded that it was
possible that the system might affect the freedom of establishment.4 24
Nonetheless, Spain contended that "overriding requirements of the
general interest"4 5 and the necessity of protecting the "continuity in

414. See Case C-483/99, Commission v. France., 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, 47, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 47; Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd., 1984 E.C.R. 2727, 35, [1984]
3 C.M.L.R. 544, 35.
415. Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 46, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 50 (2002), $ 46.
416. See 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727,
35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), 35.
417. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 35, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, $ 35.
418. Id.
419. Id. 36.
420. Id.
421. Id. 40.
422. Joined Cases C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), & C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -,
[2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 40 (citing EC Treaty
art. 295).
423. Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, 41, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 41.
424. Id. 1 43.
425. Id. 44.
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public services ' ' 1 26 justified the system.427

But the Court did not
respond to that argument, and instead analyzed the case in exactly the
same manner it had in the three original golden share cases. It based
the decision on the Spanish law's restriction of the free movement of

capital, and left unexplored the examination of the freedom of

establishment violation.42 8
The Court agreed with the Commission regarding the golden share

rights reserved in the tobacco and banking companies,429 finding that
these industries were not acceptable fields for recognition of an
imperative interest justifying a restriction of the free movement of
capital. 430 The bank in question was not involved in setting or
implementing national policy, nor EU policy, but only in commercial
activity.431 Commercial banking cannot be considered a sector whose

protection constitutes an overriding national interest justifying a
restriction on capital flows or the right of establishment.432 At best, it
is in the general financial interest of the country, and, as the Court
decisively concluded in Portugal, such interests do not permit
restricting a fundamental freedom. 433 The Court found that the other
three undertakings were active in sectors which could, under some
circumstances, validate the need to restrict capital flows. 43 4 However,

the Court again agreed with the Commission's argument and found
that the measures failed to meet the requirement of legal certainty, as
no precise or objective criteria were provided to indicate to the
potential investor when such a request for approval would be
granted.435 The scheme allowed for too much discretion "which

426. Id.
427. Id.
428. See id.
85-86:
In that regard, it is appropriate to point out that in so far as the legislation in
issue entails restrictions on freedom of establishment, such restrictions are a
direct consequence of the obstacles to the free movement of capital ...to
which they are inextricably linked. Consequently, since an infringement of
Art. 56 EC has been established, there is no need for a separate examination
of the measures at issue in the light of the Treaty rules concerning freedom
of establishment.
Id. 86.
429. See id. % 70.
430. See id. (noting that, though the Spanish government argued that "the regime
at issue is justified by overriding requirements of the general interest linked to
strategic imperatives," Spain failed to establish that the bank had a "public service
function.").
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. See, e.g., Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
52,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002),
52 ("[T]he general financial interests of a Member
State cannot constitute adequate justification.").
434. See Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, 71, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, 71.
435. See id. 74.
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represent[ed] a serious threat to the free movement of capital and
[might] end by negating it completely. 4 36

A comparison of the Spanish system in question and the one
implemented by Belgium makes clear that the Spanish scheme was
not as narrowly tailored and limited as the Belgian system that the
Court upheld.437 A notable difference was the Spanish system's lack
of judicial review of a denial of prior authorization. 43 8 Had the

Spanish scheme met the precision and proportionality requirement,
this decision could have been split: The restrictions would not have

been acceptable for two industries (tobacco and commercial banking),
but would likely have been acceptable restrictions for the other three,

as they related to imperative general interests (electricity, petroleum,
and telecommunications).
4 39
2. Commission v. United Kingdom

Another golden share case, this time against the United Kingdom,
was also decided on May 13, 2003. 44 The U.K. did not argue that the

company involved, the British Airport Authority ("BAA"),

1

was

or public policy. 442
vital to the general interest, public security
3
Instead, the U.K. relied on company law."1

436. See id. 76.
437. See id. $$ 77-78.
438. See id. 78.
439. Case C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19 (2003). The EU does not have a unified Company law, but rather each
Member State governs its own corporate law.
Member States are entitled to engage in economic activities on the same
basis as private market operators, within the framework of contracts
governed by private law. In the absence of harmonisation of the rules of
national company law, Community law cannot impose on a company which
issues shares the obligation to place the control of that company on the
market, or to attach to its shares the whole range of rights which all actual
and potential investors might wish to see attached to them.
Id. 31.
440. Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 19.
441. Id. 8.
442. It is possible that they may have succeeded had they pursued such a line of
argument. Since the specific company in question was the BAA, even disregarding
the events of September 11, 2001, a solid argument can be made for the importance of
safeguarding a nation's airports as an overriding national interest. In light of the
terrorist attacks which were launched from airports, a strong argument for a public
security exception also exists. The Court might find that a less restrictive means exists
to guard the nation's airports. But, since the Court recognized that restricting foreign
property ownership on certain parts of the Italian coast might be a valid objective for
a restriction based on national security (if the protective measure was proportionate
and not overly burdensome), it is likely that the Court would at least consider a public
security argument for airports. However, whether or not protection of the airports
would be considered fundamental to the interests of the nation is left open for the
future, since the U.K. did not argue that it was. See id. 49.
443. See id. 24.
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The Airports Act of 1986 privatized the British airport industry.""
The Act created a one pound golden share in the BAA, which was
established to manage the United Kingdom's airports." 5
The
Secretary of Transportation held the share which conferred the right

to give written consent regarding the disposal or change in control of
certain BAA assets." 6 These rights were included in Article 10 of the
BAA's Articles of Association. 4 7 Article 40 of the Articles of
Association limited the percentage of shares that could be owned by
any one person." 8 Only "[p]ermitted" persons were allowed to
individually hold more than fifteen percent of the voting stock." 9 The
U.K. defended the golden share, claiming that share structures are
governed by company law, which is a national concern.
Moreover,
the U.K. argued that since the golden share did not prevent access to
the market for the BAA shares, it was not contrary to Community
45
law.

1

The Commission attacked the golden share on two grounds: first, it
limited the potential to acquire voting shares; second, the Commission
objected to the system of pre-approval in place for decisions relating
to the disposal of assets, loss of control over subsidiaries, and the
winding up of the company.542 Such measures might hinder freedom
of establishment and also hamper the free movement of capital. 53
Because the U.K. did not argue that the objective was justifiable for
reasons of public security, public policy or an overriding reason of the
general interest, 5" and because the golden share seriously limited the
right of investors to manage the company without first obtaining
approval from the Secretary of Transportation, the Commission
argued that the measure was a restriction on the two freedoms. 55 The
Commission discounted the company law argument because the rights
under discussion did "not arise from the normal operation of that
law" 56 and were created only through an act of state. 57

444. See id. 8.
445. See id.
446. See id. % 10. Specifically, the Secretary of Transportation had to be conferred
with prior to (1) the BAA ceasing to hold controlling shares in any of the designated
airports; (2) the dissolution of the BAA or of any of its subsidiaries which own a
designated airport, unless in so doing the designated airport is still owned by the BAA
or another subsidiary; and (3) the disposal of any designated airport. See id.
447. See id.
448. See id. 11.
449. See id.
450. See id. 16.
451. See id.
452. See id. 19.
453. See id. 20.
454. See id. 22.
455. See id. 23.
456. See id. 24.
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Again refusing to investigate the possible Article 43
infringements,4 58 the Court built upon previous free movement of
capital case law and evaluated the compatibility of the U.K. golden
share with Treaty rights. Finding that measures which limit the
"scope for participating effectively in management '459 restrict the free
movement of capital, the Court established that the cap on the
amount of voting stock an investor may own was a violation of Article
56 .46
Deterring investment is an indirect restriction to market
access.461 Therefore it could not be tolerated, unless justified by a
Treaty exception or an imperative reason of national interest. 462 None
being offered, the Court confined itself to the questions presented,
and agreed with the Commission that the U.K. rule did not fall within
the normal operation of company law, and therefore was not excluded
from compliance with Article 56.463
D. Advocate GeneralRuiz-Jarabo Colomer's Opinion
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer rendered opinions in both
the 2002 golden share cases and the 2003 golden share cases.4 " In
457. See id. Since Parliament had to act to insert this special share in the Articles
of Association, the Commission refused to recognize this as a normal operation of the
U.K. Company law. Id.
458. See id.
51-52. Again the Court held that any infringement of Article 43 is a
"direct consequence" of the restriction of the free movement of capital, and need not
be examined independently. Id.
459. See id. 44; see also Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp.,
ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905, $$ 20-23 (coming to the same
conclusion vis-a-vis the right of establishment by finding that a British condition that
the owner of a ship be British in order to register it infringes upon the right of
establishment since "where the vessel constitutes an instrument for pursuing an
economic activity which involves a fixed establishment in the Member State
concerned, the registration of that vessel cannot be disassociated from the exercise of
the freedom of establishment.").
460. See Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641,
44, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19, 1 44.
461. See id. T 47. The Court has found such deterrence effectively deprives persons
of their Treaty rights. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, T 37, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603
(1995), 37 ("[N]ational measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise
of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions."
(emphasis added)); cf. Case C-222/97, Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661,
26,
[2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999),
26 (holding that a rule which might dissuade a
homebuyer from denominating his mortgage in another Member State's currency
deprives them of the right to free movement of capital).
462. E.g., Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, 45, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 45.
463. See Case C-98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4641, $$ 48-49, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 19,
48-49.
464. Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. __,
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer; Joined Cases C367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. -_,[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002); C483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002); & C-
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both instances, the Court declined to adopt his opinion.465 In the 2002

cases, the Advocate General opined that, with one exception,466 the
various powers reserved by the states in the form of the golden shares
were completely consistent with Treaty obligations.4 67 Article 295
states, simply and unequivocally: "This Treaty shall in no way
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of
property ownership. ' 468 Determining that the Treaty intended that

property ownership must "extend to any measure which, through
intervention in the public sector, understood in the economic sense,
allows the State to contribute to the organisation of the nation's
financial activity, 4 69

A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer argued that any

interpretation of property law so narrowly limited to apply to purely

private or civil law was "absurd.1 470 Furthermore, Article 295 is
placed in part six of the Treaty-General and Final Provisions-thus
he reasoned that Article 295 must apply to all preceding Treaty
provisions. 471 Furthermore, he utilized an historical approach to

interpreting the import of the article, and noted that Article 295 traces

its authority to the initial agreements. 472 Based on the wording of the

first version of this Article, "[t]his Treaty shall in no way prejudice the
system of ownership of means of production which exists within the
Community,

'473

it would be logical to conclude that a state may have a

property right in "exercis[ing] decisive influence on the definition
and
474
implementation of all or some of its economic objectives.
503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002),
Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
465. See supra notes 289-92,396-400 and accompanying text.
466. The exception was the discriminatory law in place in Portugal, which is
discussed supra Part II.B.1. See Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. __,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C-483/99, France,2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48; & C503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, $ 29-30.
467. Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. __, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99, Belgium, 2002
E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 92.
468. EC Treaty art. 295; see also Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. __,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C-483/99, France,2002 E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. _, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, 40.
469. Joined Cases C-367/98, Portugal, [2002] E.C.R. -, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, C483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R.
, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, & C-503/99, Belgium, 2002
56.
, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,
E.C.R.
470. See id. 63.
471. Id. $ 43.
472. Id. 45 ("Article 295 EC is in the unique position of deriving its authority
directly from the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, on which it has been based,
which reinforces its specific nature and symbolic importance.").
473. Id. 51 (referring to the wording of the original draft of 5 December 1956).
474. Id. 54. However, the reasoning utilized by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer fails
to fully explain why a state would not simply retain a majority holding in those
companies which it believes to be critical to the interests of the nation, and thereby
retain the ability to direct the company. For a discussion of some perceived
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A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's reasoning in the 2003 cases is arguably
the most persuasive of all the analysis available on the compatibility of
golden shares with Community law. Additionally, A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer exposed some deficiencies in the Court's analysis of the 2002
golden share cases. First, the A.G. asserted that the freedom of
establishment represents a more suitable framework than that of the
free movement of capital for an analysis of restrictions arising from
state-held golden shares.4 75 The states were attempting to influence
control of privatized companies, not the movement of capital into the
nation.47 6 As such, the measures only affect capital movements
indirectly. 477 Like Luisi & Carbone, where capital movements were

only a necessary by-product of the free movement of services,

8

here,

the movement of capital was incidental to the exercise of the right of
establishment. Because the freedom of establishment is directly

infringed, and the free movement of capital only incidentally, the
appropriate inquiry was how the various golden share mechanisms
infringed freedom of establishment.4 79
Furthermore, A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer contended that there
were some deficiencies in the Court's 2002 golden share decisions.480
Leaving aside the judgment against Portugal, which was
clear, he then
481 In Belgium, 482
compared the French regime with that of Belgium.
the Court made much of the legal certainty of the system in place: the
governmental representative on the board had only four days in which
weaknesses of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's opinion, see Kronenberger, supra note
13, at 125-27.
475. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. _, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), & C-98/01, Commission v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R.
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), Opinion of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 36.
476. See id. 36; see also Case C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, 39, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18, $ 39 (noting that government approval allows the government to ensure
that "the specific responsibilities" of the privatized undertakings are met); Case C483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
28, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49, $ 28 (noting that
ensuring that the decision-making body remain in France is essential to the protection
of the energy supplies); Case C-367/98, Portugal,2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, $$ 31-32, [2002]
2 C.M.L.R. 48, $$ 31-32 (arguing that the Portuguese government must have the
requisite level of control to ensure that the re-privatization goals are not frustrated);
Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 28, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 128 (noting
that the government needs the means to protect the energy policy from being
negatively affected by company decisions).
477. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, 36.
478. See Case C-286/82, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377,
22, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 52 (1984), $ 22.
479. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. _, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, $ 36.
480. See id. $$ 36-37.
481. Id. $$ 38-40.
482. Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002).
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to object, and the Minister then had twenty-one days to overturn the
board's decision .4" A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer noted, however, that
the French measure was also subject to strict time limits-the French
minister had one month in which to deny authorization.84 That was
only minimally longer than the time period which the Court allowed
in Belgium.4 s5
Moreover, the A.G. noted the lack of specificity in the Belgian
system; the government representative could object to any proposed
action which he deemed contrary to national energy policy.4" 6 The
Court found this to be an "objective criteria ' 487 sufficiently clear to
guarantee legal certainty. However, the A.G. did not believe this to
be so much more clear or precise than the French system of
opposition to any transfer or disposal of an asset identified in an
annex to the decree in question.488 The French law also indicated that
authorization would be denied in order to protect the national
interest,489 but the Court was not satisfied that this offered the same
level of protection as the Belgian law, which specifically stated that
490
the Minister was concerned with the national energy policy.
Apparently, this incremental amount of added specificity was enough.
Though the Court methodically evaluated each of the golden share
cases in the same manner, it remains unclear what is actually required
to meet the principle of legal certainty; indeed, it is much easier to
determine what fails to meet the test.

483. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [20031 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, $ 39; see also Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
49,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 1 49.
484. See id. $ 39. However, the French Minister was able to extend this time limit
by a further fifteen days. See id.
485. See Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 22, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50,
29. In Belgium, the Court found twenty-one days to be an acceptable time frame for
the Minister to act, whereas in the French regulation, the government had one month.
Id. 49.
486. See Joined Cases C-463/00, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. -,
[2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. -, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer,
38; see also Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
9,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 9.
487. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, $ 52, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 52.
488. See Joined Cases C-463100, Spain, 2003 E.C.R. ___ [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, & C98/01, United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. _, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 18, Opinion of A.G. RuizJarabo Colomer, 38.
489. See Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781, $ 50, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 49, 50 (2002).
490. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809,
9, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 9.
However, Fleisher finds that the two modes of control are in fact different in a very
important manner. According to Fleisher, the Belgian system restricted the
management of the company, whereas the French system restricted the access to the
company. See Fleisher, supra note 19, at 495. Such a distinction would seem to
reconcile the two decisions, but this distinction is not readily apparent in the
decisions, and the wording of the two systems is not so very different.
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III. WHAT LIES AHEAD

This part considers the future import of the golden share rulings.
Part III.A. identifies some recently commenced actions. Part III.B.
discusses the reaction by Member States, as well as both acceding and

applicant states, to the judgments. Finally, Part III.C. looks at the
broader role of the rulings within the context of the EU as an

institution.
The first golden share cases provide the framework for scrutinizing

future use and structure of golden share devices, but the fact-intensive
inquiry necessary to determine which derogations are compatible with

the Treaty49 ensures that these six cases are just a starting point.
Specifically, Portugal mandates that something more than an

economic or commercial objective is needed to justify restricting

capital flows,492 and France and Belgium are pivotal for defining the
scope of the proportionality requirement.4 93 The Belgian case ensures
that some golden shares comply with Community law,494 which is
precisely why the ECJ will hear more golden share cases. Spain and
United Kingdom illustrate the Court's application of the framework.4 95

Based on the Court's decisions and the arguments of the

Commission,4 96 one would expect that the existence of these golden
shares has had a great impact on investment in the EU. But the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (the
"OECD") concluded that barriers to inward foreign investment are

lower in EU Member States than in any other industrialized nation.497
The purpose of Article 56 and the free movement of capital is to

ensure that cross-border investment and capital flows are not

inhibited, 498 and it would seem that the existence of golden shares has
491. See supra Part II.
492. See Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, 52, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 9152; Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v.
Prime Minister, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1335, 17.
493. The French law was not as detailed as the Belgian Decrees, and failed to
provide the "objective and stable criteria" ultimately required for a golden share right
to be compatible with Community law. See Communication, supra note 20,
9.
Belgium threw a lifeline to the battered golden share, though, and ensured that these
special rights did not yet face extinction. See Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I4809, %55, [20021 2 C.M.L.R. 50, 9155 (permitting the use of the Belgian golden share
because it met the four-prong test).
494. See supra notes 377-93 and accompanying text.
495. See supra Part II.C.
496. See supra Part II.
497. In a worldwide review of investment movement, the OECD concluded that
the EU Member States have "the lowest barriers in the industrialised world to inward
foreign direct investment." Guy de Jonquieres, Europe Leads Way in Lack of Barriers
to Foreign Investment, Fin. Times, May 23, 2003, at 9. Of course, the results of the
OECD review are not adjusted to reflect the existence of restrictive measures, and it
is very likely that the results tell more about the existence and effectiveness of
restrictions elsewhere.
498. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to the
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not completely dissuaded investment movement. But Article 56 is
unequivocal, 499 and the Commission will certainly not give up the fight

to free the EU from all unnecessary restrictions.
A. Pending Action

The Commission is seriously contemplating taking action against
Germany for what it views as excessive state control over
Volkswagen. 00 The German state of Lower Saxony retains an
unusually high degree of control over Volkswagen. 50 1 Germany has
argued that the Volkswagen law (the "VW law") is simply the
German version of a golden share, and thus should not be attacked as
incompatible with Treaty obligations.502 Now that the Court has
spoken so decisively on golden shares,0 3 this argument is less likely to

prevail.
On March 19, 2003, the Commission sent Germany notice that, in
its view, this law was contrary to the free movement of capital and the

free movement of capital which are detailed in Article 58).
499. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
500. See, e.g., Aude Genet, EU Launches Action Against "Volkswagen Law," EU
Bus., Mar. 19, 2003, at http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/l05947/view.
501. A strict limitation on voting rights prevents any shareholder from exercising
more than twenty percent of the voting stock, regardless of how much stock they
actually own. See Breffni O'Rourke, Big Business in Europe-Global Outlook
Limited for
Vivendi,
Volkswagen,
EU
Bus.,
July
10,
2002,
at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2002/07/85779/view;
EU Launches Action
Against German Law Protecting VW Against Takeovers, EU Bus., Mar. 19, 2003, at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/105935/view. This guarantees the state
of Lower Saxony at least operational control of the company, despite state ownership
of only eighteen and a half percent of the company. EU Delays Decision on
Germany's Volkswagen Law by Two Weeks, EU Bus., Mar. 5, 2003, at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/104811/view. Additionally, this control
is further strengthened by the State's ability to name approximately half of the
shareholder representatives to the supervisory board. EU Launches Action Against
German Law Protecting VW Against Takeovers, EU Bus., Mar. 19, 2003, at
http://www.eubusiness.com/imported/2003/03/105935/view; see also Genet, supra note
500. Furthermore, for certain decisions, a majority vote of greater than eighty percent
is required. See Press Release, European Commission, Free Movement of Capital:
Commission Asks Germany to Justify Its Volkswagen Law (Mar. 19, 2003), available
at http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh
[hereinafter March Press
Release]. Though Volkswagen is publicly traded on exchanges throughout Europe,
New
York,
and
Japan,
see
http://www2.volkswagenir.de/index.php@id=392&type=2.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004), and is widely held
stock, the voting cap is a potential hindrance of capital movements, and as the Court
specifically stated in Trummer & Mayer, direct evidence of a restriction is not
necessary for a measure to infringe upon a fundamental freedom. Case C-222/97,
Trummer & Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1661, 1$ 26-28, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 1143 (1999), $1
26-28 (holding that measures which may dissuade investment, even if they do not
prohibit or directly restrict it, violate Article 56 EC).
502. See Equalising Shares-Governments Must Let Go of Privatised Companies,
Fin. Times, May 14, 2003, at 22.
503. See supra Part II.

2004]

THE ECJ'S GOLDEN SHARE DECISIONS

freedom of establishment.?"

2277

Germany continues to aggressively

defend the VW law.505 If the case goes to the ECJ, it is likely that the

German law will be put to the same four-part test used in the golden

share cases,50 6 even though the VW law is not structured as a

traditional golden share. 57 Like the Spanish protection of the banking
and tobacco industries, it is unlikely that protecting a car
manufacturer would be considered an imperative interest in the
national interest, or acceptable for public policy or public security
reasons.0 ' Like Portugal and Spain, Germany's objective does not
satisfy the Treaty requirements and does not merit derogation.50 9 In

the unlikely event that Germany is able to convince the Court that
there is an acceptable imperative need in the general interest for the
protection of Volkswagen, the measure would still be required to
fulfill the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. 10

The Commission has taken the first steps to bring proceedings
against the Netherlands, Italy, Luxemburg, and Denmark for use of
golden shares.511 The Netherlands holds a golden share in KPN, a

formerly state-owned telecommunications giant. 12 Despite the
Commission's stance, the Netherlands has indicated that it has no

504. Id. Germany was given eight weeks in which to justify these provisions, and if
it failed to do so, the Commission could issue a "reasoned opinion" and move on
toward litigation. See James Durance, Germany-East German Strike Pain Increases,
ForcingAutomakers to Revise Production Schedules, WMRC Daily Analysis, June 23,
2003, available at 2003 WL 56932252. It appears likely that such an opinion will be
sent, since Germany staunchly defended this law as consistent with EU law
throughout the two month period granted to it to justify the law. See id.; Haig
Simonian & Francesca Guerrera, Germany Resists EU Attempt to Outlaw VW
Takeover Protection, Fin. Times, June 21, 2003, at 9. Since the law effectively does the
same thing as a golden share, it clearly restricts the movement of capital.
505. Germany contends that the law is justified. See Renee Cordes, VW Back in
EU Headlights, Daily Deal, Jan. 16, 2004, available at 2004 WL 64605306.
Furthermore, the company is currently not doing very well financially, and there is
some fear of a takeover which would could result in many job cuts. See id.
506. See supra Part I.B.
507. See Cordes, supra note 505.
508. See supra notes 429-32 and accompanying text.
509. It is likely that the Court would view this as protection of an economic
interest, and as such, impermissible. See supra note 330 and accompanying text; see
also Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 35, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R.
18 (2003),
35; Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731,
52,
[2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 48 (2002), 52.
510. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
511. See Vincent Brophy, End of the Golden Age, Legal Wk., June 19, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 8422786; Julian Ellison & Duncan Reed, Getting Tough on
Golden Shares, Fin. Times (FT.Com), June 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57800177;
Ruling Paves the Way For Pan-EuropeanInvestment, Irish Times, May 17, 2003, at 18,
available at 2003 WL 20053490; see also Paul Meller, EU Sues Over Dutch 'Golden
Shares,' Int'l Herald Trib., Dec. 18, 2003, at 12, availableat 2003 WL 64834347.
512. See Press Release, Commission of the European Union, Free Movement Of
Capital: Commission Takes the Netherlands to Court of Justice on Special Powers in
KPN
and
TNT
(Dec.
17,
2003),
at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh.
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plans to relinquish its golden share in KPN.5 13 Italy is resisting
pressure by the Commission to relinquish a golden share in Telecom
Italia.514 In both cases, the ECJ could find that at least the first prong
of the test has been met.515
The Commission has also issued warnings to Italy and Spain
regarding laws in both nations which are designed to protect their
energy companies.5 16 Both regimes were put in place to protect
against acquisition by Itlectricit6 de France.5 17
All of this activity ensures that there will be more golden share

cases in the future. The Court in Spain stated that protection of the
telecom industry might, under the right circumstances, fall under the
public security exception." 8 The Court also held in Belgium that the

energy sector can justify a restriction of the free movement of capital

and the freedom of establishment.5 19 Therefore, any future inquiry by

the Court will focus on whether the laws imposed satisfy the principles
of proportionality and legal certainty-at least in regard to Telecom
Italia, Eni SPA, Enel, KPN and Endesa.
B. Reaction to the Decisions

1. Member States
Reaction by the Member States to the rulings in the golden share
cases has been mixed."' Popular opinion does not completely support
513. See Meller, supra note 511.
514. Fred Kapner, Italia Chief Still in Control, Fin. Times (London), July 20, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57801986. The golden share permits the state to veto the
acquisition of more than three percent of the company by an individual investor. Id.
515. Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581,
71, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), 71.
As regards the three other undertakings concerned, which are active in the
petroleum, telecommunications and electricity sectors, it is undeniable that
the objective of safeguarding supplies of such products or the provision of
such services within the Member State concerned in the event of a crisis may
constitute a public-security reason and therefore may justify an obstacle to
the free movement of capital
Id. (emphasis added).
516. See Orange, supra note 26; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
517. See Orange, supra note 26.
518. See supra note 515.
519. See Case 503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 1 46, [2002] 2
C.M.L.R. 50, 46 (2002).
520. France repealed its golden share in Elf-Aquitaine on October 3, 2002. See
Press Release, Commission of the European Union, Free Movement Of Capital:
Commission Calls On Portugal to Apply a Ruling of the Court Of Justice;
Proceedings Against France Are Closed (May 15, 2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh [hereinafter May Press Release].
The French repealed the golden share through Decree No. 2002-1231.
The
Commission officially declared the case closed on May 15, 2003. Id. A year after the
Court ruled in the 2002 cases, the case against France was officially closed, and the
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the decisions,5 21 and both Portugal and Spain have expressed
reluctance to comply with the rulings.522 But the Commission is not
Commission declared France compliant. See id. In May 2003, the Commission stated
that Portugal had failed to provide evidence that they have eliminated the restrictions.
Id. The U.K. quickly indicated that it would comply with the Court's ruling. See
Kevin Done, Government Loses BAA Golden Share, Fin. Times, Sept. 17, 2003, at 26.
Done also noted that the BAA is going beyond this and also plans to remove the
condition in its articles of association which limits voting rights of individual investors
to fifteen percent. Id.; see also Sean O'Grady, So Called Golden Shares Are the Base
Metal of Nationalism, The Independent, May 17, 2003, at 7, available at 2003 WL
20379256. However, the U.K. still holds golden shares in a number of companies,
including BAE Systems, British Energy and Rolls-Royce, among others. BAA
'Golden
Share'
Ruled
Illegal, BBC
News,
May
13,
2003,
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/3022809.stm; see also Ellison & Reed, supra note
511 (noting that the government in the U.K. still has golden shares in more than
twenty companies, and it is unlikely the Commission will stop with the BAA golden
share). Spain, on the other hand, has stated that it will not give up its golden shares in
Indra (defense and electronics), Telefonica (telecommunications), Repsol (oil), or
Endesa (power). Spain fears that "shortcomings of EU legislation in this area [will]
return the Spanish economy to a situation in which companies controlled by the state
have stakes in deregulated industries." Spain Remains Defiant over 'Golden Share'
(La Accion De Oro Solo Vetara A Empresas De CapitalPublico), Expansion, July 8,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Expansion File. However, there is some
likelihood that Spain will try to revise its golden share to fit into the Belgian model.
See Commission Sends Assent Against "Anti-EDF"Laws in Spain and Italy, Agence
Europe, July 10, 2003, availableat 2003 WL 58351621.
521. Some fear that the European Union is not really working to the best interests
of all the member states. See Graham Booth, Letter to the Editor, EU Meddling
Threatens Our Airports, W. Morning News, Sept. 30, 2003, at 4, available at 2003 WL
64568724. Mr. Booth expressed frustration with the appearance that the EU
manipulates the rules to the benefit of certain key cities, specifically Paris and
Frankfurt. Id. Mr. Booth's anger has some basis, at least on a superficial level, given
the recent concern over France and Germany's blatant disregard for the requirements
of the Stability and Growth Pact, and their subsequent ability to persuade the EU
Finance Ministers not to recommend they be forced to pay fines that would likely be
imposed on smaller EU nations which do not constitute such a large percentage of the
overall EU economy. See Ernst Welteke, The Pact's Principles Must Always Be
Protected, Fin. Times, Dec. 4, 2003, at 15 (discussing the damage to the "European
idea" caused by not penalizing Germany and France). Interestingly, the Commission
is considering taking legal action against the European Council for deciding not to
impose sanctions. See Enda O'Doherty, View from the European Press, Irish Times,
Jan. 19, 2004, at 8, availableat 2004 WL 61029250; Chris Flood, Preview: UK Interest
Rate Rise May Be Delayed, Fin. Times (FT.Com), Jan. 18, 2004, available at 2004 WL
56787003 (noting that the agenda for the EU finance ministers' meeting on January
18, 2003 included the Commission's threat to bring action against the Council). The
decision not to impose sanctions effectively seriously undermined the Stability and
Growth Pact. See Wolfgang Munchau, Flexible Rules for Europe Strictly Enforced,
Fin. Times, Jan. 19, 2004, at 13. The debate over this will undoubtedly reverberate
through EU politics. See George Parker & Bertrand Benoit, Brussels Insists on
Mounting Stability Pact Legal Challenge, Fin. Times, Jan. 14, 2004, at 2 ("The
spectacle of the Commission and the EU member states fighting in court over a
central plank of economic policy is a symptom of growing mistrust and ill feeling at
the heart of Europe."). There is some concern that golden share rulings demonstrate
only that the EU interferes in areas of national interest, where the EU does not
belong, and fear that "[t]he EU shifts power from democratic governments to elites
controlled by big corporations, seeking to create monopolies." Bob Glanville,
Activists Condemn EU Airport Ruling: Decision Prepares Ground For Hostile
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likely to stand idly by and permit individual states to disregard the
decision of the Court.523

Should Portugal and Spain continue to

ignore the decisions, the Commission can take further action and has
already indicated that it plans to initiate a proceeding against Portugal
for its failure to comply.5 24 Pursuant to Article 228, the Commission
may return to the Court and request that a penalty (lump sum or fine)
be imposed upon the delinquent Member State.525

Of course, the

suggestions of the Commission cannot bind the Court, 26 but the Court
has already demonstrated sympathy with the Commission's arguments
regarding the restriction of capital movements imposed by golden
shares. 27

2. Applicant and Acceding States

Privatization is not an historical artifact.528 It is still ongoing in
much of Central and Eastern Europe, and in other parts of the world,
such as Africa.529 Since many of the Central and Eastern European
Takeover, Morning Star, May 14, 2003, at 5, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Morning Star File (stating that the BAA ruling is "just another example of the
European Union meddling in politics and economics in Britain" (quoting Ian
Davidson, MP, chairman of Labour Against the Euro)). Such sentiments may have
no influence at all, as shown by the immediate compliance with the ECJ's ruling by
the U.K., even though voices of dissent have been heard. However, such sentiments
may strengthen the resolve of governments still battling to maintain their influence
over certain companies. And, since at least two nations have yet to comply, it is
apparent that there remains some dissatisfaction with the decisions at higher levels of
government. The fear that the EU is overshadowing national identity may fuel
support for the use of golden shares. On the other hand, some see their use as
"economic nationalism," which is contrary to the spirit of the EU, and not necessarily
the best business decision for some of these companies. See O'Grady, supra note 520.
522. Portugal has yet to comply with the decision. See May Press Release, supra
note 520. Spain also seems intent on ignoring the Court's ruling. See Follow My
Leader,The Bus., Jan. 18, 2004, availableat 2004 WL 60734799.
T[he] ... government has been stung into action by France and Germany's
methods of dealing with troublesome European Union rules by ignoring
them. After Paris and Berlin reacted to breaches of the stability and growth
pact by suspending the rules that would have imposed fines on them, Madrid
has decided to ignore the rules as they relate to golden shares.
Id.
523. See May Press Release, supra note 520 (publicizing the Commission's decision
to instigate action against Portugal for failure to comply).
524. See id.
525. EC Treaty art. 228(2).
526. Id.; see also Case C-387/97, Commission v. Greece, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5047,
89
("It should be stressed that these suggestions of the Commission cannot bind the
Court[,J ... [hiowever, the suggestions are a useful point of reference.").
527. With only one exception, the Court has been persuaded by the Commission's
arguments in the golden share cases. Only in the case of Belgium did the Court find
for the Member State rather than the Commission. See Case C-503/99, Commission v.
Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50 (2002).
528. Privatization is still ongoing in much of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as
in other parts of the world. See infra notes 529-30 and accompanying text.
529. For example, Ghana holds a golden share in Ashanti, a gold company. The
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nations are hoping to join the EU-some as early as May 2004-these
rulings have significant consequences for these nations and have not
gone unnoticed.530 Many are heeding the warning.
For example, Hungary is among the ten nations joining the EU in
2004.531 Hungary owns a golden share in MOL, an oil and gas
company. 32 The privatization agency, APV, has indicated that the
government's shares will be sold off over the next few years,533 but it
would like to hold on to its golden share as long as possible. 34
Hungary could still create a golden share in MOL, emulating the
scheme implemented by Belgium, which could withstand the Court's
scrutiny. Since the protection of the specific industries involved has

already been deemed an acceptable objective,535 the government need
only ensure that whatever law it fashions comports with the strict
requirements outlined in Belgium.536
Romania, which is not acceding to the Union in 2004, but has
applicant state status,537 has initiated proceedings to privatize SNP

golden share allows the Ghanian government to veto any company decision which
would alter the gold operation. See, e.g., Julie Bain, AngloGold Seeks Ashanti Shield,
Bus. Day (South Africa), Oct. 31, 2003, at 16, available at 2003 WL 66919947.
530. Both the Czech Republic and Poland are busy privatizing steel holdings in
order to comply with EU mandates on the limitation of state aid and new production
quotas, so it is obvious that the acceding states are paying close attention to the
mandates of EU law. See Polish and Czech Heavy Industries Undergo Painful
Transition,
EU
Bus.,
Oct.
26,
2003,
at
http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/031026025158.f65gm6ej.
There is no indication that
either state is attempting to maintain golden shares in these companies, which is just
as well, since it is highly unlikely that such restrictions could pass the justification
prong of the test.
531. See, e.g., http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/european-countries/neweu-members/
hungary/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
532. See Eral Yilmaz, Hungary-Tender for Advisor to MOL Privatisation
Attracts Five Bidders, WMRC Daily, Aug. 14, 2003, availableat 2003 WL 60322832.
533. See id.
534. See id. Despite the Court's determination that protectionist measures in the
energy and petroleum sectors can indeed be accepted under the right circumstances,
some still have the impression that such measures might not be permitted. See
Andrew Neff, Hungary Picks Citigroup to Steer State Sale of MOL Stake, WMRC
Daily, Sept. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60324264 ("[R]ecent rulings by the
European Court of Justice indicate that EU member state governments will not be
allowed to keep golden shares in 'strategic' formerly state-owned companies that have
largely passed into private hands.").
535. See Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
47, [20021 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002), 47 (citing to Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus.
& Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727,
34-35, [19841 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984), % 34-35, which
held that protection of petroleum supplies may permit restrictions on Treaty rights);
Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
50 (2002),
46 (permitting an indirect restriction on Article 56 and Article 43 rights
for protection of the nations' energy supplies).
536. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50.
537. See
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/europeanscountries/candidate-countries/
romania/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
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Petrom, which also operates in the oil and gas sectors,538 and has
indicated that the state would like to reserve a golden share in the
privatized company.53 9 Given the framing of the Court's decisions in

the golden share cases, Romania would also likely be able to craft a
golden share which would be acceptable to the ECJ. Because the

industries in question, oil and gas, meet the threshold requirement of
an acceptable objective, 540 Romania need only ensure that the law is

crafted in such a way as to be minimally restrictive
and that it meet
5 41
the principles of legal certainty and proportionality.

Another applicant state which is proceeding with privatization is

Bulgaria.542 Bulgaria is privatizing the telecom company BTC. 43
Bulgaria has reached an agreement with the British based, Americanowned, Advent for the sale of the company, but Bulgaria will retain a

golden share in the company. 54 As with Hungary and Romania, the
company operates in an industry which might justify some state
control,5 4 and therefore, so long as Bulgaria formulates the golden
share in a narrowly tailored, proportionate and precise way, it need

not conflict with EU law.
It is likely that nations undergoing privatization are now in a better
position to reserve golden shares and implement schemes to protect
industries of vital public interest or public security interest which will
hold up to the ECJ's scrutiny. Using the Court's decisions and tests as

guidance, nations can evaluate which industries might meet the
threshold acceptable objective test-such as MOL in Hungary and
538. See Valerie Mason, Romania Launches Petrom Privatizations,WMRC Daily,
Aug. 27, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60323703; see also Andrew Neff, Buyers Ready,
Seller Not: Romanian Government Postpones Sale of Petrom Again, WMRC Daily,
July 16, 2003, available at 2003 WL 58437985.
539. See Neff, supra note 538.
540. See Case C-483/99, France, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4781,
47, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 49,
47 (citing to Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984
E.C.R. 2727,
35, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984),
35, wherein the Court found
protection of petroleum supplies to be of fundamental importance to the national
security); cf. Case C-503/99, Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4809, 46, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 50,
46 (holding that safeguarding of energy supplies can meet the criteria for restricting
capital flows).
541. See generally Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 39, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 603 (1995),
39
(detailing the four required conditions for a restrictive law to be acceptable).
542. See
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/european_countries/candidate_countries/
bulgaria/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
543. See Boris Maleshkov, Chronology-No Quick End Seen to Stalled Bulgarian
Telecom PrivatisationSaga, Bulgarian News Dig., Oct. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL
61953039.
544. See id.; see also ELANA, Bulgarian Telecommunications Company Report 8
(Sept. 27, 2002) (detailing
the golden share retained in BTC), at
http://www.elana.net/market/researches/BTC 26.09.2002-ENG.pdf.
545. See Case C-463/00, Commission v. Spain, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4581, $ 71, [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 18 (2003), $ 71 (stating that the objective of ensuring the provision of
telecommunications service may "constitute a public security reason").
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Petrom in Romania.54 6 Using the Belgian system as a framework,5 47
some governmental control and influence can be maintained provided
that adequate safeguards are established to protect the affected
investors.548 There will likewise be some industries that cannot be

protected.

The Spanish ruling illustrates some such industries:

tobacco and commercial banking.549 It is also likely that, should the
German case get to the ECJ, car manufacturing will also be
excluded. 5 0 Nonetheless, there is a future for the use of a golden

share in the EU.
C. Effect of the Rulings
The Court's rulings in the golden share cases removed a large
obstacle to the ratification of a unified EU takeover law directive.

Creating a common law regarding cross-border takeovers has been a
goal of the EU since the Commission first expressed its intent to
prepare a directive on takeovers in 1985."1' The penultimate attempt
to adopt a takeover directive failed,552 in part because of vehement
German opposition which was motivated by fear that its large
companies, such as Volkswagen, would become a target for takeover
activity. 3 Unexpectedly, the Council finally succeeded in adopting a
takeover directive on December 16, 2003. 514 Though the adopted
version falls short of the ideal directive envisioned by internal market

commissioner Fritz Blokestein,

it is at least a step forward after

fourteen years of disagreement.

Though these six rulings will not

546. See supra notes 352-54 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 378-88 and accompanying text.
548. See supra Part II.B.3.
549. See supra notes 429-33 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 499-510 and accompanying text.
551. See, e.g., Completing the Internal Market, supra note 154, at 29. For a
summary of the developments and setbacks of the directive, see Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids, 2003 O.J.
(C 45E) 1. The Commission presented the initial proposal on January 19, 1989. The
latest attempt to pass the directive failed on July 4, 2001. See Eur. Parl. Doc. 2002 O.J.
(C 65E) 57, 113 (Minutes, 4 July 2001). See also High Level Group Report
(November), supra note 264; High Level Group Report (January), supra note 264;
Ruling Paves the Way for Pan-EuropeanInvestment, supra note 511.
552. See Eur. Par. Doc. 2002 O.J. (C 65E) 57 (Minutes, 4 July 2001). For a
discussion of the actions taken by the Commission in reaction to the rejection of the
directive, see Charles M. Nathan & Michael R. Fischer, An Overview of Takeover
Regimes in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, PLI Corp. L. & Prac. 1163,
1200-01 (2002).
553. See Equalising Shares; Governments Must Let Go of Privatised Companies,
Fin. Times, May 14, 2003, at 22.
554. See Daniel Dombey, ParliamentBacks Deal on European Takeover Directive,
Fin. Times, Dec. 17, 2003, at 3.
555. See id.; MEPs Approve Embattled Takeover Law, Euro. Voice, Dec. 18, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 61201927; Daniel Schwammenthal, EU ParliamentApproves
Watered-Down Takeover Code, Dow Jones Int'l News, Dec. 16, 2003, available at
WESTLAW, File No. 322-285-0131.
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bridge all of the differences between the Member States and their
approach to takeover law, they do alter the landscape of European
takeover law. The underlying reasoning behind disallowing most uses
of golden shares556 may well be applied to other protectionist or
defensive measures in the future, including the Volkswagen law.557
Because it is clear that the Court draws from previous case law when
facing new challenges, it is safe to say that the golden share rulings
will have a role in future EU legal developments.
The Court, perhaps more than any other body, has promoted the
realization of the Treaty's goal of a single European integrated
market.
Ultimately, this goal cannot be realized absent free
movement of capital. In limiting the use of golden shares, the Court
has taken an important step.
It is clear that the rulings limit the ability of Member States to use
the powerful golden share tool as an effective defense to takeovers.
For example, Portugal Decree law No. 380/93, which was declared
558 was
incompatible with the Treaty in Commission v. Portugal,
activated and used in 1998 to prevent a shareholder from acquiring
more than ten percent of Portucel.55 9 In 2000, the same law blocked a
hostile takeover attempt of Cimpor. 60 It is unlikely that these
companies would have been able to fend off takeover attempts in the
absence of the golden share. The golden share rulings level the
playing field to some extent, while still allowing Member States to
protect essential national interests.
CONCLUSION
While the Treaty gives expression to the underlying spirit and
purpose of the Community, it is the Court that breathes life into its
express and implied rights and obligations. The ability of the Court to
apply important principles to all of the freedoms has allowed
Community law to develop quickly and more comprehensively than it
otherwise might.
Drawing upon previous case law, the Court has formulated a
framework for analyzing golden shares. Because of the fact-intensive
nature of the inquiry into whether a specific golden share system is
acceptable, this framework will certainly continue to be invaluable
both to the nations hoping to maintain their golden shares, and to the
Commission in evaluating which systems infringe upon the free
movement of capital.

556. See supra Part II.
557. See supra notes 500-02 and accompanying text.
558. Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4731, [2002] 2 C.M.L.R.
48 (2002).
559. See Cdmara, supra note 12, at 511.
560. See id.
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The rulings are very important for several reasons. First, on a
practical level, they provide a framework for future analysis of golden
shares. 6' Second, from a broader perspective, the decisions embraced
some of the key principles, such as proportionality and legal
certainty,562 established regarding other fundamental freedoms,
importing elements which can now safely be called fundamental
principles, into the law of capital movements. Third, the judgments
are a big step toward accomplishing an integrated market. Finally, on
a practical level, the judgments provide guidance for future golden
shares-they may still be used to protect vital public interests, thus the
Court did not eviscerate Member States' ability to protect truly
important national interests.
The decisions are not completely satisfying, however. The Court's
refusal to face the Article 43 issue squarely5 63 is frustrating,
particularly in light of A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer's persuasive
argument in favor of an establishment analysis. The Court has also
failed to define adequately what is required to meet the legal certainty
requirement. Thus, future golden share cases will play a role in
clarifying these issues.

561. Many such systems still exist, and the Commission, perhaps emboldened by
these decisions, has instigated action against other Member States. Undoubtedly, any
of these infractions which end up before the ECJ will be subjected to the same
scrutiny as the previous six were.
562. See supra notes 191, 216 and accompanying text.
563. See supra note 428 and accompanying text.

Notes & Observations

LECTURE
A SECULAR THEORY OF NATURAL LAW
Lloyd L. Weinreb*
I appreciate the invitation of the Fordham Natural Law Colloquium
to make this presentation.
My topic is certainly within the
Colloquium's jurisdiction, which is to say, it concerns natural law.1 I
shall ask you to put aside another version of natural law, with which
you are likely much more familiar: the version expressed by Thomas
Aquinas in the thirteenth century, which, since the fourteenth century,
has been an integral part of the doctrine of the Catholic Church. It is
not part of my purpose to question that doctrine or to argue that it is
not properly called natural law. It is also true, however, that
Thomistic philosophy did not arise in the thirteenth century out of
thin air. If it was a new beginning, nevertheless it emerged out of a
long tradition that had developed over more than 1,500 years and
continued to develop after the fourteenth century in other directions.
If Thomism represents the high point and greatest flourishing of
natural law, that larger tradition has also to be considered.
I set the church doctrine of natural law aside because it is integrally,
inextricably bound up with the Catholic faith. Natural law did not
lead Thomas to that faith, which was unquestioned. His view of
natural law proceeded from that faith and depended on it. It would
be presumptuous of me, not sharing that faith, to speak about it to
you. My topic is not religious but intellectual. That is not to suggest
that natural law as a matter of faith is not also a matter of reason. It
was, after all, Thomas's great achievement to show that faith and
reason need not be altogether separate. But my topic is intellectual
only, intellect unaided by faith.
The questions I want to address are first: Is there any theory of
* Dane Professor of Law, Harvard

Law School; Visiting Professor, Fordham
University School of Law, Fall 2003.
1. This Lecture was originally prepared as a talk for the Natural Law
Colloquium, sponsored by the Law School and Department of Philosophy of
Fordham University. The talk was presented at the Law School on December 1, 2003.
The material for the talk was drawn from two books: Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Natural Law and Justice (1987) [hereinafter Weinreb, NL&J], and Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Oedipus at Fenway Park: What Rights Are and Why There Are Any (1994)
[hereinafter Weinreb, OAFP]. This Lecture is a largely unaltered transcription of the
talk. References to the books on which it is based have been added.
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natural law, any viewpoint or world view unaided by faith, that is
properly called natural law? And second: If there is, is it worth our
attention? My answer to both questions is yes.
The questions are hardly ever asked. A secular theory of natural
law had a brief efflorescence after World War II, as a school of
jurisprudence associated, in the United States, mainly with Lon
Fuller.2 It is not irrelevant that the wellspring of that jurisprudence
was an agonized reaction to the phenomenon of Nazi law. As the
agony has faded, so also has the jurisprudence that sprang from it.
Ronald Dworkin has sometimes flirted with the notion of a secular
natural law in his theory of a "right answer" or "law as integrity."3
But it is only a flirtation, an effort to have all the girls at the dance on
one's dance card. And even at that, Dworkin's is a theory of
jurisprudence, which is not my main concern. Full-blown secular
natural law has had little staying power and for the present has little
influence. My intention is to return to the original natural law
tradition, the tradition out of which the doctrines of Thomas emerged,
and to ask whether, those doctrines apart, anything can be found in
the tradition that speaks to our present circumstances.
A distinct philosophy of natural law emerged clearly in fifth century
Athens. The opposing views pervaded Greek thought, not only
philosophy but also history and literature, the great tragedies above
all. It is expressed most forcefully in the tragedies of Sophocles, as his
response to a profound debate about the significance, or meaning, of
human existence--or rather, whether human existence has any
significance or meaning beyond the events themselves. Is it finally the
case, as Jocasta says to Oedipus, that "chance is all in all," 4 or is there
some larger stage on which human lives are played out?
In
philosophical terms, the debate was between those, like Plato, who
believed that there is a natural order and those, notably the Sophists,
who believed that order, however deeply rooted, is imposed by human
contrivance. The idea of natural order (physis) beyond the contrived
human order (nomos) meant more than bare causal order. The word
for that was not physis but tyche, blind chance or necessity, without
meaning. The order at stake, natural or human, was a normative
order. I single out Sophocles among the three great tragedians
because he stands between Aeschylus, whose view of the cosmos
seems more religious than philosophical (although the Greeks would
not have made the separation as we do) and Euripides, who repeats
the formulas of divinely ordained natural order without much
conviction, as, at best, part of the question. For Sophocles, the
affirmation of moral order was a resolution, not a challenge or a
2. Weinreb, NL&J, supra note 1, at 101-08.
3. Id. at 117-22.
4. Sophocles, Oedipus the King 9, 52 (David Grene trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2d
ed. 1991) (n.p., n.d.) (line 977).
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complaint.
It meant that Oedipus's suffering, or Creon's or
Philoctetes's, all different in their circumstances, was not merely the
play of blind forces. However bitter, it was, when all was revealed, as
it ought to be and, therefore, had to be.5
There is a direct line from these ruminations, by way of the Greek
and Roman Stoics and later the Roman lawyers and Church fathers
and Christian theologians, to Thomas Aquinas.6 Cicero, not himself
an original thinker, provided the phrase "natural law."7 Brought into
contact with Christian belief in a personal, all-embracing God, the
normative natural order of the Greeks became Divine Providence, in
which human beings, able in some measure to provide for themselves,
have a share. Thomas Aquinas, of course, brought that to fruition in
his doctrine of natural law:
[T]he rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by
being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a
share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to
its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in
the rational creature is called the natural law.8
In this way, natural law preserved the crucial elements of the Greek
physis. It was real, and it was normative. Thereafter, aside from
Christian theology, although the tradition of natural law continued, it
lost that duality, which the intellectual separation of "is" and "ought"
made impossible outside of religion. In the guise of a doctrine of
natural rights as, still later, in jurisprudence, natural law became one
kind of moral theory, the distinctive quality of which was that it was
said to be true, even self-evidently true. Reality, or nature, and
especially the interconnectedness of the right and the real was not in
the case, except as an expression of what one took to be
incontrovertibly true.9 Puzzlement about humankind's place in nature
was refashioned as a question of the relationship between the
individual and the state, to which natural law in various guises,
adapted to fit the theory at hand, provided an answer. It is instructive
to look at the great political philosophers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries-Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau-in that light.1"
In jurisprudence, the legal positivists accused the natural law theorists
of confusing "is"and "ought," because they conflated questions about
what the law is with questions about what the law ought to be, and, so
the positivists said, asserted that a very bad law was not law at all.
5. Weinreb, NL&J, supra note 1, at 15-35.
6. Id. at 43-66.
7. Id. at 39-42.
8. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 91, art. 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947) (n.p., n.d.).
9. See Weinreb, NL&J, supra note 1, at 108-15.
10. Id. at 62-96.
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Natural law theorists responded that the legal positivists made
questions about one's obligation to obey law trivial. And in truth, for
all the anguish that lay behind it, the whole debate seemed trivial.
Because the case for natural law did not go beyond the assertion of
moral certitude, it appeared that the debate had to do not with what is
the case but merely with what label to apply. 1
To the modern mind, the original conception of natural law, the
idea of physis, a normative natural order, is simply a fundamental
mistake.
The separation of "is" and "ought," description and
prescription, is not a theory or position; it is a given, where we start. It
can, however, be demonstrated, I believe, that the idea of justice, as
we understand and use it, contains an incoherence-the antinomy of
freedom and cause at the individual level, and the antinomy of liberty
and equality at the level of community-that only a conception of
normative natural order resolves. Far from supplanting the Greek
view, we have merely hidden the problem out of sight and agreed not
to talk about it. And so the question is whether, without requiring too
great a suspension of disbelief, there is any aspect of the real that
contains an indisputable normative element.
I believe that there is. Oddly, the natural rights theorists had it
right. But because their interests, both intellectually and practically,
were not ontological but political, they did not recognize what they
had and came out in the wrong place.
The place where nature and the moral order intersect is the matter
of rights. The division between persons and things is an inescapable
fact about our experience of the world. The distinction does not rest
merely on physical or mental differences, although departures from
the norm in those respects may make hard cases. Rather, the
distinction is that persons are responsible and, as responsible, have
rights; things are not responsible and have no rights.
We are looking for a place in the description of the world as it is
that in and of itself implicates normative conclusions; that is, we are
looking for a locus of the normative in nature. The only phenomenon
that meets that description-as opposed to the view that nothing can
meet it-is persons, regarded as bearers of rights. That rights have
normative implications or, if you like, are normative concepts, is
evident. Perhaps it is the case-pace Immanuel Kant-that rights can
be overridden; but they unquestionably have a bearing, a strong
bearing, on how one ought to behave. More controversial is the other
side of the matter: that who has rights and what rights they have is a
matter of fact.
For a start, the grammar of rights is instructive. We speak about
many rights, many sorts of rights, in a normative mode. "Everyone
ought to have a right to medical coverage." "Some groups in the
11. Id. at 97-101, 259-63.
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population ought to have a right to preference for municipal jobs or
college admissions"-or "No one ought to have such a right." "Gay
persons ought to have a right to marry." The grammar changes when
we reach the level of "natural rights" or "human rights." It is no
longer appropriate to use the normative mode. "Everyone ought to
have a natural right to food and shelter." "There ought to be a human
right to reasonable employment." "Gay adults ought-or ought notto have a natural right to engage in consensual sex." We do not speak
that way (unless our words are surrounded with quotation marks) for
good reason. Either there is such a right or there is not. Of course,
the right may or may not be honored. And one can say that this
country or that ought to honor the human right to food and shelter
better than it does, or that it ought to recognize the human right to
work, or that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ought to
include reference to some particular right. But to whom, to what,
could a claim simply that something ought to be a natural right, which
is to say, a human right, properly be addressed? Such a claim amounts
to an assertion that the natural order ought to be different. Natural
rights, or human rights, are asserted as a matter of fact, to which the
proper response is not, "I think-don't think-that would be a good
idea," or "I agree" or "I don't agree," but simply "True" or "False." 2
The facticity of rights has always been the great stumbling block to
an analysis of rights. Judith Thomson made rights the focus of years
of fruitful scholarship, but in the end she says that rights are
unanalyzable. They are simply "moral facts." Putting aside the
objection that there are not supposed to be any moral facts, what are
they? Thomson seems generally to disregard the implications of the
very phrase she uses.13

The short response is: there are no moral facts, and there are no
natural, or human, rights. To say that a right is "natural" or "human"
is to say only that one thinks it is a very important right, one that
ought to be recognized for all persons. Although the statement,
"There ought to be a natural right to food and shelter" is meaningless,
the statement that every nation ought to recognize a right to food and
shelter for all its people is not. And, speaking carefully, that is all that
the former statement means. It is a rhetorical flourish and nothing
more. So, rights are only normative after all.
That method of avoidance does not work, because we need a
concept of rights in its strong form to account for the difference
between persons and things. That difference is a structural fact of our
experience. And the core of the difference is the notion of
responsibility, the difference between being the cause of some
occurrence and being, in the full sense that implicates moral
12. Weinreb, OAFP, supra note 1, at 13-21.
13. See id. at 37-39.
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judgment, responsible for it. By "structural fact" I mean a proposition
that cannot be contradicted without altering the nature of our
experience, not just in some concrete particulars but fundamentally,
making it a different experience altogether. To deny that persons are
responsible (or, for that matter, to assert that things are responsible) is
not like denying that human beings have opposable digits or denying
that any human beings live on Staten Island. Those propositions are
startling enough, but we would adjust, if only by supposing that the
denial was play-acting. Strict behaviorists may deny that human
beings are responsible in this sense, but they do not behave as if it
were so. If they did, we should lock them up. To deny the
responsibility of persons does not merely contradict something that
we believe strongly to be true. It transforms the nature of what we, as
human beings, experience. To translate a description of behavior that
we think responsible into a description entirely in terms of causes is
not equivalent, because responsibility has no equivalent in those
terms. 14
Speaking about responsibility as the difference between persons
and things, I referred to human beings, because broadly speaking,
leaving aside troubling cases at the edges-infants, the very aged, the
comatose-all human beings are persons, that is, are responsible
beings. Again, leaving aside some possibly troubling cases-the
Planet of the Apes-only human beings, defined simply by birth to a
human mother, are persons. Those propositions would be tested if a
creature from another planet altogether unlike us physically exhibited
a sense of human responsibility. Would we regard the creature as a
person? (To suggest the profound implications of the question,
consider how an affirmative answer would affect the story of Genesis.
Or consider how the story of Genesis indicates an answer.)"
There are many puzzles about responsibility. Hardest of all are not
the cases of unusual individual beings or beings in stages of the life
cycle in which responsibility is generally lacking. The latter cases are
generally resolved by regarding birth to a human mother as
establishing a conclusive presumption of personhood, even if
responsibility is temporarily or permanently lacking.
The
presumption is accepted the more easily because persons who are
indubitably responsible pass regularly through periods when they are
not, like sleep. Rather, the hardest puzzle is the ordinary ascription of
responsibility in the standard case of an adult, competent person. We
take it for granted that one is responsible in a moral sense, the sense
that implies desert, only for conduct that is self-determined. Just as a
hurricane is not responsible in that sense for the devastation that it
causes, and a puppy is not responsible for the mess it leaves on the
14. Id. at 45-46.
15. See id. at 101-13.
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floor, a person is not responsible in that sense for bumping into
someone if he is shoved from behind, for crying out if he is stuck with
a pin, or for any of the conduct about which he might say, "I couldn't
help it." Usually that is an empirical question, although there is
plenty of ambiguity, plenty of difficult, close cases, and plenty of
disagreement. But generally there is a pattern, understood and
accepted by us all.16
SelfThe pattern is illustrated by our practice of excuses.
determination is not a quality of action that we observe, like speed or
agility. We speak of someone acting with determination, not of acting
with self-determination. But in a general way, even if conduct is of a
kind for which we ordinarily regard persons as responsible, we regard
as not self-determined conduct that has a recognized, identifiable
causal explanation that places the person outside the endless variety
of the ordinary. Not regarded as excuses are any of the ordinary
qualities of one's nature-intelligence, good looks, physical strength,
or their lack-or any of the ordinary qualities of nurture-loving,
supporting, economically successful parents, or their lack. Some rise
above their individual circumstances, and some fall below theirs. But
we suppose that attributes such as industriousness and determination
(not self-determination) are also a product of nurture and, more and
more it turns out, nature-the chemical composition of the body, the
shape and mass of the brain-both beyond our control.
In fact, the determinist argues that everything we are now is
traceable to who, what, we were, in an unbroken chain of cause and
effect, circumstance and consequence. That is true as a matter of fact,
since whatever else we may be, we are part of the natural order. And
it is true as a matter of principle. For if an action that a person takes
now is not, however indirectly, a determinate consequence of the
person's individual attributes that are themselves fully determined in
the same way, how is it anything more than happenstance, not his
normatively, in a way that makes him responsible, but only an event
that happened to him, in which he happened to be embroiled, much as
Oedipus was unwillingly and unwittingly embroiled in the destiny of
the Theban royal house and, despite himself, fulfilled the oracle's
prophecy that he would kill his father and commit incest with his
mother. 7
The notion of human responsibility requires that our acts be free,
that is to say self-determined and not determinate. But, at the same
time, unless an act is fully determined by the person as he is and not
by anything else, it is not his in the necessary sense. It is a true
antinomy, not resolvable by halves, some of one and some of the

16. See id. at 40-65.
17. See id. at 46-51.
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other. The autonomy on which responsibility and desert depend
requires that actions be fully undetermined and fully determined.
The scope of the antinomy is indicated by our extraordinary, not to
say desperate, solutions. For the ancient Greeks, the solution was that
Oedipus was responsible for the circumstances of his being, that to be
Oedipus, the person that he was, was to do as he did. Responsibility
attaches to his self, because the natural order is itself normative. We,
of course, reject that solution out of hand. We are not responsible for
what we cannot help. Some years ago, an official in the Department
of Education, evidently a student of classical Greece, asserted publicly
that a person should be held responsible for physical handicaps due to
birth defects, which the official said reflected a person's inner worth.
The official was excoriated in the press and finally resigned from her
government position.18
Kant's solution was to remove the
autonomous self to an ineffable, noumenal plain, from which all traces
of the phenomenal, causally determinate self are removed. But, of
course, we are interested in the actions of the responsible self within
the phenomenal universe. The person whom we reward and punish is
the phenomenal self, with all those actual attributes.
Kant's
argument, as he acknowledged, is not a solution but a thorough,
rigorous statement of the problem. Or the currently favored approach
of Strawson and others: There simply are two perspectives, the
scientific and the moral. There is no unified perspective, nor need
there be. All that is required is to specify the point of view. But it is
not so, again because the person to whom we respond one way or the
other is one and the same person, acting freely or not, with all his
characteristics, his self.19
Abstracted from reference to an individual person, the puzzle of
human responsibility is lodged within the notion of justice. Hence, the
title of my book, Oedipus at Fenway Park. If Oedipus's fate was, as
we think, unjust, why is it just that Roger Clemens gets to play for the
Red Sox (as it then was) rather than some young man who
desperately wants to play in the major leagues but has a bad pitching
arm, never makes a base hit, and bobbles the ball in the field-all of
which he tries ceaselessly to overcome. Our response is peremptory:
Clemens just is a better ball player. He is Roger Clemens, and being
Roger Clemens, the person that he is, he deserves to play for the
team. But isn't that like the Greek answer to the fate of Oedipus-he
is Oedipus-an answer that we reject out of hand? Nor can the two
cases be distinguished because baseball is only a game. Try telling
18. See Philip Shenon, Weicker and Education Chief in Sharp Clash, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 17, 1985, at B4; The Philosopherand the Handicapped, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18,
1985, at A26; Stephen Engleberg, Two Aides Quit Education Dept. in Dispute Over
Views on Disabled, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1985, at A19; Handicapping Education,
Newsweek, Apr. 29, 1985, at 33.
19. See Weinreb, OAFP, supra note 1, at 51-55.
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that to the young man-or, one might add, to all those Red Sox fans
who waited out those extra innings last October. But, in any case, just
the same argument might be made across the river, where the
question is not who plays for the Red Sox but who is admitted to
Harvard. That, we all agree, is not a game, or not only a game. z° In
this way, the antinomy of freedom and cause is reflected in the
The former reflects the
antinomy of desert and entitlement.
individual, autonomous actor, responsible and incurring desert.
Entitlement reflects the just background order that alone gives
meaning to individual responsibility and desert. And rights are the
means by which we make the distinction. 1
To say that a person has a right to do, or to be, something is to say
that he is responsible for what he does or is. Nothing more. That, and
only that, is the source and explanation of the facticity of rights.
Having a right to do something does not mean that one will do it or
ought to do it. More often than not, the assertion of a right suggests
that perhaps one ought not act in that way. A right to do something is
also, necessarily, a right not to do it; for if one did not have a right not
to do it, there would be no point in saying that one has a right to do it.
Rights constitute our autonomous selves. Having a right, one is
responsible for its exercise (or nonexercise). Not having a right, one is
subject to the causal order of nature or, as we usually think of it, to a
humanly imposed constraint; one is not responsible and does not incur
desert. The normative natural order is the order in which we, as
natural beings, are also bearers of rights and exercise responsibility. 2
That is a lot to swallow. Let me elaborate and add some footnotes.
I am speaking of rights as attributes of a person simply as a person,
not as American or British, professor or student, member of this club
or that. That is, since all human beings are persons and all persons are
human beings, I am speaking of human or, as they used to be called,
natural rights. In any more particular role, as an American or
professor or club member, a person may be granted additional rights,
or not granted additional rights that others are granted, for
instrumental reasons. If additional rights are granted, then within the
bounds of and according to the terms of the community that grants
them, a person is responsible for what he does. To say that one has a
right is not necessarily to say that the right is honored, and if it is not,
within that community a person is not responsible for the
consequence in question. To say that a person does not have a right is
not necessarily to say that he lacks the power; and if he exercises the
power, he will be subject to blame for acting without right. But if a
person does exercise the power, albeit without right, it demonstrates
that he has the right to liberty that enables him to do so. So a thief,
20. Id. at 66-73.
21. See Weinreb, NL&J, supra note 1, at 184-223.
22. Weinreb, OAFP, supra note 1, at 74-100.
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who has no right to steal a wallet, is responsible for doing so, and
subject to punishment, is able to do so only because he has the rightthe right to liberty-to determine his conduct. It would be another
matter entirely if he lacked that right. Then we should put him in a
cage-or prison-and prevent him directly from stealing a wallet.
Because we tend to think of rights as things that can be granted or
withheld, honored or ignored, it is easy to think of them not as a
matter of fact but as something that one ought, or ought not, to have.
But it is just that facticity of rights-moral facts-that gives us all the
difficulty. In just the same way, responsibility is a matter of fact
(although it may be a much contested matter of fact). A person is or
is not responsible for this or that. It makes no sense to say that a
person ought to be responsible. That is like saying a chipmunk ought
to be responsible. To whom could such a statement be addressed? Of
course, a person may behave responsibly or not, and if the latter, he
may incur blame. But a person incurs no blame if he is not in fact
responsible for the conduct in question.
For human beings, therefore, apart from nature and a part of it,
rights specify the boundary between constitutive attributes, those that
define us individually as autonomous, responsible beings, and
circumstantial attributes, those that happen to us, with respect to
which we are natural beings, within a chain of cause and effect. So
long as we refer to a person's attributes descriptively, there is no need
to distinguish constitutive and circumstantial attributes. But when we
refer to a person normatively, as an autonomous being, acting
responsibly and incurring desert, there is a need to make that
distinction, because he is not responsible for, and incurs no desert for,
circumstances that happen to him, not by him. Circumstantial
attributes are subject to amelioration or limitation for instrumental
reasons, reasons of social policy, because they are not deserved but
merely circumstantial. Constitutive attributes, on the other hand, are
deserved and constitute a person as he is normatively, and they may
not justly be limited or, without unjustly depriving some other,
ameliorated.23
Consider affirmative action. Are the educational handicaps of
many African-Americans in this country-lack of family models,
parents who are not alumni of prestigious institutions, bad
schooling-constitutive or circumstantial? If they are constitutive,
simply who that person is, like Roger Clemens's good right arm, then
they are deserved, and there is no reason why they should be
ameliorated by affirmative action. But if they are circumstantial, the
effects of circumstances without normative significance, then they are
undeserved and ought to be ameliorated, in order to satisfy the
demands of justice. Amelioration, of course, is not cost-free. It
23. Id. at 87-100.

2004]

A SECULAR THEORY OFNATURAL LAW

2297

requires the limitation of someone else's opportunities to use his
favorable attributes to his advantage, and, unless those attributes are
not constitutive, the limitation will be unjust. 24 The same could be
asked of other attributes, such as a high IQ or low IQ, with respect to
anyone. We can always ameliorate or the reverse, if not directly, then
by the example of the Wizard of Oz. If we cannot give the Scarecrow
a brain, we can give him a college degree. If we cannot give the
Cowardly Lion courage, we can give him a medal and a seat on the
dais, which is probably all he wanted anyway. And if we cannot take
away the powers of the Wicked Witch of the West, we can tax her
profits. So long as a person has her rights, and only her rights,
responsibility makes sense and the demands of justice are met. If a
person has more or less than what she has a right to, justice is denied.
But isn't this manner of speaking-the constituted self and its
attributes, and the circumstantial self and its attributes-willfully
confusing? There is, after all, only one person with all her attributes.
Yes. So long as the matter at hand is not a matter of the person's
desert-or responsibility. If that is our concern, then attention to the
distinction is unavoidable, because desert depends on responsibility,
and responsibility depends on the freedom that is the antinomy of
cause; that is to say, it depends on rights. The unity of our being is not
a part of the puzzle; rather, it is an essential aspect of the solution.
Responsible conduct is self-determined, that is both not determined
and fully determined according to one's self. That is the human
condition, and only the human condition. Things, animals, are not
persons, they are not responsible, and they do not have rights. So
also, angels, whose nature it is always to will the good, have no rights.
They have no need of them. Responsibility, for angels, is out of the
question.
What rights, then, does a person have? Proceeding from the
premise that all and only human beings are persons, what human
rights are there, rights that all humans, merely as humans, have?
Rights are an implication of autonomy, or personhood, so we start
from there. I should say that the human rights are these:
1. The right not to be subjected to constraints too great to be
resisted. Since human beings are, as a matter of fact, persons, they
must have a domain of autonomous action that is not restricted by
the power of others.
2. The right to physical and mental well-being. Perhaps it is
always possible to try. But one must have some capacity, some
possibility of effective action, to believe that it is worthwhile to
try. So there is a right to well-being. The satisfaction of basic
human needs-food and shelter-is an aspect of this right.
3. The right to education. Effective agency, autonomous action, is
24. See id. at 181-95.
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a matter of intellect as well as will. One must have a capacity to
reflect congruent with one's situation.
4. The right to moral consciousness. One must be aware of
oneself as not merely a source of power, like an electrical storm or
a wild beast, but as a moral actor. One has a right to development
as a moral being.
5. The right to moral opportunities. One must not have all one's
choices made for one, even if they are made in one's favor. One
must not be so educated or trained, like Rousseau's citizen or
Winston in Nineteen Eighty-Four25 that he always chooses the
good, or what passes for the good. Angels are not persons. There
is a human right not to dwell in paradise.26
Other human rights are sometimes mentioned. The right to what
one has. The right to equal dignity and respect. The right to life.
Each of these asserted rights refers to some value that may be thought
to be of great, even overriding, importance. I do not want to
contradict that. I should say, however, without elaborating the point
here, that none of those rights is an indisputable condition of
responsibility. For that reason, I qualify them not as rights but rather
as basic components of the good.2 7
The human rights that I have identified are glaringly imprecise.
And, inasmuch as they belong to all human beings, they do not
differentiate among individuals.
Yet responsibility is insistently
individual. How do we justify concretely differential individual
attributes?
The former issue-the rights common to all-are
important, desperately so, in a world where so often rights are denied
for so many. But we need also to understand the basis for differential
rights, not the rights that we all have in common, but the rights that
each of us as an individual has, which differentiate us normatively.
We do not start from an abstract principle. Autonomy is not a
derivation of reason (even for Kant, whose moral theory sought not to
derive autonomy from reason but rationally to derive the conditions
of autonomy, taken as a given).
We start from the concrete
experience of persons as persons, and consequently the direction of
thought is from concrete particulars to the abstract and general. The
source of individual rights that differentiate us one from another is
found in experience.
One must look to the deep normative
conventions of the community for the bounds of personhood, what is
constitutive and what circumstantial. That is not to say that whatever
is, is right. Rather I mean what the Ancient Greeks meant by nomos,
the constantly reconsidered, deepest, weightiest aspects of a
community's way of life, what we commonly refer to as civil rights.
25. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Penguin Group 2003) (1949).
26. Weinreb, OAFP, supra note 1, at 114-22.
27. Id. at 122-36.
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Not only the contested, potentially vulnerable rights we usually refer
to as civil rights-the right to vote, the rights specified in the Bill of
Rights-but also, and more important, the deepest understanding
about the contradictory values of liberty and equality that define a
community: What an individual can withhold from, or demand from,
the community, and what the community can demand from, or
withhold from, an individual. The rights that define a person are
always in some state of flux. They conjoin what is and what ought to
be. In that way, the abstract conjunction of is and ought is brought
concretely down to earth.28
Issues about affirmative action are so difficult because the
community's way of life is deeply conflicted. The intractable question
is how to regard the differential attributes of African-Americans and
others who have been and are deprived as not deserved, not
constitutive, and, therefore, appropriate for amelioration, without
regarding the differential attributes of others who have fared better as
similarly not constitutive and, therefore, appropriate for limitation.
Both sides perceive the issue, correctly, as a matter of justice, because
their individual worth, or desert, is at stake, according to the nomos of
the community.29 So also, to answer the question whether a person
who is gay has distinct rights associated with sexual orientation, one
must look to the actual practices of the community. In 1994, when my
book Oedipus at Fenway Park was published, I concluded that the
nomos of this community, reflected in open acknowledgement of gay
sexuality by public figures, participation of openly gay persons in
every kind of public event, frank portrayal of gay sexuality in the
theatre, movies, fiction, and so forth, indicated a right to one's own
sexual identity, whether deliberately chosen or not.3" The Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas3 confirmed that. But that is not
so in every country and, even in the United States, such a conclusion is
as tenuous as the public attitudes on which it rests.
So, to return to the beginning, can what I have outlined properly be
regarded as a theory of natural law? The answer, I think, is yes. It is a
theory that locates the normative aspect of our existence within the
natural order, in the irrefutable designation of human beings as
persons. And is it worth our attention? Again, the answer is yes. The
theory does not itself provide us with a moral calculus, nor even a
moral compass. It requires us to look toward and beyond the actual
conditions of the community in which we live. But it is not without
significance. Its largest significance is that it rejects a utilitarian
calculation of the good as sufficient in itself. It insists that the
recognition of persons as persons, honoring their rights, is the only
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 137-56.
Id. at 181-95.
Id. at 171-78.
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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path to the good, not the highest good perhaps, but the humanly good.
And it tells us, without providing a certain guide to success, the
manner and means for achieving it.

ESSAY
UNIVERSITY DONS AND WARRIOR
CHIEFTAINS: TWO CONCEPTS OF DIVERSITY
Thomas H. Lee*
INTRODUCTION

By deciding in Grutter v. Bollinger1 to "endorse Justice Powell's

view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions,"2 the Supreme Court
has ended one debate but invited another. The burning question
whether Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of

California v. Bakke' is binding on the point4 is now moot. Nor is it
open to doubt that an affirmative-action policy with diversity as its
end can survive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.5
But just how far the diversity rationale can justify race-based policies
in educational and non-educational contexts is certain to be a focus of
future cases and controversy.6

* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., A.M., J.D., Harvard.
I thank George Cochran, Martin Flaherty, Jim Fleming, John Jeffries, Tracy Higgins,
Jim Kainen, Ken Karst, Alexandra Lee, Maria Marcus, Henry Monaghan, Russ
Pearce, Aaron Saiger, and Ben Zipursky for comments, Andrew Sparkler (Fordham
Law '05) for able research assistance, and Fordham Law School for a summer writing
grant. Errors or omissions are mine alone.
1. 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. Id. at 2337.
3. 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) ("[T]he attainment of a diverse student body ...
clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.").
4. Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 741 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
("Justice Powell's opinion.., provides the governing standard here."), and Smith v.
Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Thus, at our level of
the judicial system Justice Powell's opinion remains the law."), with Johnson v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he fact is
inescapable that no five Justices in Bakke expressly held that student body diversity is
a compelling interest under the Equal Protection Clause."), and Hopwood v. Texas,
236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding the same).
5. No State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. In light of the Court's companion holding in Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct.
2411, 2427-28 (2003), striking down the University of Michigan's undergraduate
admissions policy for lack of individualized inquiry to achieve the compelling interest
in diversity, the question of narrow tailoring will also be much contested.
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This Essay proposes a framework for clarifying the diversity
rationale in Grutter. The Court itself gave the first clue. It is not the
mere fact of student body diversity that is the compelling interest, but
rather "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body."'7 This formulation, however protean, does suggest a
substantive doctrinal test when viewed in conjunction with the Grutter
Court's analysis of the compelling interest in diversity. Such a
"benefits" test would turn on three elements. A compelling state
interest exists when the university (1) identifies "the educational
benefits that [student body] diversity is designed to produce;"8 (2)
shows that attaining those benefits is "essential to its educational
mission; ' and (3) makes a showing that a diverse student body "will,
in fact, yield [those] educational benefits."'"
This Essay proposes that there are two distinct categories of
educational benefits of student body diversity and that there is
marked variation in the extent to which higher educational institutions
seek to and in fact confer the two sorts of benefits. Accordingly, the
compelling interest test as formulated in Grutter should, by its own
terms, take account of this variation in mission and causation, with the
logical consequence that student body diversity might not suffice as a
compelling government interest in every higher educational context.
The first type of educational benefits of student body diversity is
what I shall call "discourse" benefits. There are benefits to students,
the university, and society arising from the discourse and interactions
all students will have on a racially diverse academic campus.1 Racial
diversity at the university "promotes cross-racial understanding, helps
to break down racial stereotypes,... enables students to better
understand persons of different races... [and produces] classroom
discussion [that] is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting."12 The discourse benefits of student
body diversity also include benefits that are "educational" not in the
sense of "pedagogical" or pertaining to the educational setting, but in
the different yet seemingly valid sense of lessons learned at school
applied to society and life at large. 3
On the other hand, there are benefits to society when minority
students are graduated from the few highly selective "gate-keeping"
7. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 2339.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.; see also Jack Greenberg, On Grutter and Gratz:
Examining
"Diversity" in Education: Diversity, the University and the World Outside, 103 Colum.
L. Rev. 1610, 1618-19 (2003).
12. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40 (internal citations omitted).
13. "[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them
as professionals." Id. at 2340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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schools that employ race-based admission programs (only twenty
percent of the nation's colleges and universities) 4 and assume
professional positions of leadership in nationally sensitive, noneducational institutions like the military officer corps, 5 "major
American businesses,"16 Congress, 7 and the federal judiciary. 8

Leadership diversity is in turn a compelling need for a racially diverse
society. In articulating the logic of what I shall call the "leadership"

benefits of student diversity, the Court was not, as it purported, simply

"endorsing" Justice Powell's Bakke opinion."9 Rather, the Grutter
Court was adopting an altogether different reason to find diversity a

compelling interest in the higher educational context.
The Court was powerfully influenced in this regard by an amicus
brief filed by twenty-nine retired military officers and civilian leaders
of the U.S. armed forces.2" The military leaders argued that "based on

their decades of experience, a highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its princip[al]
mission to provide national security."21 The military's claim was that

the military academies and Reserve Officers Training Corps
("ROTC") programs at civilian colleges sought diverse student bodies
because students will automatically become leaders of the armed
forces upon graduation and a diverse officer corps is essential to
14. See William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River 15 & n.1 (1998);
Daria Witt et al., Introduction to Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on
Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities 9 & n.4 (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds.,
2003) (citing regression analysis indicating that "only the top 20 percent of colleges
and universities have an admissions policy that employs a significant degree of racial
preference").
15. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2341.
18. Id.
19. Accord Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative
Action, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 60 (2004) ("The Grutter opinion... justif[ies]
affirmative action for a purpose Justice Powell had not mentioned.").
20. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), Gratz v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 1787554 [hereinafter
"Military Brief"].
I served, in 1994 and 1995, as a U.S. naval cryptology officer on the personal
staff of one of the amici, Admiral Archie Clemins, who was then Commander, U.S.
Seventh Fleet. This Essay does not reflect the views of Admiral Clemins.
The leadership diversity argument of the Military Brief was importantly
supported by amici briefs filed by prominent American corporations, which made the
same point as to American economic power. See, e.g., Brief of General Motors
Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2325 (2003), Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-231, 02-516),
2003 WL 399096, at *23-*24; Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses
in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), Gratz v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (Nos. 02-231, 02-516), 2003 WL 399056, at *1.
21. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Military Brief, supra note 20, at *5)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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national security. The Court accepted that "'it requires only a small
step from this analysis to conclude that our country's other
most
' 22
selective institutions must remain both diverse and selective.'
The selective military academies represent the strongest case for the
gate-keeping leadership benefits of student body diversity. Liberal
arts colleges represent the strongest case for diversity's discourse
benefits. The Court casually assumed that all civilian universities with
race-based admissions policies, including colleges, likewise stake a
persuasive claim to leadership benefits,23 but this is a questionable
assumption for three reasons. It is debatable, first, because unlike
military academies and professional schools, selective colleges do not
claim that specialized professional training, even in an institutional
leadership capacity, is one of their principal educational missions.
This is unlike the exchange of ideas among diverse students, which is
at the "very core" of their educational mission.24 Second, in America
today, those who seek leadership in nationally essential institutions
must increasingly obtain further training at graduate and professional
schools 25 that do seek to provide such tailored training, and this
necessarily dilutes the causal claim of undergraduate institutions to
leadership benefits. Third, with the exception of the officer corps, the
individuals and electorates who appoint such leaders have complete
discretion in choosing minority and other candidates, including the
freedom to disregard whether he or she was admitted and completed
an undergraduate program of study at an elite school. This further
dilutes the causal claim of top civilian colleges to leadership diversity
benefits. Prestigious colleges may supply a disproportionate share of
the nation's leaders, and they may claim that they mold leaders in a
broad sense, but correlation is not causation and generalized
aspiration is not educational mission.
This leads to an interesting question: If institutional leadership or
professional benefits are not central to the mission of elite
undergraduate schools, and student body diversity at these schools
does not cause these benefits in a meaningful way, i.e., in a way
comparable to the gate-keeping military academies and specialized
graduate and professional schools, is it still a compelling government
interest in light of the many direct and indirect benefits of diverse
22. Id. (quoting Military Brief, supra note 20, at *29).
23. Id. at 2341.
24. Brief for Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02241), 2003 WL 402236, at *28-*29 (discussing law school's mission) [hereinafter
Grutter Respondents' Brief]; see also Brief for Respondents, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 402237, at *21-*26 [hereinafter Gratz
Respondents' Brief]; Neil L. Rudenstine, Student Diversity and Higher Learning, in
Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action 38-39 (Gary
Orfield ed., 2001); infra Part II (comparing educational mission statements of highly
selective military academies and similarly selective civilian colleges).
25. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 14, at 91; infra Part II.
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discourse on campus, which is the core of their mission? The question
appears to be settled as a doctrinal matter. The Court in Gratz v.
Bollinger, relying on Grutter, summarily accepted that student body
diversity at the University of Michigan's College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts, was a compelling government interest.26
But I am not so sure that this was right, both on the terms of the
Grutter "benefits" test and as a matter of education policy. The
robust exchange of diverse ideas on campus is certainly essential to
the elite colleges' educational mission. But if, because of the benefits
of diverse campus discourse, student body diversity is a compelling
state interest for the twenty percent of the nation's colleges that use
affirmative action, then surely it must be so for the eighty percent of
colleges that do not. And affirmative action, to the extent it ensures
that our most selective colleges, as a class, can enroll the "highly
qualified" minority students that they could not have admitted but for
race-based policies, would necessarily set back the compelling interest
in student body diversity at non-elite colleges as a group. The bottom
line is that absent a claim to gate-keeping leadership benefits, the elite
colleges' claim to compelling interest in student body diversity (for
discourse benefits alone) stands on shaky ground.
The first part of this Essay describes the discourse benefits of
student body diversity. The second explains the contrasting logic of
leadership benefits.
The third part summarizes how different
educational institutions seek to and bring about one sort of benefit
and/or the other.
I.
What I have called "discourse" benefits are the core "educational
benefits" of student body diversity, and they are, unsurprisingly,
grounded in "the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
associated with the university environment." 7 The premise is that the
university is a special First Amendment community, whose
fundamental mission is the "robust exchange of ideas."28 The
university's administrators, as the moderators of this community, may
exercise within a roomy but reasonable zone of discretion "the right to

26. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003) ("Petitioners ... argue
that diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply too open-ended, illdefined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting
narrowly-tailored means. But for the reasons set forth today in Grutter v. Bollinger,
the Court has rejected these arguments of petitioners." (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
27. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2339.
28. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)
(Powell, J.)).
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select those students
who will contribute the most to the 'robust
29
exchange of ideas.'

This is just what the university has done in implementing race-based
admissions policies. It has made an "educational judgment

'3°

that the

presence of certain minority students who would not be enrolled but

for affirmative action is "essential to its educational mission "31 of

promoting discourse on campus. There is evidence that the fact of
being a minority affects a person's life experiences and the
conclusions she draws from them. 32 "[T]he presence of persons who
have had such experiences enriches the educational environment, if

only because it is human nature to undervalue or fail to see burdens
that we haven't truly experienced ourselves. ' 33 This sort of sharing
occurs not only in the classroom, where a variety of backgrounds will
make discussion "livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening
and interesting,"' but through the myriad informal interactions that
take place on campus. 35 In order to ensure that minority perspectives

are not reduced to single voice-in-the-wilderness stereotypes, it is
necessary to admit minority groups in sufficient numbers ("a critical
mass") to impart the confidence to speak out and to stay faithful to
differences within the groups.36

The Court, while relying on the "countervailing constitutional

interest1 37 of the university's free-speech rights, did not speak of
particular doctrines and otherwise remained noticeably vague on the
issue of deference on First Amendment grounds. Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, fairly called the majority to task on the
29. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 2341 ("Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own,
unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race
unfortunately still matters."); Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *22-*24;
Gratz Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *25 ("Racial and ethnic diversity is
educationally important because, notwithstanding decades of progress, there remain
significant differences in our lives and perceptions that are undeniably linked to the
realities of race.").
33. GrutterRespondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *24. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at
312-13 n.48, where the then-president of Princeton University, commenting on the
benefits of a diverse student body, noted: "People do not learn very much when they
are surrounded only by the likes of themselves."
34. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (citations omitted).
35. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13 n.48.
36. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. The Court noted:
The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on any belief that
minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic
minority viewpoint on any issue. To the contrary, diminishing the force of
such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one
that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
37. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
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point.38 An attempt at specification may help in understanding why
the Court deferred to the university's judgment that the discourse
benefits of student body diversity were compelling enough to validate
a race-based admissions policy.
Three different free-speech doctrines seem relevant as analogieslines of cases concerning public fora, the government as subsidizer of
speech, and the government as educator. Public-forum doctrine
allows the state to impose conditions on speech occurring on certain
public property so long as its regulation is not content-based. As a
subsidizer of speech, the government may "encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest" 39 provided that it does
not discriminate based on viewpoint. 40 As educator, the government
is allowed leeway in how it manages the educational setting, even
when it exercises considerable editorial discretion over student
speech.4
No case has ever held, nor did the University of Michigan and its
friends argue, that the university campus is itself a public forum 42 and
my point is not that it should be. Rather, the public-forum rubric is
important as an analogy. A basic intuition behind the doctrine 43 is
that the government has an obligation to permit and protect a robust
exchange of ideas in public parks, streets, and sidewalks-traditional
venues accessed typically by those lacking the wherewithal to
publicize their ideas by other means.'
Restrictions on underresourced speech in public fora-just like censorship of it-would
snuff out the desired communication for all time, to the detriment of a
38. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350, 2357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
39. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
40. See id.
41. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) ("The
principal's decision ... was reasonable under the circumstances as he understood
them."). Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (high school cannot discipline students who wore black armbands to protest
Vietnam War), with Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,685 (1986) (high
school can discipline student for "offensively lewd and indecent speech").
42. Cf Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270 (high-school newspaper not a public forum);
S.E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (community theater a
public forum).
43. Another premise of the doctrine-more clearly associated with the restriction
on content-based regulation in public forums-is equal access: Once the government
has set up a public forum, it cannot pick and choose the content of the speech that will
take place, although it may engage in regulation of the forum for reasons unrelated to
speech, such as public order and safety. Just as the norm of equal access, however
problematic its application to cases may be, compels content-neutrality in avowedly
non-speech regulation that the government may undertake, the state's promulgation
of affirmative action for the sake of all the "educational benefits" of a racially diverse
student body (not just the First Amendment-associated discourse benefits discussed
in this part) does not on its face disadvantage any specific content in the campus
exchange of ideas.
44. Cf.Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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democratic society whose legitimacy lies in the responsiveness of the
political process to the voices of all of its citizens. This idea of basic
access to the marketplace of ideas, made imperative by the implicit
risk of non-substitutability by transmission in another medium, is an
enduring First Amendment theme that has appeared in contexts other
than public fora.45
The analogy applies to the university affirmative-action cases in a
straightforward way. Without affirmative action, there would not be
enough "under-represented minorities" on elite campuses to ensure
an accurate communication of minority student perspectives in the
university marketplace of ideas, just as, without the provision and
protection of public fora, the voices of under-resourced citizens might
similarly go unheard. The "token numbers"4 6 of certain minorities in
the student body that would result from a race-blind admissions
process might refrain from speaking without the safety and moral
support of numbers,4 7 or be stereotyped by the majority when they
do.48 Campus exchanges, absent affirmative action, would accordingly
be an imperfect marketplace of ideas, 49 unfaithful to the multi-racial
democratic society that the university is seeking to serve, in the same
way that freedom of speech would be a sham if under-resourced
citizens with no other options were denied basic access to public fora.
Or the Court may have been thinking about the First Amendment
right of the state as subsidizer of speech. The government in this
capacity may promote a desired activity-such as cross-racial
discourse-so long as it does not discriminate against certain
viewpoints." The University of Michigan and its friends went to great
lengths to point out that their affirmative-action programs did not
discriminate on the basis of the viewpoints held by the minorities who
benefited. 5 In fact, the idea of the "critical mass" envisions the
45. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) ("Residential signs are an
unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of
modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical
substitute.").
46. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
47. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) ("Their
small numbers might also create a sense of isolation among the black students
themselves and thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their
potential.").
48. See Gratz Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *28 ("Put bluntly, teaching
that not all blacks think alike will be much easier when there are enough blacks
around to show their diversity of thought." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
49. See Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive EducationalEffects of Racial Diversity on
Campus, in Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action 179
(Gary Orfield ed., 2001).
50. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); cf Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832-33 (1995).
51. See, e.g., Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 24, at *30 (noting that the
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selection of minority students of various viewpoints, to cancel
stereotypes and to be faithful to variation of views within the minority
group.52
The idea of the government as educator is not so different from the

vision of it as subsidizer of speech; the main difference being the
greater degree of deference owed to the state when it is actually
running the educational enterprise. The basic premise is that public

schools are allowed discretion in going about their educational
missions, indeed, in defining those missions, even when the result is
the substantial restriction or elimination of student speech. Although
the case law acknowledging this deference developed in the context of

high-school students whose countervailing free-speech rights might53
plausibly be more curtailed than those of adult university students,

the state as educator in our case is using affirmative action to
encourage speech, not to restrict it, albeit exerting editorial discretion
by promoting a certain kind of race-inflected speech.
The distinction between deference to the state as subsidizer of
speech and the greater deference due to it as educator in its own right
logically gives rise to a distinction in compelling government interest
analysis between public and private universities. On the one hand,
when the state or federal government is educator, it may have to look
to the benefits of the public-education enterprise as a whole, whether

state or nationwide, rather than to what is best for a particular public
school in the system.5 4 By contrast, the private institution of higher

learning necessarily formulates its compelling interests more narrowly
in terms of what is good for itself. Accordingly, to the extent that
affirmative action at elite public universities promotes diversity on
those campuses at the cost of racial diversity at other less prestigious

Law School's need for a critical mass of minority students is not based on a "belief
that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic
minority viewpoint on any issue").
52. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003). Of course, viewpoint
neutrality in fact would be contingent on existing diversity of viewpoints in the
minority group-if, for example, ninety-five percent of the minority group hold a
"progressive" viewpoint, then theoretical neutrality between progressive and
conservative views would be a near-dead letter.
53. See cases cited supra note 41.
54. Cf. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350, 2354-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (arguing that Michigan does not have a compelling state interest in
maintaining an elite law school); id. at 2348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Justice Scalia explained:
I find particularly unanswerable [Justice Thomas's] central point: that the
allegedly 'compelling state interest' at issue here is not the incremental
'educational benefit' that emanates from fabled 'critical mass' of minority
students, but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school
whose normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and
other minorities.
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schools in the state, the compelling state interest test should take
account of the trade-off.
To be accurate, when a public university uses affirmative action to
promote the exchange of ideas on campus, it does engage in a form of
content-based, viewpoint discrimination, in tension with the doctrines
of public fora and the state as subsidizer of speech. That is to say, the
university is making a judgment that ideas shaped by minority racial
experiences have an especially high value in the campus exchange of
ideas, as compared to, say, ideas influenced by religious,
socioeconomic, or ideological differences. The transmission of such
ideas should accordingly be subsidized by race-conscious admission
policies. This is where the Court's insistence on deference to the
"Law School's educational judgment that diversity is essential to its
educational mission"55 appears to lean very heavily on the discretion
of the state as educator-with respect to a university's threshold
determination that racial diversity should be privileged over other
sorts of diversity in campus discourse.5 6 It follows naturally that a
school-for instance a historically black college-might within its
discretion choose not to privilege racial diversity at all, if based on a
good-faith judgment that a diverse student body was not essential to
its educational mission, even though other schools think it a
compelling interest. 7
II.
I have sought so far to describe a universal, discourse-focused
argument that universities as a class make about why the state's
interest in a diverse student body is compelling. The "robust
55. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329 (majority opinion).
56. Professor Abner Greene has made the same conclusion in the broader context
of government speech and subsidies of speech in non-educational contexts.
"Government both may and should promote contested conceptions of the good,
through direct speech acts and through funding private speech with conditions
attached." Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 68-69
(2000). While I can afford to remain agnostic on the generalized point (i.e., assuming
away the crutch of educational institutional deference) for the purposes of this Essay,
I find his argument compelling both as a lens for understanding the doctrine and as a
normative, neo-Platonic conceptualization of the state's purpose.
57. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2350, 2358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) ("The majority grants deference to the Law School's assessment that diversity
will, in fact, yield educational benefits. It follows, therefore, that an [historically black
college's] assessment that racial homogeneity will yield educational benefits would
similarly be given deference." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see
also Rudenstine, supra note 24, at 38 ("[I]nstitutions may choose on their own to take
less account of race, ethnicity, and gender in admissions .... "). Another place where
deference to the university (as educator) does special work concerns the actual
numerical determination of the "critical mass of underrepresented minorities"
necessary to achieve the compelling government interest in diversity, but that is more
a question of narrow tailoring. Compare Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342-44 (majority
opinion), with Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

2004]

TWO CONCEPTS OFDIVERSITY

2311

exchange of ideas" is the core of the university's mission. Student
body diversity promotes campus exchange of ideas informed by race
and, as a result, imparts an appreciation of racial diversity that will
These
reverberate even after school through life at large.
"educational benefits" are documented by evidentiary studies.5 8 Such
benefits are central to a university's conceptualization of its
educational mission, the pedagogical strategies it chooses to
accomplish that mission, and, ultimately, its underlying First
Amendment rights. Consequently, the university is entitled to
deference in its decision to privilege race-inflected discourse over
other types of idea exchange by deploying a race-conscious admissions
policy.
One plausible post-educational discourse benefit of student body
diversity, which Justice Powell mentioned in his Bakke opinion, was
the exposure of future leaders to diverse discourse on campus.
Quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents,59 he noted that "[t]he Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection."60
His implicit assumption was that a university education was necessary
Consequently, any
to attain a position of national leadership.
discourse benefits delivered by a university education would be
reflected in the attitudes and qualifications of the leadership class,
regardless of the racial make-up of that class. That is to say, the
discourse benefit to national leadership can, in theory and logic, be
This second-order
realized without actual leadership diversity.
discourse benefit is very different from the concept of the leadership
benefit which the Court adopted in Grutter.
The difference between discourse benefits to leadership arising
from student body diversity and the concept of the direct leadership
benefit might be made clearer by thinking of ideological diversity,
which confers a similar sort of discourse benefit. Indubitably, an
exposure to Karl Marx's philosophy of history at the university,
including interaction with Marxist scholars and student organizations
like the Spartacus League will benefit a student's understanding of
various social, economic, and political issues. And that enhanced
understanding may very well make students who achieve positions of
national leadership after graduation better leaders. It is quite a
different thing to say that ideological diversity requires that we have
some Marxists in leadership positions that require university
education as a qualification.
To reiterate this important point, Justice Powell's concept of the
58. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (majority opinion).
59. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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diversity benefit to leadership concerned the inculcation of a
particular mindset-one of toleration of difference, and it can be
found as much in a racial majority as in a racial minority. This
diversity is of course not the same as the leadership diversity claim in
Grutter, which depends on minority participation in leadership for
satisfaction.
Justice Powell's exclusive focus on discourse benefits might be
explained in part by the art of the possible: It may have been
impossible in 1978 to conceive of robust leadership diversity of the
sort that seems possible today. I would like to think as well that the
difference might be attributed to Justice Powell's divergent vision of
the diversity norm. He appears to have believed that making
presumptions about race was wrong, whether the presumption was
that minorities will behave toward minorities in a certain way if in
positions of leadership,6 1 or, more relevantly, that minorities in the
general population would regard minority leaders, irrespective of their
views on racial issues, more favorably than majority leaders with
mindsets open to racial diversity. His fear of resultant tokenism was
prescient, as witness the trend to ideologically conservative minority
appointments to leadership positions, such as federal judicial
appointments, which seemingly deploy the candidates' race to insulate
ideological viewpoints that do not fairly represent the views of
minorities at large.
The distressing presupposition of such
appointments would appear to be that minorities in the general
population will blithely accept them as indicative of meaningful
leadership diversity, without regard for the decisions that they will
likely make as leaders on their behalf.
In Grutter, the Court endorsed a subtly, but importantly, different
claim from Justice Powell's discourse benefits rationale. Diverse
discourse on campus and its societal reverberations notwithstanding,
student body diversity at a particular educational institution is sought
to produce, and in fact produces, not just racial-majority leaders who
are open to diverse perspectives, but actual and substantial racial
diversity in the leadership ranks of important non-educational
institutions. 62 As Justice Breyer put it during oral argument to counsel
for petitioner Barbara Grutter:
[Almong other things that they tell us on the other side is that many
people feel in the schools, the Universities, that the way-the only
way to break this cycle [of minority impoverishment and underschooling] is to have a leadership that is diverse ... you have to train
a diverse student body for law, for the military, for business, for all
61. Cf Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11. Justice Powell rejected the view that black
doctors would have a greater tendency to serve poorer communities. Id.
62. Grutter,123 S. Ct. at 2325; see also Karst, supra note 19, at 67 ("The services'
affirmative action aims to ensure the inclusion of minority officers in all levels of the
officer corps, and thus to improve the services' performance.").
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the other positions in this country that63will allow us to have a diverse
leadership in a country that is diverse.

The Court was clearly influenced by the military brief in this belief.
The military amici convincingly defended the affirmative-action
policies of the military service academies and ROTC programs-the
truly unique context in which diverse undergraduate student bodies
do automatically produce racial diversity in the leadership ranks of a

nationally essential non-educational institution. And, as the Court
noted, the military leaders argued that "based on their decades of
experience, a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps... is

essential to the military's ability to fulfill its princip[al] mission to

provide national security."'

The military brief was delivered, like a precision-guided munition,
under circumstances certain to maximize its effect. Grutter was
argued on April 1, 2003. That same day, poignantly, the very junior
officers discussed in the abstract by the military brief were putting
their lives at risk for their country in Iraq, with the outcome of the war
much in doubt.65 Americans did not feel safe even at home in the
wake of the September 11 bombings and the persistent threat of more

terrorist attacks. Unlike the civilian proponents of affirmative action
in the case, these amici were of the warrior class, many politically
conservative. Deference to the military was particularly likely given
that the Court itself comprised men and women of limited familiarity

with the twenty-first century military institution and specifically its
professional officer corps.66
63. Oral Argument Transcript, Grutter (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 1728613, at *13; see
also Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 ("[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders."). The
Court cited Sweatt v. Painter,339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950), in support of this statement,
see Grutter,123 S. Ct. at 2341, but the passage quoted made the distinguishable point
that law school is a "proving ground for legal learning and practice".
64. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340 (emphasis added) (quoting Military Brief, supra
note 20, at *5).
65. See Rick Atkinson, As Battle Escalates, Holy Site Is Turned Into a Stronghold,
Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 2003, at Al ("The assault is proving problematic for the Army,
which finds itself entangled in precisely the sort of urban combat that military
planners hoped to avoid."); John F. Bums, Warning of Doom, Edgy Iraqi Leaders Put
on Brave Front, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2003, at Al ("The Iraqi leadership put on a show
of redoubled defiance today and promised American troops nothing but 'death in the
desert,' [even as American forces advance towards Baghdad.]"); Josh Friedman,
Stocks Tumble on War, Economy Fears,L.A. Times, Apr. 1, 2003, at C6.
66. Five Justices never served in the U.S. armed forces (Justice Scalia did attend
St. Francis Xavier School in New York, which was a Catholic military high school at
the time). Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist were enlisted draftees, and
Justice Kennedy was a California National Guardsman. Justice Stevens, who was
commissioned out of a wartime officer-candidate program, had experience in the
Second World War (as a naval cryptology officer) in a navy that was very different
from the U.S. naval service of today. Nor did any of the Justices have law clerks that
term who had served in the officer corps. (Interestingly, three of the thirty-five law
clerks during the prior 2001 Term did serve as active-duty line officers during the
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It is clear from the record and the majority opinion in Grutter that
the military brief was, in the apt word of one esteemed commentator,
a "showstopper. 6 7 The Court quoted extensively from the military
brief in its analysis of the compelling interest in student body
diversity.' During the oral argument in Grutter, the Justices referred
repeatedly to the military brief,69 at one point referring to it as "Carter
Phillips's brief," despite the fact that Mr. Phillips, a former law clerk
to Chief Justice Warren Burger and counsel of record on the military

amicus brief, was not himself allotted any argument time, to the
apparent perplexity of those who were.7 °
The military brief's argument was clear and simple. It is important
to have a racially diverse student body at selective military academies

and ROTC programs because students are commissioned as junior
officers, the front-line leaders of the armed forces, on the day they
graduate. 7' Our enlisted ranks have many minorities (including 21.7%
African-Americans, 9.6% Hispanic, 1.2% Native Americans),72 and it
1990s: a naval aviator, a naval cryptology officer, and a marine communications
officer.)
67. James M. O'Neill, Supreme Court Experts Say Affirmative Action Looks Safe,
Justices Focus on Military Briefs, Colum. Chron., Apr. 14, 2003 (quoting Columbia
Law Professor Samuel Issacharoff who called the military brief "a showstopper" that
"impressed on the court the significance not only of the legal principles at stake but
the broader social impact of a poorly thought-out decision."), available at
http://www.ccchronicle.com/back/2003-04-14/campuslO.html;
see Charles
Lane,
Affirmative Action for Diversity is Upheld: In 5 to 4 Vote, Justices Approve U-Mich.
Law School Plan, Wash. Post, June 24, 2003, at Al; James M. O'Neill, Court Upholds
Use of Race in Admissions: Mich. Point System, Viewed as a Quota, Is Struck Down,
Phila. Inquirer, June 24, 2003, at Al ("[L]egal experts said that the military brief was
a masterful stroke .... ); David G. Savage, Court Affirms Use of Race in University
Admissions, L.A. Times, June 24, 2003, at Al.
68. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340.
69. See, e.g., Oral Argument Transcript, Grutter (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 1728613,
at *7 ("Mr. Kolbo, may I call your attention ...to the brief that was filed on behalf of
some retired military officers who said that to have an officer corps that includes
minority members in any number, there is no way to do it other than to give not an
overriding preference, but a plus for race." (Justice Ginsburg to Mr. Kolbo, on behalf
of petitioner Barbara Grutter)); id. at *9-'10 ("[T]he question is whether without
the-the weighting of race that they do in fact give, they can have an adequate
number of minorities in the academies to furnish ultimately a reasonable number of
minorities in the officer corps, that's the issue, isn't it?" (Justice Stevens to Mr.
Kolbo)); id. at *12 ("Well, let me ask you this, it's about the military brief that you
didn't come here to argue about, but it will maybe get you back to your case." (Justice
Kennedy to Mr. Kolbo)). Indeed, well over half of Mr. Kolbo's argument time, id. at
*7-'17, of 15 total pages, was taken up by questions regarding the military brief.
70. Id. at *19. The oral argument proceeded as follows: "General Olson, just let
me get a question out and you answer it at your convenience. I'd like you to
comment on Carter Phillips's brief. What is your view of the strength of that
argument?" Oral Argument Transcript, Grutter (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 1728613, at
*19 (Justice Ginsburg to Solicitor General Theodore Olson after the words "First, it
is"). General Olson's initial response was: "Well, I'm not sure." Id.
71. Military Brief, supra note 20, at *12-'13.
72. Id.
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is necessary for good order and discipline that they see highly
qualified officers of color in positions of leadership. 3 We know this is
true based on evidence from the troubled history of race and the
military institution in this country,74 and, in any event, second-guessing
the military's own prediction for what is necessary to perform its
mission poses an unacceptable risk to our national security in perilous
times.75
The brief continued: "It requires only a small step from this
analysis to conclude that our country's other most selective
institutions must remain both diverse and selective. Like our military
security, our economic security and international competitiveness
depend upon it."76 The Court accepted this "small step" without
question;7 7 my basic point here is to question it.
A useful starting point to understanding the difference between
why the military seeks student body diversity and why its civilian
counterparts do is to compare what each sort of institution asserts as
its educational mission. West Point's mission is:
[t]o educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each
graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the
values of Duty, Honor, Country; professional growth throughout a
career as an officer in the United States Army; and a lifetime of
selfless service to the nation. 8
The Naval Academy seeks to give "young men and women the upto-date academic and professional training needed to be effective
naval and marine officers in their assignments after graduation. ' 79 It
seeks a few good men and women with a certain mentality and
ambition:
"If you have a strong will to achieve, desire a real
challenge, and want to be a leader serving your country, the
opportunity of a lifetime could begin for you at the United States
Naval Academy."8 Similarly, the Air Force Academy aims high to
"[i]nspire and develop outstanding young men and women to become
Air Force officers with knowledge, character and discipline; motivated
to lead the world's greatest aerospace-force in service to the nation." 81
73. Id. at *14-*17.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *17-*18, *29.
76. Id. at *29-*30.
77. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) ("We agree that '[i]t requires
only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our country's other most selective
institutions must remain both diverse and selective."' (internal citations omitted))
78. United States Military Academy Mission Statement, available at
http://www.usma.edu/mission.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
79. United States Naval Academy Mission Statement, available at
http://www.usna.edu/about.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
80. United
States
Naval
Academy
Admissions,
available
at
http://www/usna/edu/Admissions/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
81. United States Air Force Academy Mission Statement, available at
http://www.usafa.af.mil/misvis/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
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Compare those statements with representative samples from three
highly selective civilian colleges with similar acceptance rates to the
military academies. s2
In line with their more generalist and
intellectual approach, none of these civilian institutions have
articulated a "mission" per se. A former president of Williams
College described its institutional purpose thusly:
The most versatile, the most durable, in an ultimate sense the most
practical knowledge and intellectual resources which... (-an now be
offered are those impractical arts and sciences around which the
liberal arts education has long centered: the capacity to see and feel,
to grasp, respond and act over a widening arc of experience; the
disposition and ability to think, to question, to use knowledge to
order an ever-extending range of reality; the elasticity to grow, to
perceive more widely and more deeply, and perhaps to create; the
understanding to decide where to stand and the will and tenacity to
do so; the wit and wisdom, the humanity and the humor to try to see
oneself, one's society, and one's world with open eyes, to live a life
usefully, to help things in which one believes on their way. This is
not the whole of a liberal arts education, but as I understand it, this
range of goals is close to its core.83
And a former president of Williams's archrival Amherst once
remarked:
A university or a liberal arts college, quite apart from any religious
affiliations, is pledged to a special faith of its own. It believes first
that men and women can live together in a community where they
teach and learn from each other .... A good college seeks not
merely a coterie of the like-minded, to reinforce convictions already
formed, but seeks out every vein of talent and opinion from every
possible background, so that from the ferment of ideas freely
exchanged it can advance to new conclusions. 84
Brown University's website provides:
The goal of the Brown Curriculum is for students to work toward a
liberal education, in which students learn the knowledge and ways of
thinking of a range of academic disciplines, in which they practice
habits of self-reflection and empathy for others, and in which they
82. The 2003 acceptance rates were: twelve percent for the United States Naval
Academy, thirteen percent for the United States Military Academy, seventeen

percent for the United States Air Force Academy, seventeen percent for Brown
University, eighteen percent for Amherst College, and twenty-three percent for
Williams College. US News & World Report, America's Best Colleges 2004 Lowest
Acceptance
Rates,
available
at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/brief/webex/lowacc-brief.php
(last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
83. Williams College Mission and Objectives (quoting President John E. Sawyer's
1961
Induction
Address),
available at http://www.williams.edu/admindepts/registrar/geninfo/mission.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
84. Amherst's Philosophy (quoting Peter R. Pouncey, President 1984-94),
available at http://www.amherst.edu/aboutamhl philosophy/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).

2004]

TWO CONCEPTS OFDIVERSITY

2317

are challenged to articulate 85
and examine the moral convictions that
will guide them through life.
Nor, for that matter, can civilian undergraduate colleges, or indeed,
any civilian institution of higher learning, assert the sort of robust
causal claim that the military academies can-that diverse student
bodies will necessarily cause leadership diversity in the target
institution. The military service academies and officer training
programs are unique gate-keeping institutions insofar as they are a

sufficient condition s6 for direct entry into leadership of an important
public institution-the officer corps of the nation's armed forces.87

Indeed, in functional terms, the military academy case provides the
rare circumstance in which a racially diverse student body equals a

racially diverse leadership group in a nationally sensitive noneducational institution: Ninety-nine percent of graduates from the
academies are commissioned as active-duty military officers.8 8 It
seems fair, therefore, to conclude that if the compelling government

interest at issue is "obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse
student body," one should include in the calculus for the national
military academies the "benefit" of leadership diversity in the armed

forces.
No civilian institution of higher learning, however prestigious, can
claim to be a true gate-keeper in the sense of being a sufficient

condition for entry into the leadership cadres of public or private non85. Brown University, Statement of Dean of the College, available at
http://www.brown.edu/Administration/Dean of-the-College/DOC/s2_browncurricul
urn/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
86. They are not a necessary condition because officers may also be commissioned
through ten-to-fourteen week post-undergraduate officer candidate schools and
enlisted commissioning programs. In my experience as a naval officer, however, I
perceived that minority officers who are commissioned out of the military service
academies command a special respect from the enlisted ranks because academy
graduates have traditionally formed the backbone of the professional officer corps. It
is, in this sense, a particularly poignant statement about the fairness, openness, and
legitimacy of leadership access for enlisted to see minority officers commissioned out
of the highly selective service academies.
87. As a mark of their importance to the nation, all commissioned officers have
their commissions signed by the President of the United States. See U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 3 (authorizing that the President "shall Commission all the Officers of the United
States"). Moreover, many military academy graduates put their training to use to
become civilian leaders in industry and government after completing their service
obligations, which augments the academies' claim to general national leadership
benefits.
88. The service academies permit cadets and midshipmen to resign after the
second year without incurring an active-duty service obligation. Officer candidates in
ROTC programs can resign after their first year without incurring a service
obligation. Those who drop out after that point must serve an enlisted tour or risk
prosecution, unless it is determined that there was a compelling reason in which case
authorities may permit repayment of scholarship monies with interest. All who
graduate are commissioned as officers and serve some active duty, absent a medical
or other exception rarely granted.
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educational institutions of the sort that the Court mentioned in
Grutter-state governorships,8 9 the United States Congress, 9° the

federal judiciary, 9' and "major American businesses."' There is no
such thing as a State Governors' School, a U.S. Congress academy, a
federal judge academy, or a corporate chief executive officer
("CEO") academy, 93 to which anyone with qualifications can apply
and acceptance to which guarantees a gubernatorial mansion, a
Senate or House seat, a federal judgeship, or a CEO job upon
graduation.94
Of course, certain professional and graduate schools, notably the

selective law schools and business schools, do seek to groom
institutional and professional leaders, and can also empirically claim
disproportionate access by graduates to prominent non-educational
institutions that would perform better with racial diversity in their
leadership ranks. The Court pointed out that "[i]ndividuals with law
degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than half

the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the
seats in the United States House of Representatives."95 The Court
continued that "[t]he pattern is even more striking when it comes to
highly selective law schools. A handful of these schools account for 25

89. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2340. To be fair, junior military officers, which is what the academies
and ROTC programs are principally preparing their graduates to be (with training for
command billets provided by war colleges and the like), are not really national-level
leaders like Senators, governors, Article III federal judges, and major CEOs. Rather,
junior officers are unique in that they are community-level leaders of a nationally
essential institution. But the Court neglected to develop this point, analogizing
instead to national-level civilian leaders. If the military analogy is to have full play,
integration below the pinnacle of national leadership at the community level might
also be a compelling interest. Speculation in that direction is beyond the scope of this
Essay, the intent of which is to add some precision and rigor to the legal analysis
explicitly articulated by the Court in Grutter,in the hope of guiding future discussion.
93. Many leading business schools have "advanced management programs" that
provide short-term (e.g., three-week) training programs for senior private and public
executives.
The role of such programs, however, is not to impart essential
professional training, but rather to facilitate networking and familiarization with
academic scholarship on useful subjects of currency and interest. They are, in this
sense, more like social "finishing schools" than true gate-keeping institutions.
94. The FBI Academy and state police academies are similar to the military
academies in terms of sufficiency for entrance into an institution benefited by racial
diversity in composition, but they are not undergraduate, graduate, or professional
schools in the common sense. Nor are they the sort of nationally prominent
institutions the Court seems to have had in mind when talking about leadership
diversity. The analysis of affirmative action in those contexts, then, should turn on a
direct analysis of diversity as a compelling interest in the non-educational
institution-the FBI or the state police as appropriate-without couching it in terms
of the gate-keeping "educational" institution. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
95. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
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of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States courts of appeals
judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States district

court judges."96 Modesty likely prevented the Court from observing

that the same "handful" accounted for all nine of its Members.97 We

might add that ten more state governors have advanced degrees
(including five MBAs); 98 thirty more Senators have JD's from law
schools other than the "handful" the Court had in mind and at least
twenty-two others have advanced degrees (including six MBA's and
one medical degree ("MD")). 99 And at least sixty-three of the CEOs

of the top 100 companies in the Forbes 500 have some sort of
advanced degree (twenty-five MBA's; nine JDs; one MD). 1°°
Indeed, a law degree is a prerequisite to become a federal or state

judge, prosecutor, or defense lawyer-legal sub-institutions in which
racial diversity

would

seem to

be

highly desired

given

the

disproportionate numbers of minorities who are victims, perpetrators,
and litigants in the American justice system. Consequently, the Court
in Grutter was correct, in my view, to have factored the educational
benefit of leadership diversity in its compelling-interest analysis as to

the University of Michigan Law School"' (albeit in a weaker form
than in the military-academy context).
The Court's implicit

acceptance of the same conclusion as to the University's college,1"
however, is a different matter.
In today's America, bachelor's degrees, even from the most elite

colleges, no longer command a leadership gate-keeping role, in large
part because graduate and professional degrees have become so
common.10 3 While there are 1,995 schools that confer undergraduate
degrees, there are presently an astonishing 1,499 educational

96. Id.
97. Among the nine Justices: Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer were
graduates of Harvard Law School; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor
were graduates of Stanford Law School; and Justice Stevens received his law degree
from Northwestern, Justice Thomas from Yale, and Justice Ginsburg from Columbia.
98. Governors of the United States Biographical Information, available at
http://www.nga.org/governors/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
99. Senators of the United States Biographical Information, available at
http://www.sentate.gov/generallcontactinformation/senators-cfm.cfm
(last visited
Mar. 3, 2004).
100. For the Forbes 500 companies, see Forbes 500 List (Mar. 28, 2003), availableat
http://www.forbes.com/lists/. For the educational background of CEOs, see Standard
&
Poor's
Biographical
Register,
available
at
http://web.westlaw.com/welcom/company-information/.
101. See Grutter,123 S. Ct. at 2341.
102. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003).
103. Empirical research might illuminate the validity of this conclusion. For
instance, one might design a multivariate regression model to assess the causal effect
of a degree from a selective undergraduate college as compared to other variables
such as graduate education and institution, socio-economic background, work
experience and so forth. My guess would be that such analysis might reveal a
statistically significant coefficient for a very small class of super-elite colleges, such as
Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford.
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institutions that confer master's degrees too, 535 of which also grant
doctorates,10 and, on top of that, 188 law schools accredited by the
American Bar Association.
According to 2000 U.S. census data,
28,317,792 of the nation's population twenty-five years and over have
a bachelor's degree only; 16,144,813 have an additional advanced
degree. 10 6 A former president of Harvard University and noted
education-policy expert summed it up nicely:
An excellent undergraduate education is an enormous advantage in
life. But we know that a college degree, by itself, is increasingly seen
as inadequate preparation for many careers for which it once
sufficed. Graduate training has long been necessary for aspiring
doctors, lawyers, educators, scholars, research scientists, and clergy;
in today's world, advanced degrees are also seen as highly desirable,
if not essential, for many other callings, including leadership
10 7
positions in business, public affairs, and the not-for-profit sector.
Nor is specialized job training, even in a leadership capacity-to be
a military officer, a corporate executive, a judge, a politician, or even a
non-profit administrator-a principal mission of the typical elite
undergraduate institution. (I discuss in Part III, infra, a non-specific
leadership production function that top colleges do claim-that they
mold leaders of the nation in a general way.) Unlike the military
academies, top civilian colleges do not require students to take classes
in leadership, leadership ethics, small-team tactical leadership, or
great military and political leaders of the past. The vast majority of
elite colleges, in the liberal arts tradition, do not supply this sort of
vocational training in how to be a leader so common to the military
classroom, as they are more concerned with teaching students how to
think critically in a generalist way, with one's "major" more a matter
of emphasis than specialization.10 8 Of course elite colleges-indeed all
undergraduate programs-encourage participation and leadership in
student organizations and sports teams,10 9 but such activities are
understood to be extracurricular, that is to say, voluntary and
unrelated to what is taught and expected to be learned in satisfaction
of degree requirements.
104. Fall
Enrollment,
1999
Survey,
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov//programs/digest/d01/dt210.asp.
105. Number
of
Law
Schools,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/approved.html (last visited Mar. 3,

2004).
106. 2000
U.S.
Census,
available
at
http://factfinder.census/gov/servlet/Basicfactsservlet/.
107. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 14, at 91.
108. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
109. See Don Oldenburg, Tippy-Top Secret. Yalies Bush and Kerry Share a
PatricianPast of Skull and Bones, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 2004, at D1 (Yale President
Richard Levin often "referred to Yale as 'a laboratory for leadership.' Aside from
the university's acclaimed academic life, Yale provides undergrads a wealth of
opportunities to lead. Registered on campus are 250 student organizations.").
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As a final attempt to understand the difference between leadership
and discourse benefits, it may be helpful to engage in a counterfactual thought experiment. If the military academies were to allow
cadets and midshipmen to participate in every aspect of academy life
yet opt for civilian jobs upon graduation, and most of the minority
students underrepresented in the officer corps were to choose civilian
life, then student body diversity would produce robust discourse
benefits without leadership benefits. Conversely, if selective civilian
schools allowed underrepresented minorities to enroll exclusively in
courses with overwhelming minority populations, to reside in racially
concentrated housing, to participate exclusively in minority-centric
extracurricular activities, and informally to avoid even casual
interaction with non-minorities on campus, and a large proportion of
underrepresented minorities in fact chose to segregate themselves in
these ways, then there would be negligible discourse benefits to
student body diversity.1 10 But the satisfaction of an interest gauged by
racial diversity in the numbers of graduates assuming leadership
positions in nationally prominent non-educational institutions would
be unaffected.
III.
Let us return to the doctrinal clarification of the diversity test I
offered at the beginning of this Essay. A compelling state interest in
student body diversity exists when the higher educational unit (1) has
identified the "educational benefits" diversity is "designed to
produce" and shows (2) that attaining those benefits is "essential to its
educational mission," and (3) that student body diversity does in fact
produce those mission-essential benefits.1 1 With respect to discourse
benefits, the test seems at first easily satisfied: "the robust exchange
of ideas" is at the core of a university's (in the ideal, universal sense)
educational mission and such discourse produces documented
educational benefits on campus and beyond.
It should be evident that certain kinds of educational units can

110. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2348, 2349-50 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Scalia explained:
Still other suits may challenge the bona fides of the institution's expressed
commitment to the educational benefits of diversity .... [T]empting targets,
one would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of
tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses-through minority-only
student organizations, separate minority housing opportunities, separate
minority student centers, even separate minority-only graduation
ceremonies.
Id. at 2349-50. A possible rejoinder to Justice Scalia is that even if such selfsegregation were to result, the phenomenon itself would promote potentially
beneficial discourse on the subject of racial interaction on campus.
111. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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make a better claim to discourse benefits than others because their
educational mission is more closely associated with the exchange of
ideas in which differing racial perspectives would be relevant. For
example, the curricula at liberal arts colleges, law schools, publicpolicy schools,
business-management
schools, or graduate
departments in sociology and comparative literature, deal with issues
and subject matter to which different racial experiences are deeply
relevant. By contrast, undergraduate engineering schools, military
academies, graduate programs in theoretical physics or mathematics,
and medical schools are not so focused on subjects usefully
illuminated by racial inflections. As Justice Powell put it in Bakke:
"It may be argued that there is greater force to these views [in the
interest of student body diversity] at the undergraduate level than in a
medical school where the training is centered primarily on
'
professional competency."1 12
Of course, that is not to say that a school in the latter category can
make no claim whatsoever to seeking and conferring the discourse
benefits of a diverse student body. No educational institution, not
even a military academy, which is simultaneously an educational and a
military installation," 3 says that its mission does not value the
discourse benefits of student body diversity at all." 4 As Justice Powell
observed with respect to medical schools:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population.
An otherwise
qualified medical student with a particular background-whether it
be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged -may
bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and
ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its

112. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,313 (1978).
113. As such, the military service academy occupies an interesting intersection
between the civilian university institution and its robust First Amendment rights, see
supra Part I, and the military base, where national security trumps most First
Amendment rights, see, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) ("The notion
that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally
served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by private
citizens is thus historically and constitutionally false."); id. at 843 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("[The] enclave of a [military] system ...stands apart from and outside of
many of the rules that govern ordinary civilian life in our country.").
114. See,
e.g.,
Overview
of
the
Academy,
available
at
http://www.usma.edu/admissions/overview.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
The
overview explains:
Each year the United States Military Academy admits 1,150 to 1,200 young
men and women. These new members of the cadet corps come from all
corners of the United States and represent nearly every race, religion and
culture in the country. Nurtured by the West Point environment, this
diversity of background helps cadets gain a cultural as well as a rich
educational experience.
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graduates 1 to
5 render with understanding their vital service to
humanity.
Likewise, the experiences and views of minority cadets and
midshipmen, while not so important in close-order drill, naval
propulsion systems class, or celestial navigation, are certainly valuable
in academy and ROTC classes on leadership, ethics, politics, and
history. Furthermore, there is always interaction on campus outside
of the classroom, say, at the dormitory, or through sports or other
extracurricular activities. All of this, however, is consistent with my
point: depending on the nature of a specific educational institution,
there is variation in the degree to which student body diversity is
sought to produce, and in fact produces, discourse benefits.
Determining the leadership diversity benefits of a diverse student
body at different sorts of institutions is more complicated in certain
respects and easier in others. It would be easier, as we have seen, if
we look to institutional articulations of mission and apply a strict
causal test, limiting the claim to leadership benefits to educational
units that assert diverse student bodies as a necessary (like law
schools) or a sufficient (like military academies) cause of racially
diverse leadership in nationally sensitive non-educational institutions.
One self-evident additional element of the benefits test in the
leadership context would be the requirement of postulating a
compelling need for racial diversity in the leadership of the target
non-educational institution or profession.
A successful claim under this "strict" test would be something like
the following: The mission of the military academies is to train
officers. Military academy cadets and midshipmen automatically
become officers upon graduation. A diverse officer corps is a
compelling need for the military to perform its nationally sensitive
mission.
Or, the mission of law schools is to train lawyers, who form the
exclusive pool of those who may become federal judges. Law school
students become lawyers upon graduation (when they pass the bar).
There is a compelling need for a diverse federal judiciary given the
diverse social context in which legal issues arise.
A closer call under a strict test would be the sort of claim that
business schools might make. A principal mission of the business
school is to train corporate managers. If we are to have a racially
diverse corporate leadership, we must have racially diverse student
bodies at selective business schools. It is nationally important to have
racially diverse corporate leadership because many corporate workers
are minorities and because the global business environment is a multiracial one.
A closer case yet might be medical schools. Medical doctors must
115. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
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graduate from medical school. Diverse student bodies are therefore
necessary for a racially diverse medical profession, but is a diverse
medical profession a compelling national need? Perhaps so, because
medical treatment is as much about social understanding and wisdom
as it is about science.
To be fair, one could imagine a more general form of "strict" test
for the twenty percent of the nation's top colleges that use affirmative
action, even given the increasing importance of subsequent graduate
or professional education to becoming a member of the nation's
leadership cadre. A principal mission of selective colleges like the
members of the Ivy League is to "mold" leaders of society at large in a
general way.116 If we are to have racial diversity in the leadership of
the nation, we must have racial diversity in the Ivy League.
The crucial difference between this articulation and the others is the
inability of the civilian college educational unit to make a more
precise claim of leadership mission and effect, that a diverse student
body will lead to diversity in the leadership of a specific institution or
profession in which there is a compelling need for racial diversity.
The claim of an elite college to a leadership-production function may
have an undeniable commonsense appeal, and it may be causally
accurate, albeit in a weak sense." 7 But this sort of generalized, openended claim to prospective social benefit, like its retrospective remedy
counterpart-the interest in remedying "societal" as opposed to
institutional discrimination, which was held to be unconstitutional in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education'18 -is simply too protean to
merit incorporation in a substantive legal test, particularly one that is
meant to be as exacting as the compelling interest standard. If an
argument for student body diversity is decisive on the basis of an
assertion of prospective general societal benefit, it is hard to see the
conditions under which that argument might fail.
To sum up, then, different institutions of higher learning seek and
confer the educational benefits of student body diversity to varying
degrees. Military academies seek diverse students for a diverse officer
corps and in fact produce it, but they are not so much interested in
discourse benefits although obtaining such benefits is part of their
116. See, e.g., Oldenburg, supra note 109 ("For more than three centuries, Yale has
seen its job as educating future leaders-from the fourteen Yalies who served on the
Continental Congress and four signers of the Declaration of Independence to four of
the past six U.S. presidents (the two Bushes; Bill Clinton, Yale Law '67; and Gerald
Ford, Yale Law '41."). It is interesting to point out that of the modern Yalies who
have become president in recent times, two were products of its law school, and
George W. Bush was also a graduate of Harvard Business School, a top professional
school. Moreover, George H.W. Bush was a 1948 graduate of Yale College-a
member of a generation of leaders for whom graduate and professional education was
not as important as it is in the twenty-first century.
117. See supra note 103.
118. 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). The Grutter Court did not purport to disavow
Wygant.
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mission. Law schools strongly seek and produce both the discourse
and institutional leadership benefits of a diverse student body;
business schools do so as well, although possibly less so on both
dimensions. Medical schools make the weakest argument of the
professional schools to both institutional leadership and discourse
benefits, but they can field arguments on both fronts nonetheless.
Colleges can make the strongest claim to discourse benefits, but no
real claim to institutional or professional leadership benefits on a
national level.
Should those discourse benefits be enough to find a compelling
state interest in student body diversity at the few selective public and

private colleges that use affirmative action?

The Court in Gratz

assumed so,119 and Justice Powell in Bakke said so,12° but neither
considered the broader context of the enterprise of higher education

in the United States. The most salient aspects of higher education in
America today are the accelerating proliferation of graduate and
professional schools that are the gate-keepers to leadership in our
increasingly specialized society, and the fact that there are many more
non-selective colleges which as a group lose highly qualified minority
candidates to the select group of prestigious undergraduate schools.
CONCLUSION

"Diversity," understood in the normative sense as an associative

virtue, 21 is the paradoxical celebration of difference under the
common and equal condition of humanity. Racial or ethnic diversity
is the celebration of difference in race or ethnic origin among human
beings. It is a relative newcomer to the American canon of values, 22
119. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003).
120. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
121. I call "diversity" an associative virtue because it is a good achieved only in the
context of mutual interaction, like "friendship" by contrast to virtues like "selfmastery" which are personally realized though in a social or political context. That is
not to say that diversity as an associative value does not have its analogue in strictly
personal virtues, such as the idea of human dividedness at the root of Isaiah Berlin's
thought.
122. The first chief justice of the Supreme Court was one of many founders who
believed that homogeneity, and not diversity, was the desired norm:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one
united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the
same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles
of government, very similar in their manners and customs.... This country
and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if
it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and
convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties,
should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous and alien
sovereignties.
The Federalist No. 2, at 9 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Early twentiethcentury American immigration statutes, which established quotas on immigration by
national origin that discriminated most against Asian immigrants, reflected to some
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coincident with the post-Second World War, post-colonial acceptance
of racial diversity as an inalterable yet benign (i.e., consistent with
fundamental equality) fact of the human condition and qualified
rejection of its antinomy, racial homogeneity, as a normatively
compelling form of social ordering.123
The sense of diversity as a virtue has special importance for a multiracial nation.
All nations, whether racially heterogeneous or
homogeneous, must deal with the external descriptive condition of
racial diversity in the world community at large, but a multi-racial
nation must confront it as an issue of internalgovernance. 124 The issue
takes on particular salience when racial differences correlate to
inequalities of socioeconomic wealth and political power, and it is
even more urgent when the dynamics of population growth are such
that have-not races are reproducing at greater rates than the haves.
Uncorrected, race-correlated material inequities might lead to social
instability and national decline. Skillfully managed, the condition of
stable internal racial diversity should also give the multi-racial nation
a comparative advantage over non-diverse nations in its external
relations with a diverse yet increasingly intertwined world.
Our institutions of higher learning, as a class, occupy a special place
in the potential for realization of racial diversity (in its normative
sense) for two related reasons. They are a principal means by which
citizens are taught social values such as the virtue of racial diversity.
These are the discourse benefits I have talked about, and they have to
do with how all citizens, regardless of race, view society and life. Our
universities are also an important training ground for the leaders of a
racially diverse society in which higher education is a virtual necessity
for significant socioeconomic and political advancement. This gatekeeping function means that for the nation to have the benefit of
leadership diversity, it must have minorities at its universities. It
follows as a logical matter that racial diversity among student
populations at our colleges and universities is potentially a compelling
government interest, to ensure representation both of minority
extent the resilience of the countervailing norm of racial homogeneity. The nationalorigin system continued to be a prominent feature of the 1952 Immigration and
Naturalization Act, and was only abolished in 1965. Similarly, state-sponsored
segregation enforced a de facto hierarchical accommodation of racial diversity that is
inconsistent with the fundamental human equality across races that is a premise of the
present multi-racial diversity norm.
123. 1 say "qualified," because racial or ethnic group self-determination may be the
only option in the context of states with intractable histories of inter-ethnic tension.
But no mainstream American leader, whether progressive or conservative, contends
that a return to racial homogeneity is the answer to multi-racialism in the present
United States population. Even for the fringe segregationist, the solution would
presumably be the hierarchical bifurcation of society by apartheid, not expulsion or
eradication of heterogeneous races.
124. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal,84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 1024-25 (1996).
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viewpoints and experiences on campus and of racial minorities in our
leadership elites upon graduation. The very best schools say that they
must have race-based admissions policies to enroll the highly qualified
minority applicants necessary to achieve the compelling interest in
racially diverse student bodies.
In fact, these same elite educational institutions have marked
differences in mission and emphasis, owing to the many needs of the
society they serve and the corresponding scale of the higher
educational enterprise as a whole. The highly selective military
academies, for example, seek student body diversity more for the sake
of leadership diversity in the nation's armed forces than for the
benefit of a robust exchange on campus of ideas formed by racially
diverse experiences, which is the principal aim of the selective
undergraduate schools that are their civilian counterpart. While
selective civilian undergraduate institutions may convincingly claim
that they seek student body diversity to produce the campus and
societal benefits of diverse discourse, and that courts should defer to
their educational judgment that these benefits are compelling, they
are not so clearly entitled to claim that they consciously seek to train
institutional and professional leaders on a national level-military
officers, judges, politicians, and corporate executives.
Nor can elite colleges claim that undergraduate student body
diversity causes the benefit of institutional and professional leadership
diversity in anything other than a very general, hence legally suspect,
way. Not only is such specialized training in tension with the
fundamental mission of the liberal arts college institution, the
individuals or electorates who govern access to leadership in
nationally sensitive institutions like the federal judiciary, the Senate,
and corporate boardrooms, (the nation's officer corps being the
unique and important exception), may promote racial diversity on
their own without regard to whether a person went to an elite college.
More important for our purposes, it is increasingly the case that those
who seek leadership positions in institutions of national importance
must obtain further, specialized training at graduate and professional
schools that have, as a class, the narrow educational mission of
leadership and professional diversity.
Yet even in terms of the admittedly important benefit of diverse
discourse, the case for a compelling state interest in student body
diversity at elite colleges is problematic, notwithstanding the Court's
summary acquiescence on the point in Gratz.'2 5 The self-interested
argument of the few selective public and private undergraduate
schools that employ affirmative action is that without it, they must
reject highly qualified minority applicants at the cost of meaningful
student body diversity on their campuses. This means that with
125. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2426-27 (2003).
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affirmative action at the elite colleges, those less selective colleges

(among the remaining eighty percent of all colleges) with very few
minority students have no chance to enroll these same highly qualified
minority candidates, at the expense of their own presumptively
compelling interests in student body diversity. And even those less
selective undergraduate programs with sufficiently diverse student
populations as it is will suffer a qualitative loss in their campus
discourse because of the flight of highly qualified minority students to

elite colleges engineered by affirmative action. 2 6 It might not be fair
to require a private college with government funding to answer for the

costs of this tradeoff between the elite and non-elite colleges in
compelling government interest analysis, but surely, a state with a
portfolio of public institutions of higher learning ought not to be
afforded the same latitude.2 7 And if the benefit of diverse discourse
at elite public colleges alone does not suffice as a compelling state

interest, it seems necessary to reach the same legal conclusion for
their private counterparts, to preempt the latter from cherry-picking
all highly qualified minority college students.

Is it better, then, to allow affirmative action at our most prestigious
colleges so that they may each achieve robust student body diversity,

or to dilute the concentration of highly qualified minority candidates
at elite colleges, sharing them with less prestigious schools and doing
away with affirmative action altogether at the undergraduate level?
This seems to me a very hard question. On the one hand, to the
extent that the causal claim of elite colleges to leadership diversity is
right,2 8 the latter choice would diminish the direct representation of

racial minorities in the leadership of nationally sensitive institutions
and, also, would lessen the exposure to undergraduate-campus

126. My point here necessarily presumes that minority students who are "highly
qualified" in an academic sense make a greater contribution to discourse benefits
than less qualified students. Concededly, this need not be true, because less qualified
minority students might have more diverse life experiences to share with majority
students on campus. However, to the extent highly qualified students might have
better oral and written communications skills, they may be more adept at discourse,
notwithstanding the comparative homogeneity of their experiences. In any event, the
connection between high qualifications and desired discourse benefits is an implicit
presumption of race-conscious admissions policies at elite universities, which do not
purport to give preferences, ceteris paribus,to merely qualified minority students.
127. I would think that how this plays out in practice is complicated, because a
State might reasonably choose to invest in a nationally prominent "flagship"
university, including its undergraduate arms, as opposed to its other state institutions
of higher learning. That logic is somewhat undermined to the extent a national
reputation is made by the research and scholarship conducted by the faculty and
students of a public university's graduate and professional schools, which could
continue to employ affirmative action. Indeed, those graduate and professional
programs might be benefited by greater parity in state colleges and undergraduate
programs, which could serve as in-state feeder institutions to those programs.
128. See supra note 103.
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diversity of white and other students not benefited by affirmative
action who later become such leaders.
On the other hand, to the extent that graduate and professional
schools have displaced selective colleges as the crucial gate-keeping
educational units for leadership diversity (again, with the exception of
the military academies and ROTC for the military officer corps),
getting rid of undergraduate affirmative action while keeping it at the
graduate level would have little effect on leadership diversity but
considerable salutary effect for the national educational enterprise as
a whole. For one, it would give less prestigious colleges a better
chance to attract highly qualified minority candidates to shore up their
own compelling interest in student body diversity for its discourse
benefits. Such a two-tiered system would also encourage the top
graduate and professional schools to look for minority applicants from
a more diverse universe of undergraduate institutions, for example,
historically black institutions like Hampton University, or less
prestigious public schools with large populations of under-represented
minority students like Virginia Commonwealth University129 and
private such schools like Temple University.13 And in so doing, elite
graduate and professional schools might develop a familiarity with
these undergraduate programs that would increase the chances of
outstanding non-minority graduates to get in. The end result would
be greater diversity in the undergraduate backgrounds of minority and
non-minority students at the very best graduate and professional
schools 3 -- the new gate-keepers to leadership diversity, an important
corollary of which would be elimination of the "double-counting"
effect of affirmative action, i.e., the cultivation of a super-elite of
minority students benefiting from affirmative action twice by being
accepted at an elite college and again at a top graduate or professional
school. 32
129. Virginia Commonwealth University Freshman Profile (reporting that twenty

percent of incoming freshmen in 2003 are African-American),
http://www.vcu.edu/ugrad/admissions101/freshmn-profile.html
2004).

of

available at

(last visited Mar. 2,

130. Temple University Fall 2002 Student Profile (reporting that nineteen percent
incoming freshmen in 2002 were African-American), available at

http://www.temple.edu/factbook/profile02/profile.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).

131. And to the extent this means that more minority students who attended
historically black colleges or less prestigious undergraduate schools with different
sorts of student populations attend graduate and professional schools, it would
increase the quality of diverse discourse on the campuses, since divergent
undergraduate experiences are valuable life experiences in themselves.
132. A cursory examination suggests that the concentration of elite college
graduates (presumably including many minority students for which no data is publicly
available) at top graduate schools may be staggering. Harvard Law School, for
instance, reported 1,669 full-time JD students enrolled in 2002-2003, with 268
undergraduate schools represented. See JD: Undergraduate Schools of J.D. Students
Enrolled
at
HLS
in
2002-2003,
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/admissions/jd/body.php.

But an astonishing forty-six
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The Court's lack of clarity about the diversity rationale illuminates
just how difficult it is to operate an important social value like
"diversity" into a workable legal rule that can in turn be applied to a
vast, shifting social institutional landscape while remaining faithful to
the underlying value. 33 The difficulty is compounded by the
powerful, seemingly countervailing norm of formal racial equality,
guarded by its own formidable doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause.
It is no wonder, then, that the Court, inspired by the virtues of
diversity and the specific value of student body diversity lauded by

forces as disparate as university dons and warrior chieftains,
articulated a doctrine that does not quite fit the rich fabric of fact.
This Essay has been an attempt to add some precision to the Grutter
Court's diversity analysis, but, at bottom, its theme is unoriginal:
"Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause.""13

percent of the student body (767 students) were graduated from eleven colleges: the
eight Ivy League schools, Stanford, Duke, and Berkeley. Indeed, Harvard (189) and
Yale (101) Colleges together accounted for more students (290) than 190
undergraduate schools combined (289). See generally Elizabeth Bernstein, Want to
Go to Harvard Law, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at W1 (ranking colleges in terms of
their success in placing graduates at prestigious business, medical, and law schools,
with Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, and Williams at the top of the rankings).
133. But see Karst, supra note 19, at 74 (noting that despite the uncertainty
surrounding the decision, "it does offer a starting point for those who would be more
race-conscious in their efforts to do racial justice, both in politics and in constitutional
law").
134. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) (citing Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960) ("[I]n dealing with claims under broad
provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive process of
inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified
by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in
disregard of variant controlling facts.").

ARTICLE
"BOUND FAST AND BROUGHT UNDER THE
YOKE": JOHN ADAMS AND THE
REGULATION OF PRIVACY AT THE
FOUNDING
Alison L. LaCroix*

The announcement of the United States Supreme Court in 1965
that a right to privacy existed, and that it predated the Bill of Rights,
launched a historical and legal quest to sound the origins and extent of
the right that has continued to the present day.'
Legal scholars
quickly grasped hold of the new star in the constitutional firmament,
producing countless books and articles examining the caselaw
pedigree and the potential scope of this right to privacy. Historians,
however, have for the most part shied away from tracing the origins of
the right to privacy, perhaps hoping to avoid the ignominy of
practicing "law-office history."'
Instead, some historians have

engaged in subtle searches for markers of privacy-such as an

emphasis on family,3 a notion of the home as an oasis,4 or a minimal
* Doctoral candidate, Department of History, Harvard University. B.A., Yale
University; J.D., Yale Law School; A.M., Harvard University. The author thanks
Morton J. Horwitz and James T. Kloppenberg for their comments on an earlier draft
of this Article. The author also thanks William Birdthistle.
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples). Scholarly interest in
the right to privacy originated in 1890, with the publication in the Harvard Law
Review of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's seminal article, The Right to Privacy.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890). Although Warren and Brandeis put forth a compelling argument for the long
lineage of the right in English common law, privacy did not gain recognition as a
fundamental right for another seventy-five years. After 1965, the right to privacy
steadily expanded its ambit, extending governmental protection to abortion as well as
other reproductive decisions. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding
that a woman has a constitutional right to abortion); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (striking down on equal protection grounds a state law prohibiting the use
of contraceptives by unmarried persons).
2. The phrase "law-office history" refers to "the selection of [historical] data
favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for
contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered."
Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 119,
122 n.13.
3. See, e.g., Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Family: Religion and Domestic
Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England 173 (rev. ed. 1966) (describing New
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degree of criminal prosecution'-as a means of understanding how
Americans have viewed the various spheres of activity that have
constituted their world. Rather than searching for the origins of a
right to privacy, these scholars broaden the inquiry in an attempt to
understand the nature of a realm of human activity that they
characterize as "private," in contrast to a corresponding "public"
realm.
Yet the very ambiguity surrounding these terms, with their
immense resonance for modern American life, complicates the
historiographical project. Does the use of privacy as an analytic tool
compromise the historian's ability to separate the term's modern
connotations from its historical ones? Can early uses of the words
"private" and "privacy" ever be understood as the speakers meant
them, or has the Supreme Court's pronouncement that a right to
privacy has existed all along simply lulled us into believing that the
meaning of these words remains unchanged, and that a stable notion
of "privacy" has endured and been celebrated throughout American
history? In short, the concept of privacy has not lent itself to easy
historical application. Consequently, many historians seem to have
abandoned privacy as both an analytical framework and a topic of
analysis.
Nowhere is this reluctance to grapple with the myriad layers of
privacy more marked than in the historiography of the nation's
founding. The relative dearth of scholarly attention paid to notions of
privacy in the 1770s and 1780s is startling; after all, the era that birthed
the very Constitution that became the basis of a national valorization
of privacy seems a promising candidate for an intellectual history of
the idea. Indeed, according to the Griswold Court, the colonists
carried the notion of privacy with them from the English common law,
planting it along with their earliest crops in the rocky soil of the New
World and enshrining it in the founding texts of the new nation. In
this celebratory view of seventeenth-century events, the germ of a
belief in privacy-that is, individual autonomy and freedom from
collective scrutiny-inhered in the Anglo-American consciousness,

England Puritans' shift toward viewing children and family as a wellspring of affection
rather than as the locus of communal order and salvation); Daniel Blake Smith, Inside
the Great House: Planter Family Life in Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake Society
285-89 (1980) (arguing that the late eighteenth century witnessed a "heightened
intimacy within the conjugal family" of southern planters).
4. See, e.g., Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790, at 303-05
(1982) (identifying a late-eighteenth-century tendency to view the home as a
sanctuary); Jan Lewis, The Pursuit of Happiness: Family and Values in Jefferson's
Virginia 210 (1983) (noting that in the era following the American Revolution, "the
pursuit of happiness took men and women home").
5. See, e.g., David H. Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England 248 (1972)
(citing the existence of a privilege-albeit limited-against self-incrimination as
evidence of a right to privacy in colonial New England).
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essentially unchanged from 1607 to 1965 and beyond.6 This view has
met challenges from such scholars of early American history as John

Demos and Edmund Morgan, who characterize colonial communities
as committed to an overarching social organization based on the

connections among individual grace, divine salvation, and communal
welfare.7 Far from the libertarian paradise that the Griswold Court
envisioned, colonial New England is for these scholars a tightly knit

community, the survival and salvation of which depended on constant
public monitoring of what we would now consider quintessentially

private behavior, such as childrearing, spirituality, and sexual activity.
Despite disagreements about the extent to which privacy was a
value (much less a right) in early America, very few scholars have

focused on eighteenth-century notions of privacy.

Instead, many

historians have avoided the term altogether, concentrating instead on

the development of certain aspects of politics and society that they
associate with the emergence of a modern, nineteenth-century
worldview based on differentiated private and public spheres.8 This is

an unfortunate trend, for it ignores the many early Americans who
thought and wrote extensively about the interaction between private
activity and public life in the early Republic. If legal scholars have

been too quick to take the Griswold Court at its word and accept
privacy as a foundational American value, historians seem equally
hasty in their willingness to treat privacy as a fundamentally modern
idea, and therefore to use it only as a lens through which to view early

America rather than as a legitimate subject of inquiry. In almost
every case, privacy is celebrated as the fruit of Enlightenment reason,
a marker of a fully modern society and an unmitigated social good.
People who value privacy are in some way "like us"; people who do

not are at best not yet ready for modernity and at worst potential
pawns of a totalitarian state.9
The writings of John Adams demonstrate, however, that at least

6. At least one scholar has found an "unwritten" right to privacy in colonial
America, which he explicitly connects to the Griswold decision. See id. at 248-49.
7. John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (2d
ed. 2000); Morgan, supra note 3. Nancy Cott has made a related argument in the
context of divorce law. See Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women
in Eighteenth-CenturyMassachusetts, 33 Wm. & Mary Q. 586 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Helena M. Wall, Fierce Communion: Family and Community in
Early America (1990). As Hendrik Hartog has argued in the context of the law of
municipal corporations, the nineteenth century was the high tide of formal separation
between public and private spheres. See Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private
Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law, 1730-1870, at 3
(1983).
9. See, e.g., David W. Marcell, Privacy and the American Character, 66 S.
Atlantic Q. 1 (1967); Thomas H. O'Connor, The Right to Privacy in Historical
Perspective, 53 Mass. L.Q. 101 (1968). Marcell's and O'Connor's views of privacy as
the beneficial and necessary consequence of modernity typify the prevailing attitude
in the years immediately following the Griswold decision.
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one member of the founding generation devoted substantial time and
ink to considering the problem of privacy. Adams's writings confirm
that privacy was not always among the chief goals of the American
republic. On the contrary, Adams displayed a marked suspicion of
privacy and the private life. Although he rarely employed the term
"privacy," Adams's highly developed political theory assumed the
existence of both a public and private realm, arguing consistently that
the "private" (a word he frequently used) realm of individual activity
Adams
comprised only selfish passions and human weakness.
therefore premised his theory of government on what he considered a
realistic view of human nature, replacing the classical republican ideal
of the identity between individual virtue and civic virtue with a
systemic solution to humans' tendency toward vice. By severing the
connection between the virtue of the citizen and that of the state,
Adams drove a wedge between private and public activity, arguing
that the private passions for reputation and luxury had to be subdued
and controlled by the institutions of government in order for the
Republic to function. Adams thus gave up on the private sphere as a
source, by itself, of republican virtue and order. As his writings
demonstrate, his was among the most developed conceptions of the
role of privacy in a republic.
Adams's political theory was not wholly pessimistic with respect to
human nature, however. On the contrary, his resistance to the notion
of private life stemmed from a basic belief that republican
governments required constant scrutiny by citizens, and that citizens
should therefore not be permitted to withdraw into the comfortable
realm of private interests and pursuits. Rather than constraining
individuals' activities, this arrangement would make every citizen "in
some degree a statesman," granting an individual the authority "to
examine and judge for himself the tendency of political principles and
measures."'" Adams's optimism stemmed from his insistence that this
realignment of individuals away from selfish pursuits and toward the
welfare of all was possible.
While Adams disdained the' activities of the private realm
throughout his writings, he never questioned the realm's existence or
power. Indeed, his entire system of government was structured to
control passion, the private realm's principal component. In contrast
to the Griswoldian image of the founders as devoted to individual
freedom to live beyond the long arm of the state, Adams argued that a
nation of citizens engaged only in private pursuits sapped democracy
of its strength and subjected unwary citizens to the risk of tyranny.
For Adams, privacy clearly existed in early America, but he did not
view it as the benign source of autonomy and rights that it would
10. John Adams, On Self-Delusion, in The Revolutionary Writings of John
Adams 11 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000).
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become in the twentieth century." Unlike his contemporaries James
Madison and Adam Smith, Adams was not willing to believe that the
cumulative effect of many private impulses could be harnessed for
social good. 2 Madison's and Smith's view may have ultimately

prevailed and even paved the way for Griswold's embrace of an
affirmative right to privacy. But Adams's refusal to accept private
vice as a necessary evil was a crucial step in the transition from
classical republicanism based on a virtuous populace to liberal

republicanism based on a political structure that sought to cabin the
worst human tendencies while redirecting others to beneficial ends.
This Article focuses on John Adams's writings on privacy, which
remained remarkably consistent throughout a career spanning more
than seven decades. Adams was still discussing political theory with
various correspondents, most notably Thomas Jefferson, a few days
before he died at the age of eighty-nine on July 4, 1826. Although
Adams's reputation has, as he feared, not ascended to the level of
such Revolutionary peers as Madison, Jefferson and George

Washington, he was one of the most prolific political theorists of his
time and has been called "the master psychologist" of American
political thought.13 His major writings, A Dissertationon the Canon
11. Throughout this Article, I will use the terms "privacy," "private life," and "the
private realm" more or less interchangeably, with each of them referring to a notion
of a realm of human activity that exists apart from an accompanying public realm of
politics and civic discourse. The phrase "right to privacy" will be used as a term of art
for the constitutional right recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut and its predecessor
rights at common law.
12. The most famous statement of Madison's philosophy on this point is, of
course, The FederalistNo. 10, in which Madison argued that the evils of faction could
be cured by setting those factions loose in a large republic, which would in turn
provide maximum freedom and stability to its citizens. The Federalist No. 10, at 64
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also Lance Banning, The Sacred
Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic 204
(1995). Similarly, in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith posited that moral as well as
economic benefits on an aggregate scale could result from individual choices:
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is
in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more
likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them
that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them....
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk
to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations I ch. 2 (Alfred A. Knopf 1991) (1776); see also
Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political
Thought 333 (1960) (describing Smith's "unseen hand" idea as a "theory of individual
moral behavior: both the moral good of society and its material well-being had their
origins in instinct, desire, and passion; and neither was the result of action intended to
advance the good of society as a whole"); cf. Garry Wills, Inventing America:
Jefferson's Declaration of Independence 232 (1978) (arguing that Smith emphasized
"providential harmonies within society" and characterizing Smith a "communitarian"
who was "conscripted to individualist uses by nineteenth-century liberalism").
13. Joseph J. Ellis, Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams 47
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and FeudalLaw (1765), the Novanglus letters (1774-75), A Defence of
the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (178687), and the Discourses on Davila (1790-91), canvass the history of
republican government from classical to modern times and assess the
prospects of success for the embryo republic founded in 1776 on the
western rim of the Atlantic Ocean. But they also contain remarkable
insight into human nature, bringing a pragmatic perspective to the
difficult project of establishing a new government of a type that had
not been seen for more than a thousand years.
This Article tracks some of the major themes of Adams's writing on
privacy, discussing the impact of his Puritan background on his
thought and then moving to the broader issues that most interested
him: virtue, passion, decay, and public life. Each of these concepts
provided Adams with fodder for contemplating the nature of privacy,
and each became a component of his overall vision of the relationship
between public and private life. Analyzing these concepts together
allows reexamination of Adams's legacy and theory, pulling together
the strands of his suspicion of privacy and his deep conviction that the
private realm was no place for American citizens to spend the
majority of their time.
I. PURITANISM

For an individual who left remarkably complete records of his
activities and thoughts, Adams has generated a considerable amount
of dispute among historians. One major area of debate has been the
impact of Adams's Puritan heritage on his political philosophyspecifically, the degree to which the Puritan ethos of worldly austerity
and the faith's close association of political and spiritual life
influenced Adams's thinking about the formation of republics. Born
to a long line of Massachusetts smallholders, the son of a deacon,
Adams received an education that inculcated in him the precepts of
Calvinism. Adams seriously considered studying for the ministry,
spending the year after his graduation from Harvard fretting about his
fitness for the profession and ultimately deciding to pursue a career in
law. In his intellectual biography of Adams, C. Bradley Thompson
attributes Adams's decision not to enter the ministry to a theological
controversy that took place in Adams's hometown of Braintree while
he was at Harvard, which ended in the public censure of a clergyman
whose views had strayed too close to Arminian doctrines of free will.
Shortly thereafter, Adams rejected several foundational tenets of
Calvinism, adopting instead what Thompson calls a "religion of civic
(1993). Adams's contemporaries referred to him as "the Atlas" and the "colossus" of
independence. David McCullough, John Adams 127, 163 (2001) (quoting Richard
Stockton, New Jersey delegate to the Continental Congress, and Thomas Jefferson,
respectively).
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morality" influenced by Lockean and Newtonian thought as well as
the writings of several liberal English theologians. 4
Despite Adams's youthful protestations against Calvinism,
reformed Christianity clearly remained important in his thought. At a
minimum, it harmonized with his political philosophy, providing a
theological underpinning for his theories. Writing in 1796, Adams
observed that a "great Advantage" of Christianity was that it taught
the "Duties and Rights of The Man and the Citizen." Promises of
"future Life are thus added to the Observance of civil and political as
well as domestic and private Duties."' 5 Moreover, on several
occasions the young Adams draped himself in the mantle of
seventeenth-century Puritan worthies, engaging in 1767 in a spirited
exchange of articles under the name "Governor Winthrop" with an
interlocutor calling himself "Governor Bradford." The articles had
nothing to do with religion, focusing on a controversy in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives and urging the people of
Massachusetts not to allow the repeal of the Stamp Act to dissuade
them from their newfound American patriotism. Yet Adams's
identification with the leader of the Puritan Massachusetts Bay
Colony was motivated by more than simple expedience. The very
language that Adams employed sounded the century-old Calvinist
themes of decadence and renewal, connecting the health of the
individual body with that of the civic body: "Calamities are the
caustics and cathartics of the body politic. They arouse the soul. They
restore original virtues. They reduce a constitution back to its first
principles."' 6 Haranguing his fellow colonists not to allow British
overtures to lull them into "such a tame, torpid state of indolence and
inattention, that the missionaries of slavery are suffered to preach
their abominable doctrines,""7 Adams borrowed the rhetoric of what
Edmund Morgan calls "the Puritan Ethic," embracing adversity as an
opportunity to test the mettle of one's faith. 8
Puritanism therefore had a profound influence on Adams, as it did
on many members of the Revolutionary generation. 9 Certainly,
Puritan theology and Adams's Revolutionary thought shared at least
one characteristic: distrust of a too-private life, with its potential to
detach individuals from the Puritan commonwealth or the republican
14. C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty 6-13, 23 (1998).
15. Id. at 23 (quoting 3 Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 240-41 (L.H.
Butterfield ed., 1962)).
16. John Adams, Governor Winthrop to Governor Bradford, in The
Revolutionary Writings of John Adams 60 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000).
17. Id.
18. Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24 Wm.
& Mary Q. 3 (1967).
19. See id.; see also Richard L. Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee: Character and
the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690-1765 (1967); Michael Walzer, The Revolution
of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (Atheneum 1976) (1965).
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state. To stave off such offenses to the polity, Puritan communities
engaged in elaborate surveillance and prosecution of deviant behavior
and issued jeremiads against corruption and decline. Adams, for his
part, engaged in his own laments of human nature, as when he railed
in 1774 against Bostonians' boundless greed for imported British tea:
What numbers there are in every community, who have no
providence or prudence in their private affairs, but will go on
indulging the present appetite, prejudice, or passion, to the ruin of
their estates and families, as well as their own health and characters!
How much larger is the number of those who have no foresight for
the public, or consideration of the freedom of posterity! ... Must
the wise, the virtuous and worthy part of the community, who
constituted a very great majority, surrender their liberty, and involve
their posterity in misery, in complaisance to a detestable, though
small, party of knaves,
and a despicable, though more numerous,
2°
company of fools?
Would the wise, the virtuous, and the worthy be degraded into the
same dependence on imported luxuries that afflicted the knaves and
fools? Or would the knaves and fools realize the wickedness of their
ways and reform in time to save their entire community? Adams's
critique explicitly linked "private affairs" with the "public" and with
"posterity," spelling out the dire consequences of the unwholesome
"appetite, prejudice, or passion" that he saw in his fellow citizens.
The nature of the distress was clear: Private choices caused public
hardship and rendered the town vulnerable to further British
exploitation. But Adams's diatribe contains far more than this simple
statement of cause and effect. As his Puritan forbears had done,
Adams condemned the private weaknesses that endangered the entire
community. Like his ancestors' Puritan zeal, which linked "[p]ersonal
salvation and national reformation" in a "highly collective emotion,"
Adams's revolutionary rhetoric deplored private interests and selfinvolved citizens.21 The two strains of thought thus shared a language
based on the quest for virtue, the inevitability of corruption, the
remoteness of salvation, and the enervating effects of worldly luxury.
As Edmund Morgan has argued, the colonial boycott movements
represented "a way of reaffirming and rehabilitating the virtues of the
Puritan Ethic," in particular the idea that "adversity provided a spur
to virtue. '22 Virtue, however, would prove more elusive in the 1770s
and 1780s than it had for any previous generation, leading Adams to
conclude that private virtue could not sustain a republic.

20. John Adams, Novanglus, No. VI, in The Revolutionary Writings of John
Adams 213 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000).
21. See Walzer, supra note 19, at 170, 12.
22. Morgan, supra note 18, at 8.
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II. VIRTUE
In addition to the Puritan Ethic, the Revolutionary generation was
deeply affected by the ideals of the classical republican (or civic
humanist) tradition, which J.G.A. Pocock has described as "anchored
in the Florentine Renaissance, Anglicized by James Harrington,
Algernon Sidney, and Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, but
looking unmistakably back to antiquity and to Aristotle, Polybius, and
Cicero. 2' ' 3 The essential element of classical republicanism was its
reliance on citizen virtue to maintain the fragile balance between
tyranny (defined as an excess of monarchy) and anarchy (defined as
an excess of democracy). A republic, therefore, demanded what
Gordon Wood terms "extraordinary moral character" of its people, in
that "each man must somehow be persuaded to submerge his personal
wants into the greater good of the whole. 21 4 This public virtue would
stem from individuals' private virtue, in a process of aggregation and
cumulation of acts of virtue between citizens.
By the 1780s, however, the promises of classical republicanism
appeared to many Americans as nothing more than empty
blandishments. Under the relatively weak structure of the Articles of
Confederation, state legislatures seemed to have run amok, passing
and then rapidly repealing laws, engaging in irresponsible paper
money schemes, passing debtor-friendly legislation that hindered
collection by creditors, and abandoning themselves to the type of
"democratic despotism" that Adams and others had once viewed as a
contradiction in terms.25 In late 1786, the rebellion led by Daniel
Shays in western Massachusetts, which protested high taxes and
demanded additional debtor relief, provided vivid evidence of the
defects of the Confederation. To the emerging Federalist camp,
which counted Adams among its more independent members, the
conclusion was clear: The people's virtue provided an insufficient
foundation on which to build the national edifice.
The very
institutions of government would have to be reconstituted in order to
bolster capricious citizen character with steady, systemic structures.
As Wood puts it, the Federalists "hoped to create an entirely new and
original sort of republican government-a republic which did not
require a virtuous people for its sustenance." Because American
character had proved insufficiently virtuous to support the republic,
the republic would26have to be reformed so as to "moderate the effects
of its viciousness.,
23. J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century, 3 J. Interdisc.
Hist. 119, 120 (1972).
24. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 68
(1969).
25. Id. at 404.
26. Id. at 475. J.G.A. Pocock has charged Wood with exaggerating the magnitude
of the shift that occurred in republican thought in 1787-88, arguing that a balanced
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Adams, who approved of the new Constitution that emerged out of
the postwar desire for structure, consistently warned against relying
solely on individual virtue, which he considered "the effect of the well
ordered constitution, rather than the cause., 27 Unfortunately for his
contemporaries and for posterity, however, Adams observed the postRevolutionary crisis from England, where he served from 1785 to 1788
as the Republic's first minister to the Court of St. James. He could
not contribute his considerable expertise on the subject of human vice
and virtue to the Constitutional Convention, which met in
Philadelphia from 1787 to 1788. Despite his distance from his nascent
nation, however, the indefatigable Adams busied himself between
visits to the frosty Hanoverian court by penning his three-volume
Defence of the Constitutions of the United States of America. True to
its name, the Defence undertook to rebut the claim of French radical
Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot that the bicameral constitutions
adopted by virtually all the American states, including Adams's own
Massachusetts constitution, merely reproduced the outmoded and
anti-democratic structure of the British constitution. Yet Adams's
interest in defending the states' tripartite "mixed governments" did
not prevent him from including his views on virtue in the Defence.
According to Adams, virtue and its components, such as the love of
liberty, were insufficient-and possibly unnecessary-elements of
republican government. Indeed, Adams expanded the Federalist
anxiety about the inadequacy of virtue, fearing not only that a lack of
private virtue would prove unable to counterbalance government
corruption but also that private corruption might replace virtue and
gnaw away at the republic from within. In other words, Adams found
in virtue another reason to distrust citizens in their capacity as private
individuals. "The numbers of men in all ages have preferred ease,
slumber, and good cheer to liberty, when they have been in
competition," Adams wrote. "We must not then depend alone upon
the love of liberty in the soul of man for its preservation., 28 As in the
early days of the war, when he had lambasted his fellow citizens as
"knaves" and "fools" for failing to curb their thirst for tea and thereby
ensuring the colony's dependence on British trade, Adams argued in
the 1780s and 1790s that a government could not rely on its citizens to
possess the discipline or will to choose the virtuous course of action
republic of one, few, and many need not be the only arena for classical virtue. See
Pocock, supra note 23, at 133. As Adams's writings make clear, however, the
founders had by the 1780s abandoned classical virtue as a realistic basis on which to
build a nation.
27. John Adams, 3 A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States of America (1786-87), reprinted in 6 The Works of John Adams, Second
President of the United States: With a Life of the Author 1, 219 (Charles Francis
Adams ed., 1851).
28. Letter from John Adams to Samuel Adams (Oct. 18, 1790), reprinted in The
Political Writings of John Adams 664, 668 (George W. Carey ed., 2000).
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for themselves or their country. Absent this private will, therefore,
Adams called on organized, public entities to step in and take charge.
Reflecting on the state of the nation in a 1790 letter to Samuel
Adams, then-Vice President John Adams wrote:
"The love of liberty," you say, "is interwoven in the soul of man."
So it is ... in that of a wolf; and I doubt whether it be much more
rational, generous, or social, in one than in the other, until in man it
is enlightened by experience, reflection, education, and civil and
political institutions ....
With his readiness to give up on virtue altogether as a source of
political order, Adams essentially severed the classical causal link
between private behavior and public result. In its place, he offered a
systemic solution that, unlike the Federalist Constitution, established
a public realm of balanced government and checks on power that
explicitly sought to control the "[s]elf-interest, private avidity,
ambition, and avarice" that he viewed as the dominant threats to the
stability of the new republic.3" Unlike Madison, who believed that
public benefits could be reaped from private defects (e.g., the desire
to form factions) if those defects were properly harnessed, Adams
refused to believe that private impulses could be rehabilitated and
insisted that they had no place in a healthy government.
Moreover, Adams believed that government ought to bind citizens
together and encourage them to become invested in the
commonwealth. To this end, he argued that government should
"compel all to respect the common right, the public good, the
universal law, in preference to all private and partial considerations."'"
This goal stands in sharp contrast to that of the English-derived
"Country ideology" that J.G.A. Pocock associates with Revolutionary
thought. In Pocock's view, Country ideology envisioned a man "so
independent of other men and their social structures that his
dedication to the res publica could be wholly autonomous. 3 2 To
Adams, the risk that men and women left alone would surrender to
their private vices was simply too great to rely on anything except the
controlling power of public authority. The inevitability of vice (or, to
use the Puritan term, sin) was a major premise of Adams's conclusion
that private drives had to be subordinated to public objectives. The
notion that citizens possessed a "right to be let alone" would have
struck Adams as mere sophistry, a clever justification for a lack of
prudence and restraint.33
29. Id.
30. John Adams, 3 A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States of America, reprinted in The Political Writings of John Adams: Representative
Selections 105,150 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., 1954).
31. Id. at 147.
32. Pocock, supra note 23, at 122, 129.
33. By 1890, however, Adams's distrust of unchecked human nature had clearly
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III. PASSION

Once virtue had lost its primacy in republican political theory, there
remained one source of private influence on public affairs: the
passions. For Adams and his contemporaries, the term "passion"
encompassed varied human desires, such as the desire for reputation,
for wealth, and for all other forms of gratification. Although some
scholars, such as Albert Hirschman, have argued that earlyeighteenth-century thought transformed the passions from a
destructive and sinful force to a creative and beneficial one, many of
the founders-and Adams in particular-remained influenced by the
older notion of passions as harmful, selfish, and fundamentally
irrational.' Indeed, in the minds of Adams and his contemporaries,
the passions represented the primary impediment to private virtue,
and therefore the primary incitement to bad behavior. By the time he
was twenty years old, Adams had developed the perspective on
passion that would inform his political theory for the rest of his life:
He is not a wise man, and is unfit to fill any important station in
society, that has left one passion in his soul unsubdued.... These
passions should be bound fast, and brought under the yoke.

Untamed, they are lawless bulls; they roar and bluster, defy all
control, and sometimes murder their proper owner. But, properly
inured to obedience, they take their places under the yoke without
noise, and labor vigorously in their master's service.35
Like vice, passion inhered in human nature; unlike vice, however, it
could be controlled and used in the service of public order.
Thirty-two years after Adams advocated yoking private passion to
the service of the common weal, reformers such as Madison made a
similar case for their new Constitution. As part of their effort to
replace a government that depended on the people's virtue with one
that incorporated the people's shortcomings in its very structure,
Madison and the other drafters produced a Constitution that, in the
words of Gordon Wood, "cut through the structure of the states to the
people themselves and yet was not dependent on the character of that
people. ' 36 In essence, the Constitution "depended for stability, not on
virtue, but upon the counterbalanced energies of competing private
interests."37 The relatively benign-sounding "interest" concealed a
fallen out of favor. Brandeis and Warren described privacy as "the right to enjoy
life,-the right to be let alone." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
34. See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments
for Capitalism Before Its Triumph 47 (rev. ed. 1997).
35. John Adams, Diary: With Passages from an Autobiography (June 14, 1756),
in 2 The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With a Life
of the Author 3, 22 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850).
36. Wood, supra note 24, at 475.
37. Christopher Grasso, A Speaking Aristocracy: Transforming Public Discourse
in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut 361 (1999).
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neat legerdemain, insofar as it was a euphemism for a passion that
could be deliberately controlled and deployed against another, more
destructive passion.3 8 In The Federalist No. 51, Madison articulated
the revolutionary idea that the very architecture of government could
direct the passions toward productive ends:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human
affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in
all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is,
to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that
each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every
individual may be a centinel over the public rights. These inventions
of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the
supreme powers of the state.39
Realizing that ungoverned passions could only sink the Republic in
the quagmire of personal desires and squabbles, Madison argued that
the structure of the Constitution allowed it to check the passions'
destructive effects and even extract benefits from them by pitting
interest against interest.
Adams concurred in the need for the state to act as what Hirschman
calls "a transformer, a civilizing medium."4 0 Yet Adams did not share
even the guarded optimism of The Federalist No. 51, for he placed no
trust in the ability of private interests to stand guard over public
rights. On the contrary, he firmly believed that only the public realm
of the state possessed the necessary architecture to act as a sentinel.4
For Adams, government's primary purpose was regulating the
passions. Indeed, he feared that ignoring the passions or pretending
that they did not exist would lead to the kind of tyranny that had
gripped revolutionary France-a futile search for human perfectibility
that would inevitably lead to violence and destruction. While Adams
was serving as vice president, he exhorted the French people to use
government as a check on passion rather than as an excuse to
38. See Hirschman, supra note 34, at 20-21.
39. The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 349. As Lance
Banning has noted, however, it is a mistake to read The Federalist No. 51 as a
complete departure from the British republican tradition. See Banning, supra note 12,
at 214-19.
40. Hirschman, supra note 34, at 16.
41. Adams set forth his vision of private interests kept in check by the state in an
1813 letter to Jefferson, in which Adams described the place of aristocracy in a mixed
government.
If I could prevent its deleterious influence I would put it all into 'The Hole'
of Calcutta: but as this is impossible, as it is a Phoenix that rises again out of
its own Ashes, I know no better Way than to chain it in a 'Hole by itself,'
and place a Watchfull Centinel on each Side of it.
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 19, 1813), in 2 The AdamsJefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and
Abigail and John Adams 409 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959) (emphasis added).
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"Frenchmen! Act and think like
surrender to baser interests.
yourselves!," Adams implored in Discourses on Davila, his series of
letters published in the Gazette of the United States between 1790 and
1791. "Consider that government is intended to set bounds to
passions which nature has not limited; and to assist reason, conscience,
justice, and truth in controlling interests which without it would be as
The public realm of government,
unjust as uncontrollable."42
therefore, would necessarily possess a monopoly on the power to
"restrict the public expression of passions inimical to the cultivation of
man's reason."43 If passions represented the private side of life,
reason exemplified the virtues of the public realm-the realm that
truly mattered."a
Moreover, contrary to the charges of his many critics, Adams
believed that passions influenced interactions at all levels of society
and were not simply confined to the binary of the few versus the
many.45 For Adams, the most disruptive passions were also the most
universal: the related desires of emulation, ambition, jealousy, and
46
envy, all of which he attributed to the "[s]pectemuragendo" impulse
(literally, "Let us be seen in action"),47 which Adams considered "the
great principle of activity for the good of others."48 This "passionfor
distinction" infected all men, for the "desire to be observed,
considered, esteemed, praised, beloved, and admired by his fellows is
as well as keenest dispositions discovered in the
one of the earliest
49
heart of man.
Needless to say, this passion required a social realm to provide an
arena for the ritual display and affirmation of individuals' reputation.
Something more was needed, however, to transform the social arena
from a mere theatre of personality to a genuinely public realm
devoted to the people's welfare (salus populi). Adams insisted that
only government could curb the destructive nature of the passion for
distinction and extract some small benefit. "It is a principal end of
42. John Adams, Discourses on Davila (1790-91), reprinted in The Political
Writings of John Adams: Representative Selections 190-91 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed.,
1954). In a footnote dated 1813, Adams commented, "Frenchmen neither saw, heard,
nor felt or understood this." Id. at 191 n.15.
43. Grant B. Mindle, Liberalism, Privacy, and Autonomy, 51 J. Pol. 575, 577
(1989).
44. See id. at 576-77.
45. The most notable modern proponent of this view is Gordon Wood, who has
argued that Adams viewed politics as a contest between the interests of democracy
and those of the aristocracy. See Wood, supra note 24, at 576. Adams's most
vociferous contemporary critic was John Taylor of Caroline, whose 1814 Inquiry into
the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States aimed to rebut
Adams's Defence of the Constitutions of Government. Taylor claimed to have spent
more than twenty years composing his five-hundred-page tome.
46. Adams, supra note 30, at 178.
47. Thompson, supra note 14, at 154.
48. Adams, supra note 30, at 178.
49. Id. at 176.
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government to regulate this passion," Adams wrote in Davila, "which
in its turn becomes a principal means of government. ' 5' Keenly aware
of the dangers of either leaving the passions unregulated or simply
ignoring them, as he felt the French revolutionaries had, Adams
feared the corruption and degeneracy that awaited an insufficiently
vigilant government and a citizenry engrossed in the pursuit of private
passions. In contrast to the attitude of post-Griswold Americans,
Adams saw only chaos resulting from the belief that individual
autonomy represented an end in itself.
IV. DECAY

The threat of social decay lurked close to the surface of Adams's
thought, as it did for virtually every member of the founding
generation. Chief among the founders' fears was the prospect that all
nations-including their own infant one-might be bound to an
immutable biological progression of birth, maturity, decay, and
death.5 ' Far from a vague forecast of events that might occur in
subsequent centuries, the prognosis provided clear signposts for
monitoring the health of one's nation. Adams, for example, inveighed
against the indicia of refinement that late-eighteenth-century
Americans increasingly adopted, associating such fripperies as "balls,
assemblages, cards, equipage, tea, and elegance of every kind with
monarchy" and other noxious forms of late-stage civilization. 2
Anxious that the life cycle of the Republic might have already
commenced, Adams and his contemporaries searched constantly for
harbingers of social collapse.
Inevitably, they turned to their fellow citizens, seeking clues to the
fate of society in individual behavior. And oftentimes, Adams and his
associates found their contemporaries wanting, in thrall to the
spectemur agendo as well as the more prosaic temptations of luxury
items such as coffee, sugar, and imported manufactured goods. Such
shortsightedness infuriated Adams as much in the 1790s as it had in
1774, when he had accused Bostonians of truckling to British
commercial interests by continuing to consume imported tea. Adams
consistently viewed such actions as a selfish retreat into privacy, an
irresponsible refusal to recognize the public, political consequences of
individual decisions.
His disapproval of such myopia was
compounded by his belief that it was all too common. Adams
50. Id. at 178.
51. See Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic:
Political Economy in
Jeffersonian America 33 (1980).
52. Richard L. Bushman, The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities
193 (1992). Bushman focuses specifically on Adams's reaction to the spread of
genteel culture, describing Adams as an "outspoken" but ambivalent critic of
refinement and noting that both John and Abigail Adams enjoyed the cosmopolitan
delights of Parisian society when they lived there between 1783 and 1785. Id. at 197.
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therefore approached the problems of luxury and decadence much as
he had the problem of passion: He advocated designing institutional
structures that would compensate for the dangerous proclivities of
private citizens and encourage them to view private behavior as
intimately connected to the fate of the Republic.
This "paradigm of virtue and corruption," to use J.G.A. Pocock's
term, encouraged Adams and his contemporaries in their belief that
individual decadence-on the part of both leaders and citizens-could
spread into public life, thereby infecting the social and political fabric
of the nation. 3 In 1770, Adams confided to his diary his fears of social
decay and its effect on government:
In times of simplicity and innocence, ability and integrity will be the
principal recommendations to the public service, and the sole title to
those honors and emoluments which are in the power of the public
to bestow. But when elegance, luxury, and effeminacy begin to be
established, these rewards will begin to be distributed to vanity and
folly; but when a government becomes totally corrupted, the system
of God Almighty in the government of the world, and the rules of all
good government upon earth, will be reversed, and virtue, integrity,
and ability, will become the objects of the malice, hatred, and
revenge of the men in power, and folly, vice, and villany will be
cherished and supported.54
Adams's diary entry painted a bleak picture of a government
sapped of fortitude and a society bereft of character. As a young man
witnessing the first struggles for independence, he envisioned the
creep of corruption originating with the people and spreading to the
state, easily making the leap from private to public decadence.
Writing to his wife, Abigail, in 1776, Adams enumerated the elements
of a corrupt society-"Vanity, and Gaiety, a Love of Pomp and Dress,
Furniture, Equipage, Buildings, great Company, expensive
Diversions, and elegant Entertainments"-and could only conclude,
"[T]here is no knowing where they will stop, nor into what Evils,
natural, moral, or political, they will lead us. '5 5 These misgivings
about human nature, which Adams considered simple realism,
6
remained with him throughout his life.
53. J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought,
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century 48 (1985).
54. John Adams, Diary: With Passages from an Autobiography (Aug. 22, 1770),
in 2 The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With a Life
of the Author 250-51 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850).
55. Bushman, supra note 19, at 199 (quoting Adams).
Shortly after his
inauguration as president in 1797, Adams himself felt compelled to resist the allure of
European-style equipage when he learned that Abigail, who was at home in Quincy,
Massachusetts, had had the family coat of arms painted on her carriage. He
immediately asked her to have the device painted out, commenting, "They shall have
a republican President in earnest." McCullough, supra note 13, at 468.
56. On this point, I disagree with the conclusion of several historians who posit a
dramatic shift in Adams's attitude toward the morality of the American people
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Yet Adams's unflattering characterization of the American
character should not be taken as evidence of thoroughgoing

pessimism about the fate of the Republic. On the contrary, as a young
man and in his latter years, Adams believed that the institutional
structure of government could provide a mechanism for harnessing
passion and putting it to work in the service of the public. In keeping
with the Federalist shift away from the classical politics of virtue,
Adams "believed that a virtuous citizenry could be generated by
channeling the passions through a well-balanced constitution. 5 7 Once
again, Adams looked hopefully toward public, institutional solutions

to private, individual problems. As he wrote to Mercy Otis Warren in
1776 and reiterated a decade later in A Defence of the Constitutions,
"the Form of Government... gives the decisive Colour to the

Manners of the People, more than any other Thing."58 The problem,
therefore, was "to find a form of government best calculated to

prevent the bad effects and corruption of luxury, when, in the
ordinary course of things, it must be expected to come in." 59
Notwithstanding the ostensibly tonic effects of the Constitution on
republican morality, Adams constantly worried that the success of the

American endeavor might condemn the young nation to treading the
same gilded path as its debauched elder sisters in Europe. Just as he

feared that underestimating the destructive capacity of private passion
might doom the United States to French-style anarchy, Adams
warned his contemporaries that giving in to fashion and greed might
lead to the "luxury, effeminacy, and venality" that had "arrived at
such a shocking pitch in England."6 Adams thus explicitly connected
the moral corruption of private individuals with the decay of public
virtue. "I fear that human nature will be found to be the same in

America as it has been in Europe, and that the true principles of
between the 1770s and the 1790s. Notable among this group is John R. Howe, Jr. See
John R. Howe, Jr., The Changing Political Thought of John Adams (1966).
57. Thompson, supra note 14, at 199.
58. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren (Jan. 8, 1776), in 3 The Papers
of John Adams 397-98 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1979).
59. Adams, supra note 27, at 94.
60. John Adams, Novanglus, No. II, in 4 The Works of John Adams, Second
President of the United States: With a Life of the Author 28 (Charles Francis Adams
ed., reprint 1969) (1850). A gloomy Adams reiterated this point in a letter to
Jefferson written in 1787, when war with France seemed imminent:
The War that is now breaking out will render our Country, whether she is
forced into it, or not, rich, great and powerful in comparison of what she now
is, and Riches Grandeur and Power will have the same effect upon
American as it has upon European minds. We have seen enough already to
be sure of this. A Covent Garden Rake will never be wise enough to take
warning from the Claps caught by his Companions. When he comes to be
poxed himself he may possibly repent and reform.
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 9, 1787), in 1 The AdamsJefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and
Abigail and John Adams 203 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
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liberty will not be sufficiently attended to," he wrote in 1776.61
Retreat to the secluded confines of fine carriages and fashionable
drawing rooms would constitute abandonment of the republican
project. Worse, a mass surrender to luxury would drain the public
realm of its lifeblood, replacing vigorous, civic morality with lax,
selfish indulgence. Even the most carefully crafted system of balanced
government might not be able to compensate for such a vacuum of
private integrity. With this fear in mind, Adams in Davila exhorted
his fellow citizens to marshal their republican mettle in the face of
mounting aggression abroad and party conflict at home:
Americans! ....Instead of following any foreign example, to return
to the legislation of confusion, contemplate the means of restoring
decency, honesty, and order in society by preserving and completing,
if anything should be found necessary to complete, the balance of
your government.
In a well-balanced government, reason,
conscience, truth, and virtue must be respected by all parties, and
exerted for the public good.62
Corruption on an individual level led directly to confusion and
disorder in the public realm. The most feasible solution was to bolster
the institutions of government and hope that they could contain the
soporific effects of luxury.
V. PUBLIC LIFE

Despite Adams's preoccupation with the consequences of human
weakness, at no point did he completely despair of the potential of the
American people to shake off their torpor of vice, passions, and
luxury and to throw themselves into the project of self-government.
His distrust of the private side of life did not lead him to endorse the
kind of invasive, totalitarian state that modern observers typically
associate with societies that do not recognize a right to individual
privacy. On the contrary, Adams believed that people must act as
engaged citizens first, and individuals only secondarily, to avoid
political enslavement and achieve liberation. For Adams, unlike for
his post-Griswold descendants, privacy was not a right that an
individual claimed against the state but a condition that prevented
citizens from engaging in self-government. Arguments for privacy,
therefore, sounded to Adams and his contemporaries suspiciously
close to calls for citizens to withdraw from the realm of government
and society and to bury themselves in the pursuits of reputation,
wealth, and comfort. Such a scenario characterized the tyrannical
61. Letter from John Adams to Joseph Hawley (Aug. 25, 1776), in The Political
Writings of John Adams 654 (George W. Carey ed., 2000).
62. John Adams, Discourses on Davila (1790-91), reprinted in The Political
Writings of John Adams: Representative Selections 191 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed.,
1954).
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governments of the Old World, where palace intrigues and court
machinations unfolded far from the lives of everyday subjects. In
these societies, a vast gulf separated the private lives of individuals
from the realm of public authority. Adams, however, insisted that
republican government required an enlightened citizenry that would
emerge from the private realm of home and work to monitor,
question, and inform the work of government in a kind of
Habermasian "public sphere in the political realm."63 Thus, Adams
trusted the private individual only when he or she was willing to enter
the public zone.
On a practical level, then, Adams subscribed to the belief that "selfimmersion" in the comforts of life would inevitably endanger
republican
government by distracting citizens
from civic
responsibility. 64 As he wrote to Mercy Otis Warren in 1776, the new
republic would require "a positive Passion for the public good, the
public Interest, Honour, Power and Glory, established in the Minds of
the People." This public passion therefore had to be "Superiour to all
private Passions." In short, Adams wrote, "[A]ll Things must give
Way to the public."'65 Specifically, he argued that citizens must
constantly scrutinize the affairs of government, putting aside their
private pursuits in order to shine a cleansing light on the public realm.
Passive acquiescence in the decisions of government did not befit
citizens of a republic, Adams believed. At no time was he more proud
of his fellow citizens than when they first came together to resist the
Stamp Act. "The year 1765 has been the most remarkable year of my
life," he confided to his diary.
The people, even to the lowest ranks, have become more attentive
to their liberties, more inquisitive about them, and more determined
to defend them, than they were ever before known or had occasion
to be.... Our presses have groaned, our pulpits have thundered, our
legislatures have resolved, our towns have voted; the crown officers
have everywhere trembled, and all their little tools and creatures
been afraid to speak and ashamed to be seen.66
Nevertheless, Adams ruefully concluded that determination alone
63. Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society 30 (Thomas Burger & Frederick
Lawrence trans., MIT Press 2000) (1990). For a discussion of the role of the
"bourgeois public sphere" in the context of early Republican print culture, see
Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in
Eighteenth-Century America (1990).
64. Lance Banning, Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of
Revolutionary Thinking, in Conceptual Change and the Constitution 194, 200
(Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988).
65. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren (Apr. 16, 1776), quoted in
Howe, supra note 56, at 31-32.
66. John Adams, Diary: With Passages from an Autobiography (Dec. 18, 1765),
in 2 The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With a Life
of the Author 154 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850).
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would not ensure liberty. "This spirit, however, has not yet been
sufficient to banish from persons in authority that timidity which they
have discovered from the beginning. 6 7 Also necessary was
thoroughgoing vigilance on the part of citizens, such that their rights
could not be threatened in the first place. In short, private life would
have to be subordinated to public life in order to draw citizens into the
political realm and keep them there. "[T]he spirit of liberty is and
ought to be a jealous, a watchful spirit," Adams wrote in the guise of
Governor Winthrop. "Obsta Principiis [resist the first beginnings] is
her motto and maxim; knowing that her enemies are secret and
cunning, making the earliest advances slowly, silently, and softly."68
This jealous watchfulness would prove salutary to citizens as well as
the state; moreover, it would bring private passions to bear on the
public realm of government. Convinced that "citizens neither could
nor should act selflessly," Adams and his fellow Revolutionaries put
selfishness to work by asking citizens to enter the political fray and
defend their liberties against government encroachment.69
Indeed, even the famous writs of assistance case of 1761, in which
James Otis argued that the general search warrants issued to customs
officers violated the natural rights of Englishmen and were therefore
void, can be viewed not simply as a precursor to the Fourth
Amendment search-and-seizure rules but also as a statement of a
particularly eighteenth-century vision of privacy.
Adams's
autobiography suggests that he viewed the controversy as a dispute
about the rights of the citizenry to live unmolested by the long arm of
the British Crown rather than the rights of a single citizen to be free
from the inquiries of customs surveyor general Thomas Lechmere:
England proud of its power and holding Us in Contempt would
never give up its pretentions. The Americans devoutly attached to
their Liberties, would never submit, at least without an entire

devastation
of the Country, and a general destruction of their
71
Lives.

Years later, Adams struck a similarly grand note in describing the
scene in the Council Chamber of Boston's Town House: "Every Man
of a crowded Audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to
take Arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there was the first
scene of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great
67. Id. at 154-55.
68. John Adams, Governor Winthrop to Governor Bradford (1767), reprinted in 1
Papers of John Adams 200 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1979) (emphasis added).
69. See Banning, supra note 64, at 199.
70. See generally William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not
His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37
Win. & Mary Q. 371 (1980) (discussing the writs of assistance case).
71. John Adams: A Biography in His Own Words 53 (James Bishop Peabody ed.,
1973) (quoting Adams).
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Britain. 7 2 Notwithstanding the likelihood that Adams indulged in a
few ex post rhetorical embellishments, the tenor of the comments
suggests that Adams viewed the writs of assistance case as involving a
kind of common, public privacy-the shielding of the citizenry from a
particular overweening government, not the defense of individuals
from intrusions in general. Adams's celebration of the case thus
comported with his overarching belief that citizens ought to be
encouraged to enter the public sphere and protected when they did so.
For Adams and many of his contemporaries, then, the public realm
determined the nature, content, and extent of the private realm.7 3
Adams's statement to Warren that "all Things must give Way to the
Public" suggested that he espoused what Quentin Skinner has called
the essence of the neo-roman theory of the state: namely, "that it is
only possible to be free in a free state."74 In other words, the
conditions of individuals' private lives stemmed directly from the
condition of their government.
Still more abstractly, Adams's
statement suggests a fully developed vision of differentiated public
and private spheres, and a consequent quest to submerge private
desires and passions in the larger project of building the Republic.
This point is both historical and historiographical, for it relates to
what one scholar terms the "convergence of public sphere theory and
the history of private life." 75 That is, there exist many theories of the
public sphere and perhaps still more histories of private life. Yet very
few historians have proposed theories of the private sphere, despite
the obsession of post-Griswoldjurisprudence and political theory with
individual privacy. Has the twentieth-century valorization of privacy
in the form of personal autonomy prevented historians from
examining the intellectual history of the concept? Quite possibly. As
Adams's writings demonstrate, however, many eighteenth-century
Americans thought extensively about privacy, believed that it existed,
72. Id. at 55 (quoting Adams). For a complete account of the trial and Adams's
involvement, see 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 106-47 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965).
73. This is the most profound point of disagreement between the Adams view and
the Brandeis-Warren view. Brandeis and Warren based their newly discovered right
to privacy on a vision of individual autonomy, which they saw as the basis of an
enlightened civilization: "[T]he protection of society must come mainly through a
recognition of the rights of the individual. Each man is responsible for his own acts
and omissions only." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219-20. At least one legal
scholar has pointed out that Brandeis and Warren's purported common law right to
privacy, which they claimed had evolved in Anglo-American law, was "not... a
picture of the law as it was, but of the law as they believed (or hoped) it should be."
Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1335, 1347-48.
74. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism 60 (1998).
Skinner's "neoroman" theory is essentially analogous to the republican or civic humanist tradition.
75. Dena Goodman, Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of
Current HistoriographicalApproaches to the Old Regime, 31 Hist. & Theory 1, 12
(1992). Goodman's primary focus is the Old Regime in France, but her analysis is
equally applicable to the early American republic.
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but ultimately concluded that it was slippery stuff not to be trusted
except in controlled conditions.
VI. CONCLUSION

The concept of privacy has not been altogether absent from the
historiography of the early Republic. A few scholars agree that the
founders took a dim view of privacy. According to Gordon Wood, the
Federalists charged the Articles of Confederation with permitting
greed and speculation to run rampant, leading to large-scale social and
political disintegration: "The wholesale pursuits of private interest
and private luxury were, they thought, undermining America's
capacity for republican government. They designed the Constitution
in order to save American republicanism from the deadly effects of
these private pursuits of happiness."76 Grant Mindle, meanwhile, has
argued that the founders disparaged privacy, exiling it to the realm of
passion and
offering it limited protection under the rubric of
"property."77 Insofar as they suggest that the founders did not
embrace the concept of privacy, both historians paint a picture of the
founding generation that is decidedly at odds with the Griswold story
of the-right-that-was-there-all-along, a story that Adams's writings
also call into question. Yet Wood's instrumental, causation-focused
argument suggests that the founders' true motivation was a fear of
popular politics more than of privacy per se, and Mindle's insistence
on contrasting the founders with the Brandeis-Warren and twentiethcentury visions of privacy possesses overtones of the asymptotic
search for original intent. Moreover, Wood attributes the founders'
privacy anxiety solely to the events of the Confederation years. As
Adams's writings demonstrate, however, the origins of the founders'
preoccupation with the evils of privacy ran far deeper than either of
these accounts suggests. Indeed, only a broader, more cultural
reading of the role of privacy truly captures the extent to which the
concept influenced the attitudes of the founding generationespecially Adams-concerning several of the most significant issues of
contemporary political theory: virtue, passion, decay, and public life.
To leaf through Adams's abundant writings is to be struck by the
number of pages devoted to plumbing the depths of both friends and
strangers' motivations, desires, and disappointments. Throughout his
life, Adams paid close attention to human nature on a large scale,
bringing his vast knowledge of law and history to bear on his equally
76. Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the
Constitution, in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American
National Identity 69, 81 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987). Michael Sandel cites
Wood to support his claim that the United States has become a "procedural republic"
and is therefore unable to address deep moral questions. Michael J. Sandel,
Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 108, 129 (1996).
77. Mindle, supra note 43, at 583.
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vast experience in the world of people. A few points seemed clear to
him: (1) all people felt the impulse toward vice, passion, and comfort;
(2) left to themselves, the majority of people would follow those

impulses; and (3) the work of government was to harness these
impulses and put them to productive use, subordinating personal

drives and selfish motives to an overarching institutional system.7 8
Indeed, no founder understood the need to suppress personal desires
more fully than the second President of the United States, who

constantly upbraided himself for his own character flaws and mistakes
of judgment.79 To a modern reader, Adams's deep suspicion of the
private realm underpins his anxious comments on virtue, passion,
decay, and public life. Moreover, the very words "private" and
"public" formed a kind of refrain in his writings, suggesting that the

author himself may have been conscious that his views stemmed from
an overarching suspicion of privacy.
Yet the suspicion of privacy that Adams had so forthrightly

articulated during his lifetime, and that many of his contemporaries
appeared to share, somehow vanished from the landscape after his

death. Rather than hailing Adams as one architect of a system that
put private desires to work in the service of the common weal, many
Americans of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries awarded this
distinction solely to Madison, associating Adams with old regimes of
monarchy and aristocracy based on a misreading of his Defence of
Constitutions and Discourses on Davila.° Moreover, they forgot his
warnings against vice, passion, and decay as well as the distrust of
privacy that lay beneath those warnings. As Joseph Ellis has argued,
Adams's views simply did not comport with the liberal vision that

came to dominate nineteenth- and twentieth-century America, for
Adams
represents a cluster of political principles that do not fit comfortably
within the framework of our national political mythology.
Memorials will only be erected to him, according to this train of
78. In a related vein, Joanne Freeman has argued that honor politics, especially
dueling and other reputation-based practices, formed "a regulated force of
government, the ultimate check in an intricate system of checks and balances."
Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic xix
(2001).
79. Adams's diary seems to have provided the chief receptacle for this stream of
self-criticism. "Vanity I am sensible, is my cardinal Vice and cardinal Folly," read one
chastisement, "and I am in continual Danger, when in Company, of being led an ignis
fatuus Chase by it, without the strictest caution and watchfulness over my self." Ellis,
supra note 13, at 49-50 (quoting Adams).
80. Gordon Wood and Joyce Appleby have each argued that Adams was-and
was seen as-increasingly out of touch with the liberalization of America after the
1790s. One chapter in Wood's Creation of the American Republic bears the title "The
Relevance and Irrelevance of John Adams." Wood, supra note 24, at 567-92; see also
Joyce Appleby, The New Republican Synthesis and the Changing Political Ideas of
John Adams, 25 Am. Q. 578,579-80 (1973).
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thought, when the rhetoric of Jeffersonian liberalism ceases to
dominate mainstream American culture; when the exaltation of "the
people" is replaced by a quasi-sacred devotion to "the public". ... 81
Just as Adams had feared throughout his life, his longtime rival and
friend Jefferson-whose soul Adams had once described as "poisoned
82
with ambition"-outstripped him in the race to claim posterity.
Most startling, however, has been the power of the liberal,
Jeffersonian vision to blot out any memory of the second president's
lifetime contemplation and suspicion of privacy. As Griswold and the
progeny of that fecund case have demonstrated, the private realm, not
the public one, captured the imaginations of twentieth-century
American political and legal theorists, culminating in the addition of
the right to privacy to Jefferson's list of self-evident truths. Although
privacy has certainly established itself in modern America, Adams's
writings remind us that events might have turned out differently. In
contrast to Griswold's view of privacy as a frail flower needing
constant protection from the destructive force of the state, Adams saw
privacy as pervasive and omnipresent, and private interests as
tenacious weeds that managed to work their way into every crevice of
human interaction. To the public, with its duties, not to individuals,
with their privileges: this was Adams's deepest allegiance. Adams
found worrisome signs of privacy-such as vice, passion, and decayat every turn, but he remained confident throughout his life that its
harmful effects could be contained by a vigorous public realm.

81. Ellis, supra note 13, at 232.
82. McCullough, supra note 13, at 448 (quoting Adams).

